THE
IN ISLAM
DR. T. J. DE BOER
Translated by
EDWARD R. JONES, B.D.
© ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
ONLINE, INC.
NEW YORK
TRANSLATOR'S PREFATORY NOTE.
This edition of Dr. De Boar's recent work is produced in the
hope that it may prove interesting to not a few English readers, and especially
that it may be of service to younger students commencing to study the subject
which is dealt with in the following pages. The translator has aimed at nothing
more than a faithful reproduction of the original. His best thanks are due to
the accomplished author, for his kindness in revising the proof sheets of the
version, as it passed through the Press.
E. R.
J.
PREFACE.
The
following is the first attempt which has been made, since the appearance of
Munk's excellent sketch[1], to
present in connected form a History of Philosophy in Islam. This work of mine
may therefore be regarded as a fresh initiation, -.not a
completion of such a task. I could not know of all that had been done by
others, in the way of preliminary study in this field ; and when I did know of
the existence of such material, it was not always accessible to me. As for
manuscript assistance, it was only in exceptional cases that this was at my
disposal.
Conforming
to the conditions which I bad to meet, I have in the following account
refrained from stating my authorities. But anything which I may have taken
over, nearly word for word or without testing it, I have marked in
foot-references. For the rest, I deeply regret that I cannot duly indicate at
present how much I owe, as regards appreciation of the sources, to men like
Dieterici, de Goeje, Goldziher, Houtsma, Aug. Müller, Munk, N?ldeke, Renan,
Snouck Hurgronje, van Vloten, and many, many others.
Since
the completion of this volume an interesting monograph on Ibn Sina[2] has
appeared, which farther extends its survey over the earlier history of
Philosophy in Islam. It gives rise to no occasion, however, to alter
substantially my conception of the subject.
For all
bibliographical details I refer the reader to "die Orientalische
Bibliographie", Brockelmann's "Geschichte der Arabischen
Litteratur", and Ueberweg-Heinze's "Grundriss der Geschichte der
Philosophie" II', p. 213 sqq. In the
transcription of Arabic names I have been more heedful of tradition and German
pronunciation, than of consistency. Be it noted only that z is to be pronounced
as a soft s, and th like the corresponding English sound.[3] In the
Index of Personal Names, accents signify length.
As far
as possible I have confined myself to Islam. On that ground Ibn Gebirol and
Maimonides have received only a passing notice, while other Jewish thinkers
have been entirely omitted, although, philosophically considered, they belong
to the Muslim school. This, however, entails no great loss, for much has been
written already about the Jewish philosophers, whereas Muslim thinkers have
hitherto been sadly neglected.
Groningen (Netherlands).
T. J. DE BOER.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Page
1. The
Theatre 1-6
4.
Ancient Arabia ........ 1
2. The
first Caliphs. Medina. The Shiites ......... 2
3. The
Omayyads. Damascus, Basra and Kufa 3
4. The
Abbasids. Bagdad........ 3
5.
Minor States. Fall of the Caliphate .... 5
2.
Oriental Wisdom 6-11
4.
Semitic Speculation . 6
2.
Persian Religion. Zrwanism .. 8
3.
Indian Wisdom .... 8
3. Greek
Science 11-30
1. The
Syrians ...... 11
2. The
Christian Churches .. 11
3.
Edessa and Nisibis ...... 12
4.
Harran ..... 13
5.
Gondeshapur ..... 14
6.
Syriac Translations ..... 14
7.
Philosophy among the Syrians ..... 16
8.
Arabic Translations ..... 17
9. The
Philosophy of the Translators 19
10.
Range of Tradition .... 21
11.
Continuation of Neo-Platonism ... 22
12. The
"Book of the Apple" ............. 24
13. The
"Theology of Aristotle" ............. 25
14.
Conception of Aristotle............ 27
15. Philosophy in Islam ............ 28
CHAPTER II. PHILOSOPHY AND ARAB
KNOWLEDGE
1.
Grammatical Science .. 31-35
1. The
several Sciences ........ 31
2. The
Arabic Language. The Koran 31
3. The
Grammarians of Basra and Kufa ........ 32
4.
Grammar influenced by Logic. Metrical Studies........ 33
5.
Grammatical Science and Philosophy .... 35
2. Ethical Teaching ..... 36-41
1.
Tradition and Individual Opinion (Sunna, Hadith, Ra'y) ……………………. 36
2.
Analogy (Qiyas). Consensus of the Congregation (Idjma) ……………………37
3.
Position and Contents of the Muslim Ethical System (al-Filth) ………………..38
4.
Ethics and Politics ........ 40
3. Doctrinal
Systems . 41-64
1.
Christian Dogmatic ...... 41
2. The
Kalam ........ 42
3. The
Mutazilites and their Opponents ..... 43
4.
Human and Divine Action ........ 44
5. The
Being of God 46
6.
Revelation and Reason ........ 48
7.
Abu-l-Hudhail ........ 49
8.
Nazism ........ 51
9.
Djahiz ........ 53
10.
Muammar and Abu Hashim ................ 54
11.
Ashari ................ 55
12. The
Atomistic Kalam ............... 57
13.
Mysticism or Sufism................ 62
4.
Literature and History ......... 65-61
1.
Literature ...... 65
2.
Abu-l-Atahia. Mutanabbi. Abu-l-Ala. Hariri 65
3.
Annalistic. Historical Tradition ........ 67
4.
Masudi and Muqaddasi ... 69
CHAPTER III. THE
PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY
1.
Natural Philosophy 72-80
1. The
Sources ........ 72
2.
Mathematical Studies ........ 73
3.
Natural Science ........ 75
4.
Medicine ........ 76
5. Razi
........ 77
6. The Dahrites ........ 80
2. The
Faithful Brethren of Basra . 81-96
1. The
Karmatites ....... 81
2. The
Brethren and their Encyclopaedia . 82
3.
Eclecticism ...... 84
4.
Knowledge ....... 85
5.
Mathematics ..... 87
6.
Logic .......... 89
7. God
and the World 90
8. The
Human Soul... 92
9.
Philosophy of Religion .......... 93
10.
Ethics .......... 94
11.
Influence of the Encyclopaedia . 95
CHAPTER IV. THE NEO-PLATONIC
ARISTOTELIANS OF THE EAST
1. Kindi
95-106
1. His
Life .. 97
2.
Relation to Theology ......... 99
3.
Mathematics 100
4. God;
World; Soul 101
5.
Doctrine of the Spirit (`aql) 402
6.
Kindi as an Aristotelian .. 104
7. The
School of Kindi ....... 105
2.
Farabi ..... 106-128
1. The
Logicians ...... 106
2.
Farabi s Life ...... 107
3.
Relation to Plato and Aristotle ...... 108
4.
Farabi's Conception of Philosophy .. 110
5. His
Logic ...... 111
6. His
Metaphysics. Being. God 114
7. The
Celestial World ...... 115
8. The
Terrestrial World ...... 117
9. The
Human Soul 118
10. The
Spirit in Man .............. 419
11.
Farabi's Ethics .............. 121
12. His
Politics .............. 122
13. The
Future Life .............. 123
14.
General Survey of Farabi's System .............. 124
15.
Effects of his Philosophy. Sidjistani .............. 126
3. Ibn
Maskawaih ..... 128-131
1. His
Position ...... 128
2. The
Nature of the Soul 128
3. The Principles of his Ethics
...... 129
4. Ibn
Sins (Avicenna) ... 131-148
1. His
Life .... 131
2. His
Work .... 132
3.
Branches of Philosophy. Logic .... 134
4.
Metaphysics and Physics .... 135
5.
Anthropology and Psychology 139
6. The
Reason... 141
7.
Allegorical Representation of the
Doctrine of the Reason .... 143
8.
Esoteric Teaching 144
9. Ibn
Sina's Time. Beruni .... 145
10.
Behmenyar ........... 146
11.
Survival of Ibn Sina's Influence........... 147
5. Ibn
al-Haitham (Alhazen) ... 148-153
1.
Scientific Movement turning Westward 148
2. Ibn
al-Haitham's Life and Works .... 149
3.
Perception and Judgment 150
4.
Slender effect left by his Teaching 152
CHAPTER V. THE
OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE EAST
1.
Gazali ... 154-168
1.
Dialectic and Mysticism 154
2.
Gazali's Life ..... 155
3.
Attitude towards his Time:
Hostility
to Aristotelianism . 158
4. The
World as the Production of God's
Free Creative Might..... 159
5. God
and Divine Providence 162
6.
Doctrine of the Resurrection .... 163
7.
Gazali's Theology 164
8.
Experience and Revelation 166
9.
Estimate of Gazali's Position and Teaching 168
2. The
Epitomists ..... .... 169-171
1.
Position of Philosophy in the East,
after Gazali's Time... 169
2.
Philosophical Culture ... 170
CHAPTER VI.
PHILOSOPHY IN THE WEST
1.
Beginnings .. 172-175
1. The
Age of the Omayyads ... 172
2. The Eleventh Century . 174
2. Ibn
Baddja (Avempace) ..... 175-181
1. The
Almoravids .. 175
2. Ibn
Baddja's Life 176
3. The
Character of his Works ...... 177
4. His
Logic and Metaphysics 177
5. His
Opinions regarding Soul and Spirit ...... 178
6. The
Individual Man ...... 179
3. Ibn
Tofail (Abubacer) ..... 181-187
1. The
Almohads .... 181
2. Ibn
Tofail's Life 182
3.
"Hai ibn Yaqzan.. . .... 182
4.
"Hai" and the Development of Humanity .... 184
5.
"Hai's" Ethics ...... 185
4. Ibn
Roshd (Averroes) ..... 187-199
1. His
Life 187
2. Ibn
Roshd and Aristotle ...... 188
3.
Logic. Attainability of Truth ...... 189
4. The
World and God ...... 191
5. Body
and Spirit ...... 193
6.
Spirit and Spirits ...... 194
7.
Estimate of Ibn Roshd as a Thinker ..... 196
8.
Summary of his Views on the Relations of Theology, Religion
and Philosophy to one another.
Practical Philosophy . . 197
1. Ibn
Khaldun .... 200-208
1. The
Conditions of his Time ..... 200
2. Ibn
Khaldun's Life ..... 201
3.
Philosophy and Worldly Experience 202
4.
Philosophy of History. Historical Method ..... 204
5. The
Subject of History ..... 205
6.
Characterization ...... 206
2. The
Arabs and Scholasticism 208-213
1.
Political Situation. The Jews ..... 208
2.
Palermo and Toledo..... 209
3. Parisian Averroism in the
Thirteenth Century ..... 211
I. INTRODUCTION.
1. THE THEATRE.
1. In olden time the Arabian desert was, as it is at this day, the
roaming-ground of independent Bedouin tribes. With free and healthy minds they
contemplated their monotonous world, whose highest charm was the raid, and
whose intellectual treasure was the tribal tradition. Neither the achievements
of social labour, nor the accomplishments of elegant leisure were known to
them. Only on the borders of the desert, in regularly constituted communities,
which often had to suffer from the incursions of those Bedouins, a higher
degree of civilization had been attained. This was the case in the South, where
the ancient kingdom of the Queen of Sheba continued its existence in Christian
times under Abyssinian or Persian overlordship. On the West lay Mecca and
Medina (Yathrib), by an old caravan route; and Mecca in particular, with its
market safe-guarded by a temple, was the centre of a brisk traffic. Lastly on
the North, two semi-sovereign States had been formed under Arab princes:
towards Persia, the kingdom of the Lakhmids in Hira; and towards Byzantium the
dominion of the Gassanids in Syria. In speech and poetry, however, the unity of
the Arab nation was set forth to some extent even before Mohammed's time. The
poets were the `men of knowledge' for their people. Their incantations held
good as oracles, first of all for their several tribes, but no doubt extending
their influence often beyond their own particular sects.
2.
Mohammed and his immediate successors, Abu Bekr, Omar, Othman and Ali (622-661)
succeeded in inspiring the free sons of the desert, together with the more civilized
inhabitants of the coast-lands, with enthusiasm for a joint enterprise. To this
circumstance Islam owes its world position: for Allah showed himself great,
and the world was quite small for those who surrendered themselves to him
(Muslims). In a short time the whole of Persia was conquered, and the
East-Roman empire lost its fairest provinces, - Syria and Egypt.
Medina
was the seat of the first Caliphs or representatives of the prophet. Then
Mohammed's brave son-in-law Ali, and Ali's sons, fell before Moawiya, the able
governor of Syria. From that time dates the existence of the party of Ali
(Shi`ites), which in the course of diverse vicissitudes, - now reduced to
subjection, now in detached places attaining power, - lives on in history,
until it finally incorporates itself with the Persian kingdom in definite opposition
to Sunnite Islam.
In their struggle against the secular power the Shiites availed
themselves of every possible weapon, - even of science. Very early there
appears among them the sect of the Kaisanites, which ascribes to Ali and his
heirs a superhuman secret lore, by the help of which the inner meaning of the
Divine revelation first becomes clear, but which demands from its devotees not
less faith in, and absolute obedience to, the possessor of such knowledge, than
does the letter of the Koran. (Cf. III, 2 4 1).
3.
After the victory of Moawiya, who made Damascus the capital of the Muslim
empire, the importance of Medina lay mainly in the spiritual province. It had
to content itself with fostering, partly under Jewish and Christian influences,
a knowledge of the law and Tradition. In Damascus, on the other hand, the
Omayyads (661-750) conducted the secular government. Under their rule the
empire spread from the Atlantic to districts beyond the frontiers of India and
Turkestan, and from the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus and the very walls of
Constantinople. With this development, however, it bad reached its farthest
extension.
Arabs
now assumed everywhere the leading position. They formed a military
aristocracy; and the most striking proof of their influence is the fact, that
conquered nations with an old and superior civilization accepted the language
of their conquerors. Arabic became the language of Church and State, of Poetry
and Science. But while the higher offices in the State and the Army were administered
by Arabs in preference, the care of the Arts and Sciences fell, first of all,
to Non-Arabs and men of mixed blood. In Syria school-instruction was received
from Christians. The chief seats of intellectual culture, however, were Basra
and Kufa, in which Arabs and Persians, Muslims, Christians, Jews and Magians
rubbed shoulders together. There, where trade and industry were thriving, the
beginnings of secular science in Islam must be sought for, - beginnings themselves
due to Hellenistic-Christian and Persian influences.
4. The Omayyads were succeeded by the Abbasids (750-1258). To obtain the sovereignty,
the latter had granted concessions to the Persians, and had utilized
religio-political movements. During the first century of their rule (i. e. up to
about 860), though only during that period, the greatness of the empire
continued to increase, or at least it held its own. In the year 762, Mansur,
the second ruler of this house, founded Bagdad as the new capital, - a city
which soon outshone Damascus in worldly splendour, and Basra and Kufa in
intellectual illumination. Constantinople alone could be compared to it. Poets
and scholars, particularly from the North-Eastern provinces, met together in
Bagdad at the court of Mansur (754-775), of Harun (786-809), of Mamun
(813-838), and others. Several of the Abbasids had a liking for secular
culture, whether for its own sake or to adorn their court, and although they
may often have failed to recognize the value of artists and learned men, these
at any rate could appreciate the material benefits conferred upon them by
their patrons.
From
the time of Harun at least, there existed in Bagdad a library and a learned
institute. Even under Mansur, but especially under Mamun and his successors,
translation of the scientific literature of the Greeks into the Arabic tongue
went forward, largely through the agency of Syrians; and Abstracts and
Commentaries bearing upon these works were also composed.
Just
when this learned activity was at its highest, the glory of the empire began to
decline. The old tribal feuds, which had never been at rest under the Omayyads,
bad seemingly given place to a firmly-knit political unity; but other
controversies, - theological and metaphysical wranglings, such as in like
manner accompanied the decay of the East-Roman empire, - were prosecuted with
everincreasing bitterness. The service of the State, under an Eastern
despotism, did not require men of brilliant parts. Promising abilities
accordingly were often ruined in luxurious indulgence, or flung away upon
sophistry and the show of learning. On the other hand, for the defence of the
empire the Caliphs enlisted the sound and healthy vigour of nations who had not
been so much softened by over civilization, - first the Iranian or Iranianized
people of Khorasan, and then the Turks.
5. The
decline of the empire became more and more evident. The power of the Turkish
soldiery, uprisings of city mobs and of peasant labourers, Shi'ite and
Ismaelite intrigues on all sides, and in addition the desire for independence
shown by the distant provinces, - were either the causes or the symptoms of the
downfall. Alongside of the Caliphs, who were reduced to the position of
spiritual dignitaries, the Turks ruled as Mayors of the Palace; and all round,
in the outlying regions of the empire, independent States were gradually
formed, until an utterly astounding body of minor States appeared. The most
influential ruling houses, more or less independent, were the following: in
the West, to say nothing of the Spanish Omayyads (cf. VI, 1), the Aglabids of
North Africa, the Tulunids and Fatimids of Egypt, and the Hamdanids of Syria
and Mesopotamia; in the East, The Tahirids and Samanids, who were by slow
degrees supplanted by the Turks. It is at the courts of these petty dynasties
that the poets and scholars of the next period (the 10th and 11th centuries)
are to be found. For a short time Haleb (Aleppo), the seat of the Hamdanids,
and for a longer time Cairo, built by the Fatimids in the year 969, -
have a better claim to be regarded as the home of intellectual endeavour than
Bagdad itself. For another brief space lustre is shed on the East by the court
of the Turk, Mahmud of Ghazna, who had become master of Khorasan in the year
999.
The
founding of the Muslim Universities also falls within this period of petty
States and Turkish administration. The first one was erected in Bagdad in the
year 1065; and from that date the East has been in possession of Science, but
only in the form of stereotyped republications. The teacher conveys the
teaching which has been handed down to him by his teachers; and in any new book
hardly a sentence will be found which does not appear in older books. Science
was rescued from danger; but the learned men of Transoxiana, who, upon hearing
of the establishment of the first Madrasah, appointed a solemn memorial
service, as tradition tells, to be held in honour of departed science, have
been shewn to be correct in their estimate.[4]
Then, -
in the 13th century, - there came storming over the Eastern regions of Islam
the resounding invasion of the Mongols, who swept away whatever the Turks had
spared. No culture ever flourished there again, to develope from its own
resources a new Art or to stimulate a revival of Science.
2.
ORIENTAL WISDOM.
1. Prior to its contact with Hellenism, the Semitic mind had proceeded no
farther in the path of Philosophy than the propounding of enigmas, and the
utterance of aphoristic wisdom. Detached observations of Nature, but especially
of the life and fate of Man, form the basis of such thinking; and where
comprehension ceases, resignation to the almighty and inscrutable will of God
comes in without difficulty. We have become familiar with this kind of wisdom
from the Old Testament; and that it was developed in like manner among the
Arabs, is shewn to us by the Bible story of the Queen of Sheba, and by the
figure of the wise Loqman in the Arab tradition.
By the
side of this wisdom there was found everywhere the Magic of the sorcerer, - a
knowledge which was authenticated by command over outward things. But it was
only in the priestly circles of ancient Babylonia, - under what influences and
to what extent we do not precisely know, - that men rose to a more scientific
consideration of the world. Their eyes were turned from the confusion of
earthly existence to the order of the heavens. They were not like the Hebrews,
who never got beyond the wondering stage[5], or
who saw merely an emblem of their own posterity in the countless stars[6]; they
resembled rather the Greeks who came to understand the Many and the Manifold in
their sublunary forms, only after they had discovered the harmony of the All in
the unity and steadiness of the movement of the heavens. The only drawback was
that much mythological by-play and astrological pretence was interwoven with
what was good, as in fact was the case also in Hellenism. This Chaldaean
wisdom, from the time of Alexander the Great, became pervaded, in Babylonia and
Syria, with Hellenistic and later with Hellenistic-Christian ideas, or else was
supplanted by them.
In the
Syrian city of Harran only, up to the time of Islam, the old heathenism held
its ground, little affected by Christian influences. (Cf. 1, 3, § 4).
2. Of
more importance than any Semitic tradition, was the contribution made to Islam
by Persian and Indian wisdom. We do not need to enter here upon the question as
to whether Oriental wisdom was originally influenced by Greek philosophy, or
Greek philosophy by Oriental wisdom. What Islam carried away directly from Persians
and Indians may be learned with tolerable certainty from Arabic sources, and
to this we may confine ourselves.
Persia
is the land of Dualism, and it is not improbable that its dualistic religious
teaching exercised an influence upon theological controversy in Islam, either
directly or through the Manichaeans and other Gnostic sects. But much greater,
in worldly circles, was the influence wielded by that system which, according
to tradition, came to be even publicly recognized, under the Sasanid Yezdegerd
II (4389-457), viz. Zrwanism (Cf. III, 1, 4 6). In this system the
dualistic view of the world was superseded by setting up endless Time, (zrwan, Arab. dahr) as the paramount principle, and identifying it with Fate,
the outermost heavenly sphere or the movement of the heavens. This doctrine,
pleasing to philosophic intellects, has secured, with or without the guise of
Islam, a prominent place for itself in Persian literature and in the views of
the people, up to our own day. By theologians, however, and no less by
philosophers of the Idealistic schools, it was disavowed as Materialism,
Atheism and so forth.
3. India was regarded as the true land of
wisdom. In Arab writers we often come upon the view that there the birthplace
of philosophy is to be found. By peaceful trading, in which the agents between
India and the West were principally Persians, and next as a result of the
Muslim conquest, acquaintance with Indian wisdom spread far and wide. Much of
it was translated under Mansur (754-775) and Harun (786-809), partly by means
of the intervening step of Persian (Pahlawi) versions, and partly from the
Sanskrit direct. Many a deliverance of ethical and political wisdom, in the
dress of proverbs, was taken over from the fables and tales of India, such as the
Tales of the Pantshatantra, translated from the Pahlawi by Ibn al-Moqaffa in
Mansur's time, and others. It was, however, Indian Mathematics and Astrology, -
the latter in combination with practical Medicine and Magic, - that mainly
influenced the beginnings of secular wisdom in Islam. The Astrology of the
Siddhanta of Brahmagupta, which was translated from the Sanskrit, under Mansur,
by Fazari assisted by Indian scholars, was known even before Ptolemy's
Almagest. A wide world, past and future, was thereby opened up. The high
figures with which the Indians worked produced a powerful, perplexing
impression upon the sober Muslim annalists, just as, on the other hand, Arab
merchants, who in India and China put the age of our created world at a few
thousand years, exposed themselves to the utmost ridicule.
Nor did
the logical and metaphysical speculations of the Indians remain unknown to the
Muslims. These produced, however, much less effect on scientific development
than did their Mathematics and Astrology. The investigations of the Indians,
associated with their sacred books and wholly determined by a religious
purpose, have certainly had a lasting
influence upon Persian Sufism and Islamic Mysticism. But, - once for all, -
Philosophy is a Greek conception, and we have no right, in deference to the
taste of the day, to allot an undue amount of space in our description to the
childish thoughts of pious Hindus. What has been advanced by these meditative
penitents about the deceptive show of everything sensuous, may often possess a
poetic charm, just as it agrees perhaps with those observations on the
evanescence of all that is earthly, which the East had access to in
Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic sources; but it has contributed just as little
of importance as these did, towards the explanation of phenomena or the
awakening of the scientific spirit. Not the Indian imagination, but the Greek
mind was needed to direct the reflective process to the knowledge of the Real.
The beat example of this is furnished by Arabic Mathematics. In the opinion of
those who know the subject best, almost the only thing Indian in it is the
Arithmetic, while the Algebra and the Geometry are Greek, preponderatingly, if
not exclusively. Hardly a single Indian penetrated to the notion of pure
mathematics. Number, even in its highest form, remained always something
concrete; and in Indian Philosophy knowledge in the main continued to be only a
means. Deliverance from the evil of existence was the aim, and Philosophy a
pathway to the life of blessedness. Hence the monotony of this wisdom, -
concentrated, as it was, upon the essence of all things in its Oneness, - as contrasted with the many-branched science of the Hellenes,
which strove to comprehend the operations of Nature and Mind on all sides.
Oriental
wisdom, Astrology and Cosmology delivered over to Muslim thinkers material of many kinds, but the Form, -
the formative principle, - came to them from the Greeks. In every case where it
is not mere enumeration or chance concatenation that is taken in hand, but
where an attempt is made to arrange the Manifold according to positive or
logical points of view, we may conclude with all probability that Greek
influences have been at work.
3.
GREEK SCIENCE.
1. Just as the commercial intercourse between India and China and
Byzantium was conducted principally by the Persians, so in the remote West, as
far even as France, the Syrians came forward as the agents of civilization. It
was Syrians who brought wine, silk &c. to the West. But it was Syrians also
who took Greek culture from Alexandria and Antioch, spreading it eastward and
propagating it in the schools of Edessa and Nisibis, Harran and Gondeshapur.
Syria was the true neutral ground, where for centuries the two world-powers,
the Roman and the Persian, came in contact with one another, either as friends
or as foes. In such circumstances, the Christian Syrians played a part
similar to the one which in later days fell to the share of the Jews.
2. The Muslim conquerors found the Christian church split up into
three main divisions, - to say nothing of many sects. The Monophysite church,
alongside of the Orthodox State-church, preponderated in Syria proper, and the
Nestorian church in Persia. The difference between the doctrinal systems of
these churches was perhaps not without importance for the development of Muslim
Dogmatics. According to the teaching of the Monophysites, God and Man were
united in one nature
in Christ, whereas the Orthodox, and in a still more pronounced manner the
Nestorians, discriminated between a Divine nature and a human nature in him.
Now nature means, above everything, energy or operative principle. The
question, accordingly, which is at issue, is whether the Divine, and the human
Willing and Acting are one and the same in Christ or different. The
Monophysites, from speculative and religious motives, gave prominence to the
Unity in Christ their God, at the expense of the human element : The
Nestorians, on the other hand, emphasized, in contrast with the Divine element,
all that is specially characteristic of human Being, Willing and Acting. The
latter view, however, favoured by political circumstances and. conditions of
culture, offers freer play to philosophical speculations on the world and on
life. In point of fact the Nestorians did most for the cultivation of Greek
Science.
Syriac
was the language both of the Western and of the Eastern or Persian Church ; but
Greek was also taught along with it in the Cloister Schools. Rasain and
Kinnesrin must be mentioned as being centres of culture in the Western or
Monophysite Church. Of more importance, at the outset at least, was the school
of Edessa, inasmuch as the dialect of Edessa had risen to the position of the
literary language; but in- the year 489 the school there was closed because of
the Nestorian views held by its teachers. It was then re-opened in Nisibis,
and, being patronized by the Sasanids on political grounds, it disseminated
Nestorian belief and Greek knowledge throughout Persia.
Instruction
in these schools had a pre-eminently Biblical and ecclesiastical character, and
was arranged to meet the needs of the Church. However, physicians or coming students
of medicine also took part in it. The circumstance that they frequently
belonged to the ecclesiastical order does not do away with the distinction
between theological study and the pursuit of secular knowledge. It is true that
according to the Syro-Roman code, Teachers (learned Priests) and Physicians
were entitled in common to exemption from taxation and to other privileges; but
the very fact that priests were regarded as healers of the soul, while physicians
had merely to patch up the body, seemed to justify the precedence accorded to
the former. Medicine always remained a secular matter; and, by the regulations of
the School of Nisibis (from the year 590), the Holy Scriptures were not to be
read in the same room with books that dealt with worldly callings.
In
medical circles the works of Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle were highly
prized; but in the cloisters Philosophy was understood to be first of all the
contemplative life of the ascetic, and "the one thing needful" was
the only thing cared for.
4. The
Mesopotamian city of Harran, in the neighbourhood of Edessa, takes a place of
its own. In this city, especially when it began to flourish again after the
Arab conquest, ancient Semitic paganism comes into association with
mathematical and astronomical studies and Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic
speculation. The Harranaeans or Sabaeans, as they were called in the 9th and 10th centuries, traced
their mystic lore back to Hermes Trismegistus, Agathodaemon, Uranius and
others. Numerous pseud-epigraphs of the later Hellenism were adopted by them in
good faith, and some perhaps were forged in their own circle. A few of them
became active as translators and learned authors, and many kept up a brisk
scientific intercourse with Persian and Arab scholars from the 8th
to the 10th century.
5. In
Persia, at Gondeshapur, we find an Institution for philosophical and medical
studies established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521-579). Its teachers were
principally Nestorian Christians; but Khosrau, who had an inclination for
secular culture, extended his toleration to Monophysites as well as to
Nestorians. At that time, just as was the case later at the court of the
Caliphs, Christian Syrians were held in special honour as medical men.
Farther,
in the year 529, seven philosophers of the Neo-Platonic school, who had been
driven away from Athens, found a place of refuge at the court of Khosrau. Their
experiences there, however, may have resembled those of the French
free-thinkers of the 18th century at the Russian court. At all events they
longed to get home again; and the king was sufficiently liberal-minded and
magnanimous to allow them to go, and in his treaty of peace with Byzantium of
the year 549 to stipulate in their case for freedom of religious opinion. Their
stay in the Persian kingdom was doubtless not wholly devoid of influence.
6. The period of Syriac translations of profane literature from the
Greek extends perhaps from the 4th to the 8th century. In the 4th century
collections of aphorisms were translated. The first translator, however, who
makes his appearance avowing his name, is Probus, "Priest and physician
in Antioch" (19t half of the 5th century?). Possibly
he was merely an expounder of
the logical writings of Aristotle, and of the Isagoge of Porphyry. Better known
is Sergius of Rasain, = who died at the age of 70 or so, probably in
Constantinople, about 536, - a Mesopotamian monk and physician, whose studies,
which were probably pursued in Alexandria itself, took in the whole range of
Alexandrian science, and whose translations not only embraced Theology, Morals
and Mysticism, but even Physics, Medicine and Philosophy. Even after the Muslim
conquest the learned activity of the Syrians continued. Jacob of Edessa (circa 640-708) translated Greek
theological writings; but he occupied himself besides with Philosophy, and in
answer to a question relative thereto he pronounced that it was lawful for
Christian ecclesiastics to impart the higher instruction to children of Muslim
parents. There was thus a felt need of culture among the latter.
The
translations of the Syrians, particularly of Sergius of Rasain, are generally faithful;
but a more exact correspondence with the original is shewn in the case of
Logic and Natural Science than in Ethical and Metaphysical works. Much that is
obscure in these last has been misunderstood or simply omitted, and much that
is pagan has been replaced by Christian material. For instance, Peter, Paul and
John would come upon the scene in room of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
Destiny and the Gods were obliged to give place to the one God; and ideas like
World, Eternity, Sin and the like were recast in a Christian mould. The Arabs,
however, in subsequent times went to a much greater length with the process of
adaptation to their language, culture and religion than the Syrians. This may
perhaps be partly explained by the Muslim horror of everything heathen, but
partly too by their greater faculty of adaptation.
7.
Apart from a few mathematical, physical and medical writings, the Syrians
interested themselves in two subjects, - the first consisting of moralizing collections of aphorisms, put together
into a kind of history of Philosophy, and, generally, of mystical
Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom. This is found principally in pseudepigraphs, which
bear the names of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plutarch, Dionysius and others. The
centre of interest is a Platonic doctrine of the Soul, subjected to a later
Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic, or Christian form of treatment. In the Syrian
cloisters Plato is even turned into an oriental monk, who built a cell for
himself in the heart of the wilderness, far away from the dwellings of men, and
after three years' silent brooding over a verse of the Bible was led to a
recognition of the Tri-Unity of God.
A second subject of interest was added,
in Aristotle's Logic. Among the Syrians, and for a longer period among the
Arabs also, Aristotle was commonly known almost solely as a logician. This
knowledge, just as in the early scholasticism of the West, extended to the
Categories, the Hermeneutics, and the first Analytics as far as the
Categorical Figures. They stood in need of the Logic in order to comprehend the
writings of Greek ecclesiastical teachers, since these, at least in form, were
influenced thereby. But as they did not possess it complete, as little did they
possess it pure. They had it before them only in a Neo-Platonic redaction, as
may be seen, for example, from the work of Paulus Persa, which was written in
Syriac for Khosrau Anosharwan. In that work knowledge is placed above faith,
and philosophy is defined as the process by which the soul becomes conscious of
its own inner essence, in which, like a God as it were, it sees all things.
8. What
the Arabs owe to the Syrians is expressed by this circumstance amongst others,
- that Arab scholars held Syriac to be the oldest, or the real (natural)
language. The Syrians, it is true, produced nothing original; but their
activity as translators was of advantage to Arab-Persian science. It was
Syrians almost without exception, who, from the 8th century
to the 10th, rendered Greek works into Arabic, either from the
older Syriac versions or from those which had been in part improved by them,
and in part re-arranged, Even the Omayyad prince, Khalid ibn Yezid (died 704),
who occupied himself with Alchemy under the guidance of a Christian monk, is
said to have provided for translations of works on Alchemy from Greek into
Arabic. Proverbs, maxims, letters, wills, and in short whatever bore on the
history of philosophy, were at a very early time collected and translated. But
it was not till the reign of Mansur that a commencement was made with the
translation into Arabic - partly from Pahlawi versions - of those writings of
the Greeks which deal with Natural Science, Medicine and Logic. Ibn al-Moqaffa,
an adherent of Persian Dualism, took a leading part in this task, from whom later workers
must have marked themselves off by their terminology. None of his
philosophical translations have come down to us. Other material too, belonging
to the 8th century has
gone a missing. The earliest specimen of this work of translation which we possess
dates from the 9th century, the time of Mamun and his successors.
The translators of the 9th
century were, for the most part, medical men; and Hippocrates and Galen were
among the first to be translated after Ptolemy and Euclid. But let us
confine ourselves to Philosophy, in the narrower sense. A translation of the
Tim?us of Plato is said to have come from Yuhanna or Yakhya ibn Bitriq (in the
beginning of the 9th century), as well as Aristotle's `Meteorology',
the `Book of Animals', an epitome of the `Psychology', and the tract 'On the
World'. To Abdalmasikh ibn Abdallah Naima al-Himsi (circa 835) is to be ascribed a rendering of the 'Sophistics' of
Aristotle, in addition to the Commentary of John Philoponus upon the
`Physics', as well as the so-called `Theology of Aristotle', - a paraphrased
epitome of the Enneads of Plotinus. Qosta ibn Luqa al-Balabakki (circa 835) is said to have translated
the Commentaries of 'Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus upon the
`Physics' of Aristotle, and in part, Alexander's Commentary on the 'De
generatione et corruptione', as well as the 'Placita Philosophorum' of the
Pseudo-Plutarch, and other works.
The
most productive translators were Abu Zaid Honain ibn Ishaq (809 P-873), his
son, Ishaq ibn Honain (t 910 or 911), and nephew Hobaish ibn al-Hasan. Seeing
that they worked together, there is a good deal which is ascribed, now to the
one and now to the other. Not a little material must have been prepared, under
their oversight, by disciples and subordinates. Their activity extended over
the whole range of the science of that day. Existing translations were
improved, and new ones added. The father preferred to work at versions of
medical authors, but the son turned more to the rendering of philosophical
material.
The work of the translators was still proceeding in the 10th century.
Among those who especially distinguished themselves were Abu Bishr Matta ibn
Yunus al-Qannai (t 940), Abu Zakarya Yakhya ibn Adi al-Mantiqi (t 974), Abu Ali Isa ibn Ishaq ibn Zura (t 1008), and finally,
Abu-l-Khair al-Hasan ibn al-Khammar (born 942), a pupil of Yakhya ibn Adi's, of
whose writings, besides translations, commentaries, and so forth, a tract is
mentioned, on the Harmony between Philosophy and Christianity.
From
the time of Honain ibn Ishaq the activity of the translators was almost wholly
confined to Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian writings, and to epitomes of
them, to paraphrases of their contents and to commentaries upon them.
9.
These translators are not to be regarded as specially great philosophers. Their
work was seldom entered upon spontaneously, but almost always at the command of
some Caliph or Vizir or other person of note. Outside of their own department
of study, usually Medicine, they were chiefly interested in Wisdom, - that is,
in pretty stories with a moral, in anecdotes, and in oracular sayings. The
expressions which we merely bear with in intercourse, in narrative or on the
stage, as being characteristic utterances with certain persons, were admired and
collected by these worthy people for the sake of the wisdom contained in them,
or perhaps even for no more than the rhetorical elegance of their form. As a
rule, those men continued true to the Christian faith of their fathers. The
traditional story of Ibn Djebril gives a good idea both of their way of
thinking and of the liberal-mindedness of the Caliphs. When Mansur wanted to
convert him to Islam, he is said to have replied: "In the faith of my
fathers I will die: where they are, I wish also to be, whether in heaven or in
hell". Whereupon the Caliph laughed, and dismissed him with a rich
present.
Only a
small portion has been saved -of the original writings of these men. A short
dissertation by Qosta ibn Luqa on the distinction between Soul and Spirit (tvevµa,
ruh), preserved in a Latin
translation, has been frequently mentioned and made use of. According to it,
the Spirit is a subtle material, which from its seat in the left ventricle of
the heart animates the human frame and brings about its movements and
perceptions. The finer and clearer this Spirit is, the more rationally the man
thinks and acts : there is but one opinion upon this point. It is more difficult,
however, to predicate anything sure, and universally valid, of the Soul. The
deliverances of the greatest philosophers occasionally differ, and
occasionally contradict each other. In any case the Soul is incorporeal, for it
adopts qualities, and, in fact, qualities of the most opposite nature at one
and the same time. It is uncompounded and unchangeable, and it does not, like
the Spirit, perish with the body. The Spirit only acts as an intermediary
between the Soul and the Body, and it is in this way that it becomes a
secondary cause of movement and perception.
The statement which has just been given regarding the Soul is found
in many of the later writers. But by slow degrees, as the Aristotelian
philosophy thrusts Platonic opinions more and more into the background, another
pair of opposites come into full view. Physicians alone continue to speak of
the importance of the `ruh' or Spirit
of Life. Philosophers institute a comparison between Soul and Spirit or Reason (vovc, `aql). The Soul is now reduced to
the domain of the perishable, and sometimes, in Gnostic fashion, even to the
lower and evil realm of the desires. The rational Spirit, - as that which is
highest, that which is imperishable in man - is exalted above the Soul. In
this notice, however, we are anticipating history: let us return to our
translators.
10.
The most valuable portion of the legacy which the Greek mind bequeathed to us
in art, poetry, and historical composition, was never accessible to the
Orientals. It would even have been difficult for them to understand it, seeing
that they lacked the due acquaintance with Greek life, and the relish for it.
For them the history of Greece began with Alexander the Great, surrounded with
the halo of legend; and the position which Aristotle held beside the greatest
prince of ancient times must have assuredly conduced to the acceptance of the
Aristotelian philosophy at the Muslim court. Arab historians counted up the
Greek princes, on to Cleopatra, and then the Roman Emperors; but a Thucydides,
for example, was not known to them, even by name. Of Homer they had not picked
up much more than the sentence, that "one only should be the ruler".
They bad not the least idea of the great Greek dramatists and lyric poets. It
was only through its Mathematics, Natural Science and Philosophy, that Greek
antiquity could bring its influence to bear upon them. They had come to know
something of the development of Greek Philosophy, from Plutarch, Porphyry and
others, as well as from the writings of Aristotle and Galen. A good deal of
legendary matter, however, was mingled with their information; and the account
which passed in the East, of the doctrines of the Pre-Socratic philosophers can
only be referred by us to the
pseudepigraphs which they consulted, or perhaps even to the opinions which had
been developed in the East itself, and which they endeavoured to support with
the authority of old Greek sages. But still, in every case, our thoughts must
turn first of all to some Greek original.
11. It
may be affirmed generally that the Syro-Arabs took up the thread of philosophy,
precisely where the last of the Greeks had let it fall, that is, with the
Neo-Platonic explanation of Aristotle, along with whose philosophy the works of
Plato were also read and expounded. Among the Harranaeans, and for a long time
in several Muslim sects, it was Platonic or Pythagorean-Platonic studies which
were prosecuted with most ardour, - with which much that was Stoic or
Neo-Platonic was associated. Extraordinary interest was taken in the fate of
Socrates, who had suffered a martyr's death in heathen Athens for his rational
belief. The Platonic teaching regarding the Soul and Nature exercised great
influence. The Pythian utterance: "Know thyself", - handed down as
the motto of the Socratic wisdom, and interpreted in a Neo-Platonic sense, -
was ascribed by the Muslims to Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law, or even put into the
mouth of the Prophet himself. "He who knows himself, knows God his Lord
thereby" : this was the text for Mystic speculations of all kinds.
In
medical circles and at the worldly court, the works of Aristotle came more and
more into favour, first of all of course the Logic and a few things from the
Physical writings. The Logic - so they thought - was the only new thing the
Stagyrite had discovered: in all the other sciences he agreed throughout with
Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Plato. Accordingly Christian
and Sabaean translators, and the circle influenced by them, drew their
psychologico-ethical, political and metaphysical instruction without hesitation
from the Pre-Aristotelian sages.
What
bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras &c., was, naturally, spurious.
Their wisdom is traced either to Hermes or to other wise men of the East. Thus
Empedocles must have been a disciple of King David's, and afterwards of Loqman
the Wise : Pythagoras must have sprung from the school of Solomon, - and so on.
Writings which are cited in Arabic works as Socratic are, in so far as they are genuine, Platonic dialogues in which Socrates appears. Their
quotations from Plato - not to speak of spurious writings -- have a more or
less comprehensive range : they are taken from the Apology, Crito, the
Sophistes, Phaedrus, the Republic, Phaedo, Tim?us and the Laws. That does not
mean, however, that they possessed complete translations of all these works.
This
much is certain, - that Aristotle did not reign as sole lord from the very
outset. Plato, as they understood him, taught the Creation of the world, the
Substantiality of the Spiritual, and the Immortality of the Soul. That teaching
did no harm to the Faith. But Aristotle, with his doctrine of the Eternity of
the World, and his less spiritualistic Psychology and Ethics, was regarded as
dangerous. Muslim theologians of the 9th and 10th
centuries, from various camps, wrote therefore against Aristotle. But
circumstances altered. Philosophers arose by-and-by who rejected the Platonic
doctrine of the One World-Soul, of which the souls of men are only transient
parts, and sought grounds for their hope of immortality from Aristotle who
attributed so great a significance to the Individual Substance.
12. The
conception which was entertained of Aristotle in the period most remote, is
best shown by the writings which were foisted upon him. Not only did they get
his genuine works with Neo-Platonic interpretations attached to them, - not
only was the treatise: "On the world" unhesitatingly acknowledged as
Aristotelian, but he was also regarded as the author of many late-Greek productions,
in which a Pythagorising Platonism or Neo-Platonism, or even a barren
Syncretism was quite frankly taught.
Let us
take here as our first example "the Book of the Apple"[7],
wherein Aristotle plays the same part as Socrates in the Phaedo of Plato. As
his end draws near, the Philosopher is visited by some of his disciples who
find him in a cheerful frame of mind. This leads them to request their
departing Master to give them some instruction about the Essence and
Immortality of the Soul. Thereupon he discourses somewhat as follows: -
"The Essence of the Soul consists in knowing, - in fact, in Philosophy, which
is the highest form of knowing. A perfect knowledge of the truth constitutes
therefore the blessedness which after death awaits the soul which is devoted to
knowing. And just as knowing is rewarded with a higher knowledge, - so the
punishment for not-knowing consists in a deeper ignorance. And really, there is
nothing in Heaven or Earth, after all, except knowing and not-knowing, and the
recompence which these two severally bring with them. Farther, - virtue is not
essentially different from knowing; nor does vice differ essentially from
not-knowing. The relation of virtue to knowing, or of vice to not-knowing, is
like that of water to ice: i. e. it is the same thing in a different form.
In
knowing, - which is the divine essence of the Soul, - the Soul finds naturally
its only true joy, and not in eating and drinking and sensual pleasure. For,
sensual pleasure is a flame which merely warms for a short time; but the
thinking Soul, - which longs for its deliverance from the murky world of the
senses, - is a pure light that sheds a radiance far and wide. The Philosopher
therefore is not afraid of death, but meets it gladly, when the Deity summons
him. The enjoyment, which his limited knowledge affords him here is a guarantee
to him of the rapture which the unveiling of the great world of the Unknown
will procure him. Even already he knows something of this, for it is only
through knowledge of the invisible, that the proper estimate of the sensible,
on which be prides himself, is at all possible. He who comes to know his own
self in this life, possesses in that very knowledge of himself the assurance of
comprehending all things with an eternal knowledge, - i. e. of being
immortal."
13. In
the second place the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" may be
referred to. In it Plato is represented as the Ideal-Man, who gains a knowledge
of all things by means of an intuitive thinking, and thus has no need of the
logical resources of Aristotle. Indeed, the highest reality - Absolute Being -
is not apprehended by thinking, but only in an ecstatic Vision. "Often was
I alone with my soul", says Aristotle-Plotinus, on this point.
"Divested of the body, I entered as pure substance into my proper self,
turning back from all that is external to what is within. I was pure knowing there,
at once the knowing and the known. How astonished I was to behold beauty and
splendour in my proper self, and to recognize that I was a part of the sublime
Divine world, endowed even with creative life! In this assurance of self, I was
lifted above the world of the senses, ay, even above the world of spirits, up
to the Divine state, where I beheld a light so fair that no tongue can tell it,
nor ear understand".
The
soul forms the centre of the discussions in the `Theology' also. All true human
science is science of the soul or knowledge of self, - knowledge of its
essence, it is true, coming first, and next in order, though less complete,
knowledge of the operations of that essence. In such knowledge, to which
exceedingly few attain, the highest wisdom consists, which does not admit of
being fully understood in the form of ideas, and which therefore the
philosopher like a skilful artist and wise lawgiver represents, for us men, in
ever beautiful figures in religious service. In this function precisely, the
wise man comes forward as the potent, self sufficing magician, whose knowledge
lords it over the multitude, seeing that they remain always bound in the
fetters of outward things, of presentations and desires.
The
soul stands in the centre of the All. Above it are God and Intelligence,
beneath it - Matter and Nature. Its coming from God through Intelligence into
Matter, its presence in the body, its return on high - these are the three stadia in which its life and that of
the world run their course. Matter and Nature, Sense-perception and
Presentation here lose their significance almost entirely. All things exist by
Intelligence (you;, `aql). Intelligence
constitutes all things, and in Intelligence all things are One. The Soul too is
Intelligence, but, so long as it stays in the body, it is Intelligence in hope,
Intelligence in the form of longing. It longs for what is above, for the good
and blessed stars, which spend their contemplative existence as sources of
light, exalted above presentation and effort.
That
then is the oriental Aristotle, as he was acknowledged by the earliest
Peripatetics in Islam[8].
14. We need not wonder that the Easterns did not succeed in reaching
an unadulterated conception of the Aristotelian philosophy. Our critical apparatus
for discriminating between the genuine and the spurious was not in their
possession. It must have proved even more difficult for them, to familiarize
themselves with the world of Greek civilization, than for the Christian
scholars of the Middle Ages, which had never entirely lost living touch with
antiquity. In the East men remained dependent on NeoPlatonic redactions and
interpretations. A part of the scientific system, to wit, the Politics of
Aristotle, was a-wanting; and so, as a matter of course, the Laws or the
Republic of Plato took its place. Only a few were aware of the difference
between the two.
Another
determining motive deserves notice. In their Neo-Platonic sources even, the
Muslims came upon a harmonizing exposition of the Greek philosophers, and they
felt constrained to adopt it. The first adherents of Aristotle were bound to
assume a polemical and apologetic attitude. In opposition to, or in conformity
with, the voice of the Muslim community, they required a coherent philosophy,
in which the One Truth must be found. The same reverence, which Mohammed in
his day had paid to the sacred writings of the Jews and of the Christians, was
shewn afterwards by Muslim scholars towards the works of Greek philosophers;
but these learned men exhibited greater familiarity with their models, and
less originality. In their eyes the old philosophers were invested with an
authority, to which it was their duty to submit. The earliest Muslim thinkers
were so fully convinced of the superiority of Greek knowledge that they did not
doubt that it had attained to the highest degree of certainty. The thought of
making farther and independent investigations did not readily occur to an
Oriental, who cannot imagine a man without a teacher as being anything else than
a disciple of Satan. In accordance, therefore, with the precedent set by Hellenistic
philosophers, an attempt had to be made to demonstrate the existence of the
harmony between Plato and Aristotle, - and, in particular, to shelve tacitly
those doctrines which gave offence, or to exhibit them in a sense which was not
too decidedly contrary to Muslim Dogmatics. In order to humour the opponents of
Aristotle or of Philosophy in general, prominence was given to wise and
edifying sayings out of the philosopher's works, - both the genuine.
and the spurious, - that so the way might be prepared for the reception of his
scientific thoughts. To the initiated, however, the teaching of Aristotle, like
that of other schools and sects, was set forth as a higher truth, to which the
positive faith of the multitude and the more or less firmly established system
of the theologians were merely preliminary steps.
15.
Muslim Philosophy has always continued to be an Eclecticism which depended on
their stock of works translated from the Greek. The course of its history has
been a process of assimilation rather than of generation. It has not
distinguished itself, either by propounding new problems or by any peculiarity
in its endeavours to solve the old ones. It has therefore no important advances
in thought to register. And yet, from a historical point of view, its
significance is far greater than that of a mere intermediary between classical
antiquity and Christian Scholasticism. To follow up the reception of Greek
ideas into the mixed civilization of the East is a subject of historical
interest possessing a charm entirely its own, especially if one can forget at
the same time that once there were Greeks. But the consideration of this
occurrence becomes important also by its presenting an opportunity for
comparison with other civilizations. Philosophy is a phenomenon so unique - so
thoroughly indigenous and independent a growth of Grecian soil -that one might
regard it as being exempt from the conditions of general civilized life, and as
being explicable only per se. Now the
History of Philosophy in Islam is valuable, just because it sets forth the
first attempt to appropriate the results of Greek thinking, with greater comprehensiveness
and freedom than in the early Christian dogmatics. Acquaintance with the
conditions which made such an attempt possible, will permit us to reach
conclusions, by way of analogical reasonings - though with precaution, and for
the present at least, to a very limited extent - as to the reception of
Graeco-Arab science in the Christian Middle Ages, and will perhaps teach us a
little about the conditions under which Philosophy arises in general.
W e can
hardly speak of a Muslim philosophy in the proper sense of the term. But there
were many men in Islam who could not keep from philosophizing; and even through
the folds of the Greek drapery, the form of their own limbs is indicated. It is
easy to look down on these men, from the high watch-tower of some
School-Philosophy, but it will be better for us to get to know them and to
comprehend them in their historical environment. We must leave to special
research the tracing of each thought up to its origin. Our aim in what follows
can be nothing more than to point out what the Muslims constructed out of the
materials which were before them.
II. PHILOSOPHY AND ARAB KNOWLEDGE.
I. GRAMMATICAL SCIENCE.
By
Muslim scholars of the 10ih century the sciences were divided into Arab
Sciences' and 'Old'- or `Non-Arab Sciences'. To the former belonged Grammar,
Ethics and Dogmatics, History and Knowledge of Literature; to the latter Philosophy,
Natural Science and Medicine. In the main the division is a proper one. The
last-named branches are not only those which were determined the most by
foreign influences, but those too which never became really popular. And yet
the so called `Arab Sciences' are not altogether pure native products. They too
arose or were developed in places in the Muslim empire where Arabs and
Non-Arabs met together, and where the need was awakened of reflecting on those
subjects which concern mankind the most, - Speech and Poetry, Law and Religion,
- in so far as differences or inadequacies appeared therein. In the mode in
which this came about, it is easy to trace the influence of Non-Arabs, particularly
of Persians; and the part taken by Greek Philosophy in the process asserts
itself in ever growing importance.
2. The
Arabic language, -- in which the Arabs themselves took particular delight, for
its copious vocabulary, its wealth of forms and its inherent capability of
cultivation, - was peculiarly fitted to take a leading position in the world.
If it is compared, for example, with the unwieldy Latin, or even with the
turgid Persian, it is found to be specially distinguished by the possession of
short Abstract-forms, -- a property of great service in scientific expression.
It is capable of indicating the finest shades of meaning; but just because of
its richly developed stock of synonyms, it offers temptations to deviate from
the Aristotelian rule, - that the use of synonyms is not permissible in exact
science. A language so elegant, expressive, and difficult withal, as Arabic
was, necessarily invited mach examination, when it had become the polite
language of the Syrians and the Persians. Above all, the study of the Koran,
and the recital and interpretation of it demanded profound attention to be
devoted to the language. Unbelievers, also, may have thought that they could
point out grammatieal errors in the sacred Book; and therefore examples were
gathered out of ancient poems and out of the living speech of the Bedouins, to
support the expressions of the Koran. To these examples remarks were, no
doubt, added upon grammatical accuracy in general. On the whole, the living
usage formed the standard, but in order to save the authority of the Koran, it
was certainly not applied without artifice. This proceeding was regarded, all
the same, by simple believers, with a measure of suspicion. Masudi tells us
even of some grammarians from Basra, who, when on a pleasure trip, took to
going through a Koran Imperative, and for that reason(?) were soundly cudgelled
by country folk engaged in date-gathering.
3. The Arabs trace their grammatical science, like so many other things, to Ali, to whom is ascribed even Aristotle's tripartite division of speech. In reality the study began to be cultivated in Basra and Kufa. Its earliest development is involved in obscurity, for in the Grammar of Sibawaih (d 786) we have a finished system, - a colossal work --, which, like Ibn Sina's Canon of Medicine in after times, could only be explained by later generations as the production of many scholars working in collaboration. We are but ill-informed even on the points of difference between the schools of Basra and Kufa. The Basra grammarians, like the school of Bagdad in subsequent times, must have conceded a great influence to Qiyas (Analogy) in the determination of grammatical phenomena, while those of Kufa allowed many idiomatic forms which diverged from Qiyas. On this ground, to mark the contrast between the Basra grammarians and those of Kufa, the former were called `the Logic people'. Their terminology differed in detail from that of the Kufa school. Many, whose heads had been turned by logic, in the opinion of the genuine Arabs, must have gone decidedly too far in their captious criticism of the language; but on the other side caprice was raised to the position of rule.
It was
from no mere accident that the school of Basra was the first to avail itself of
logical resources. Generally speaking, it was at Basra that the influence of
philosophic doctrines first appeared, and among its grammarians were to be
found many Shiites and Mutazilites, who readily permitted foreign wisdom to
influence their doctrinal teaching.
4. Grammatical science, in so far as it was not confined, to the
collecting of Examples, Synonyms &c., when so determined by the subjects
specially treated, was affected by the Aristotelian Logic. Even before the
Muslim era, Syrians and Persians had studied the treatise ???? with Stoic and Neo-Platonic additions.
Ibn al-Moqaffa, who at first was intimate with the grammarian Khalil (v. infra), then made accessible to the
Arabs all that existed in Pahlawi of a grammatical or logical nature. In
conformity therewith the various kinds of Sentences were enumerated, - at one
time five, at another eight or nine, as well as the three parts of speech, -
Noun, Verb and Particle. Afterwards some scholars, like Djahia, included
syllogistic figures among the Rhetorical figures; and in later representations
there was much disputation about Sound and Idea. The question was discussed
whether language is the result of ordinance or a product of nature; but
gradually the philosophic view preponderated, that it came by ordinance.
Next to Logic the
influence of the preparatory or mathematical sciences falls to be noticed here.
Like the prose of ordinary intercourse and the rhymes of the Koran, the verses
of the poets were not only collected but also arranged according to special
principles of classification, - for example, according to metre. After Grammar
Prosody arose. Khalil (f 791), the teacher of Sibawaih, to whom the first
application of Qiyas to grammatical science was attributed, is said even
to have created metrical science. While language came to be regarded as the
national, conventional element in poetry, the notion was entertained that what
was natural, and common to all populations, would be found in their metre.
Thabit ibn Qorra (836-901) therefore maintained, in his classification of the
sciences, that metre was something essential, and the study of metre a natural
science, and therefore a branch of philosophy.
5.
Grammatical science, nevertheless, limited as it was to the Arabic language,
retained its peculiarities, upon which this is not the place to enter. At all
events, it is an imposing production of the keenly-observing and
diligently-collecting Arab intelligence, - a production of which the Arabs
might well be proud. An apologist of the 10th century, who was engaged in combating
Greek philosophy, said : "He who is acquainted with the subtleties and
profundities of Arab poetry and versification, knows well that they surpass all
such things as numbers, lines and points, which are wont to be advanced in
proof of their opinions, by people who idly dream that they are capable of
understanding the essence of things. I cannot see the substantial advantage of
things like numbers, lines and points, if, in spite of the trifling profit
which may attend them, they do harm to the Faith and are followed by
consequences, against which we have to invoke the help of God." Men would
not have their delight in the minutiae of their language disturbed by general
philosophic speculations. Many a word-form, originating with the translators of
foreign works, was held in detestation by purist Grammarians. The beautiful art
of caligraphy, more decorative in its nature than constructive, like Arabic art
in general, became developed in noble, delicate forms, and met with a wider
expansion than scientific research into the language. In the very characters of
the Arabic speech, we may still see the subtlety of the intelligence which
formed them, although at the same time we may see a lack of energy, which is
observable in the entire development of Arab culture.
2. ETHICAL TEACHING.
1. The
believing Muslim, in so far as custom did not maintain its dominion over him,
had at first the Word of God and the example of His Prophet as his rule of
conduct and opinion. After the Prophet's death, the Sunna of Mohammed was
followed, in cases where the Koran gave no information, - that is to say, men
acted and decided, as Mohammed had decided or acted, according to the Tradition
of his Companions. But from the time of the conquest of countries in possession
of an old civilization, demands which were altogether new were made of Islam.
Instead of the simple conditions of Arab life, usages and institutions were met
with there, in regard to which the Sacred Law gave no precise direction, and to
meet which no tradition or interpretation of tradition presented itself. Every
day added thus to the number of individual cases which had not been provided
for, and yet about which one had to come to a decision, whether according to
custom, or his own sense of right. In the old-Roman provinces, Syria and
Mesopotamia, Roman law must have long continued to exercise an important
influence.
Those jurists who
attributed to their own opinion (Ray, opinio)
alongside of the Koran and Sunna, a subsidiary authority to determine the
law, were called `Adherents of the Ra'y'. One of them, Abu Hanifa of Kufa (t
767), the founder of the Hanifite School, became specially famous. But even in
Medina, before the appearance of the school of Malik (715-795), as well as in
that school, a harmless though restricted deference was at first paid to the
Ray. By slow degrees, however, and in the course of opposing a Ra'y
which was becoming a pretext for much arbitrariness, the view gained ground,
that in everything the Tradition (hadith)
respecting the Sunna of the Prophet was to be followed. Thereupon
traditions were collected from all quarters, and explained - and in large
numbers even forged -; and a system of criteria to determine their genuineness
was formed, which, however, laid more stress upon the external evidence and the
appropriateness of the traditionary material than upon consistency and historic
truth. As a consequence of this development, the `people of the Ra'y', who were
chiefly located in Iraq (Babylonia), were now confronted by the `Adherents of the
Tradition', or the Medina school. Even Shafii (767-820), the founder of the
third school of Law, who in general held to the Sunna, was numbered with the
partisans of Tradition, in contradistinction no doubt to Abu Hanifa.
2.
Logic introduced a new element into this controversy, viz Qiyas or
Analogy. There had been, of course, stray applications of Qiyas, even in
earlier times; but, to lay down Qiyas as a principle, a foundation or a
source of law, - presupposed the influence of scientific reflection. Although the terms Ra'y and Qiyas may be used as
synonyms, yet there is in the latter term, less suggestion of the
presence and operation of individual predilection than there is in Ray. The more one grew accustomed to
employ Qiyas in grammatical and logical researches, the more readily
could he include this principle in the institutes of jurisprudence, whether by
way of reasoning from one instance to another, or from the majority of
instances to the remainder (i. e. analogically), or by way of seeking rather for
some common ground governing various cases, from which the conduct proper in a
particular case might be deduced (i. e. syllogistically)[9].
The
application of Qiyas appears to have come into use, first and most
extensively, in the Hanifite school, but afterwards also in the school of
Shafii, - though with a more limited range. In connection therewith, the
question - whether language was capable of expressing the Universal, or could
merely denote the Particular - became important for ethical doctrine.
The logical
principle of Qiyas never attained to great repute. Much more emphasis
was laid, - next to the Koran and the Sunna, the historic foundations of the
Law -, upon the Idjma, that is, the Consensus of the
Congregation of the faithful. The Consensus of the Congregation or,
practically, of the most influential learned men in it, -- who may be compared
to the fathers and teachers of the Catholic Church, - is the Dogmatical
principle, which, contested only by a few, has proved the most important
instrument in establishing the Muslim Ethical System. Theory, however,
continues to assign a certain subordinate place to Qiyas, as a fourth
source of moral guidance, after Koran, Sunna and Idjma.
3. The Muslim Ethical System (al-fyh) == 'the knowledge') takes into
account the entire life of the believer, for whom the Faith itself is the first
of all duties. Like every innovation the system at first encountered violent
opposition : - commandment was now turned into doctrinal theory, and believing
obedience into abstruse pursuit of knowledge: that called for protestation
alike from plain pious people and from wise statesmen. But gradually the `knowing' men or men learned in
the Law (ulama’, or in the West, faqihs) were recognized as the true
heirs of the prophets. The Ethical system was developed before the Doctrinal,
and it has been able to hold the leading position up to the present day. Nearly
every Muslim knows something of it, seeing it is part of a good religious
upbringing. According to the great Church-father Gazali, `the Fiqh' is the
daily bread of believing souls, while the Doctrine is only valuable as a
Medicine for the sick.
We are not called
upon here to enter into the minutiae of the fine-spun casuistic of the Figh.
The main subject handled in it is an ideal righteousness, which can never be
illustrated in all its purity in our imperfect world. We are acquainted now
with its principles, and with the position which it holds in Islam. Let us
merely add a brief notice of the division of moral acts which was formulated
by ethical teachers. According to this classification there are:
1. Acts, the practice of which is
an absolute duty and is therefore rewarded, and the omission of which is
punished
2. Acts
which are recommended by the Law, and are the subject of reward, but the
neglect of which does not call for punishment:
3. Acts
which are permitted, but which in the eyes of the Law are a matter of
indifference:
4. Acts
which the Law disapproves of, but does not hold as punishable:
5. Acts
which are forbidden by the Law and which demand unconditional punishment.[10]
4.
Greek philosophic enquiries have had a two-fold influence upon the Ethics of
Islam. With many of the sectaries and mystics, both orthodox and heretic, an
ascetic system of Ethics is found, coloured by Pythagorean-Platonic views. The
same thing appears with philosophers, whom we shall afterwards meet again. But
in orthodox circles the Aristotelian deliverance, -- that virtue consists in
the just mean -, found much acceptance, because something similar stood in the
Koran, and because, generally, the tendency of Islam was a catholic one, - one
conciliatory of opposites.
More
attention indeed was given to Politics than to Ethics, in the Muslim empire,
and the struggles of political parties were the first thing to occasion
difference of opinion. Disputes about the Imamat,
i. e. the headship in the Muslim Church, pervade the entire history of
Islam ; but the questions discussed have commonly more of a personal and
practical than a theoretical importance, and therefore a history of philosophy
does not need to consider them very fully. Hardly anything of philosophic value
emerges in them. Even in the course of the first centuries there was developed
a firm body of constitutional law canonically expressed; but this, like the
ideal system of duty, was not particularly heeded by strong rulers, - who
viewed it as mere theological brooding, - while, on the other band, by weak
princes it could' not be applied at all.
Just as
little is it worth our while to examine minutely the numerous `mirrors of
Princes', which were such favourites, in Persia especially, and in whose wise
moral saws, and maxims of political sagacity, the courtly circles found
edification.
The weight of philosophic endeavour in Islam lies on the theoretical
and intellectual side. With the actual proceedings of social and political
life they are able to make but a scanty compromise. Even the Art of the
Muslims, although it exhibits more originality than their Science, does not
know how to animate the crude material, but merely sports with ornamental
forms. Their Poetry creates no Drama, and their Philosophy is unpractical.
3. DOCTRINAL SYSTEMS.
1. In
the Koran there had been given to Muslims a religion, but no system, - precepts
but no doctrines. What is contrary to logic therein, - what we account for by
the shifting circumstances of the Prophet's life, and his varying moods, - was
simply accepted by the first believers, without asking questions about the How
and Why. But in the conquered countries they were faced by a fully-formed
Christian Dogmatic as well as by Zoroastrian and Brahmanic theories. We have
laid frequent stress already upon the great debt which the Muslims owe to the
Christians; and the doctrinal system has certainly been determined the most by
Christian influences. In Damascus the formation of Muslim Dogmas was affected
by Orthodox and Monophysite teaching, and in Basra and Bagdad rather perhaps by
Nestorian and Gnostic theories. Little of the literature belonging to the
earliest period of this movement has come down to us, but we cannot be wrong in
assigning a considerable influence to personal intercourse and regular
school-instruction. Not much was learned in the East at that time out of books,
any more than it is to-day: more was learned from the lips of the teacher. The
similarity between the oldest doctrinal teachings in Islam and the dogmas of
Christianity is too great to permit any one to deny that they are directly
connected. In particular, the first question about which there was much
dispute, among Muslim Scholars, was that of the Freedom of the Will. Now the
freedom of the will was almost universally accepted by Oriental Christians. At
no time and in no place perhaps was the Will-problem - first in the
Christology, but afterward in the Anthropology - so much discussed from every
point as in the Christian circles of the East at the time of the Muslim
conquest.
Besides these considerations which are partly of an a priori character, there are also
detached notices which indicate that some of the earliest Muslims, who taught
the Freedom of the Will, had Christian teachers.
A number of purely philosophic elements from the Gnostic systems, and
afterwards from the translation literature, associated themselves with the
Hellenistic Christian influences.
2. An assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether
verbal or written, was called by the Arabs, generally, but more particularly in
religious teaching -
a Iralam (A6ya5), and those who advanced such
assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name was transferred from
the individual assertion to the entire system, and it covered also the
introductory, elementary observations on Method, -- and so on. Our best
designation for the science of the Kalam is 'Theological Dialectics' or simply
'Dialectics'; and in what follows we may translate Mutakallimun by 'Dialecticians'.
The
name Mutakallimun, which was at first
common to all the Dialecticians, was in later times applied specially to the
Anti-mutazilite and Orthodox theologians. In the latter case it might be well,
following the sense, to render the term by Dogmatists or Schoolmen. In fact
while the first dialecticians had the Dogma still to form, those who came later
had only to expound and establish it.
The
introduction of Dialectics into Islam was a violent innovation, and it was
vehemently denounced by the party of the Tradition. Whatever went beyond the
regular ethical teaching was heresy to them, for faith should be obedience, and
not, - as was maintained by the Murdjites and Mutazilites -, knowledge. By the
latter it was laid down without reserve that speculation was one of the duties
of believers. Even to this demand the times became reconciled, for according
to tradition the Prophet had said already: 'The first thing which God created
was Knowledge or Reason'.
3.
Very numerous are the various opinions which found utterance in the days even
of the Omayyads, but especially in those of the early Abbasids. The farther
they diverged from one another, the more difficult it was for the men of the
Tradition to come to an understanding with them; but gradually certain compact
doctrinal collections stood out distinctly, of which the rationalist system of
the Mutazilites, the successors of the Qadarites, was most widely extended, particularly
among Shiites. From Caliph Mamun's time down to Mutawakkil's, it even received
State recognition; and the Mutazilites, who had been in earlier days oppressed
and persecuted by the temporal power, now became Inquisitors of the Faith
themselves, with whom the sword supplied the place of argument. About the same
time, however, their opponents the Traditionalists commenced to build up a
system of belief. Upon the whole there was no lack of intermediary forms
between the naive Faith of the multitude and the Gnosis of the dialecticians.
In contrast to the spiritualistic stamp of Mutazilitism these intermediary
forms took an anthropomorphic character with regard to the doctrine of the
Deity, and a materialistic character with regard to the theory of man and the
universe (Anthropology and Cosmology). The soul, for example, was conceived of
by them as corporeal, or as an accident of the body, and the Divine Essence was
imagined as a human body. The religious teaching and art of the Muslims were
greatly averse to the symbolical God-Father of the Christians, but there was an
abundance of absurd speculations about the form of Allah. Some went so far as
to ascribe to him all the bodily members together, with the exception of the
beard and other privileges of oriental manhood.
It is impossible to .discuss in detail all the Dialectic
sects, which often made their first appearance in the form of political
parties. From the standpoint of the history of Philosophy it is enough to give
here the chief doctrines of the Mutazilites, in so far as they can lay claim to
general interest.
4. The first question, then, concerned man's conduct and destiny. The
forerunners of the Mutazilites, who were called Qadarites, taught the Freedom
of the human Will; and the Mutazilites, even in later times, when their
speculations were directed more to theologico-metaphysical problems, were first
and foremost pointed to as the supporters of the doctrine of Divine
Righteousness, - which gives rise to no evil, and rewards or punishes man according
to his deserts -, and, in the second place, as the confessors, or avowed
supporters of the Unity of God, i. e. the absence of properties from his
Essence considered per se [or the
predicateless character of the essential nature of God]. The systematic statement
of their doctrines must have been influenced by the Logicians (v. 1V, 2 § 1);
for even in the first half of the 10th century, the Mutazilite system began
with the confession of the Unity of God, while the doctrine of God's
Righteousness, announced as it is in all his works, is relegated to the second
place.
The
responsibility of man, as well as the holiness of God, who is incapable of
directly causing man's sinful actions, had to be saved by asserting the freedom
of the Will. Man must therefore be lord of his actions; but he is lord of these
only, for few entertained any doubt that the energy which confers ability to
act at all, and the power of doing either a good or a bad action come to man
from God. Hence the numerous subtle discussions, - amalgamated with a criticism
of the philosophic conception of Time -- on the question whether the power,
which God creates in man, is bestowed previous to the action, or coincidently
and simultaneously therewith: For, did the power precede the act, then it would
either have to last up to the time of the act, which would belie its accidental
character (cf. 11, 3 § 12), or have ceased to exist before the act, - in which
case it might have been dispensed with altogether.
From
human conduct speculation passed on to consider the operations of nature.
Instead of God and man, the antithesis in this case is God and nature. The
productive and generative powers of nature were recognized as means or
proximate causes; and some endeavoured to investigate them. In their opinion,
however, nature herself, like all the world, was a work of God, a creature of
his wisdom: And just as the omnipotence of God was limited in the moral kingdom
by his holiness or righteousness, - so in the natural world it was limited by
his wisdom. Even the presence of evil and mischief in the world was accounted
for by the wisdom of God, who sends everything for the best. A production or
object of Divine activity, evil is not. "God may be able, indeed," -
so an earlier generation had maintained - "to act wickedly and
unreasonably, but he would not do it." The later Mutazilites taught, on
the other hand, that God has no power at all to do anything which is in this
way repugnant to his nature. Their opponents, who regarded God's unlimited
might and unfathomable will as directly operative in all doing and effecting
were indignant at this teaching, and compared its propounders to the dualistic
Magians. Consistent Monism was on the side of these opponents, who did not care
to turn man and nature into creators - next to and under God - of their acts or
operations.
5. The Mutazilites, it is clear from the foregoing, had a different
idea of God from that which was entertained by the multitude and by the
Traditionalists. This became specially evident, as speculation advanced, in the
doctrine of the Divine attributes. From the very beginning the Unity of God was
strongly emphasized in Islam; but that did not prevent men from bestowing upon
him many beautiful names following human analogy, and ascribing to him several attributes.
Of these the following came gradually into greatest prominence, under the
influence assuredly of Christian dogmatics: - viz.: Wisdom, Power, Life, Will,
Speech or Word, Sight and Hearing. The last two of these - Sight and Hearing -
were the first to be explained in a spiritual sense, or entirely set aside. But
the absolute Unity of the Godhead did not appear to be compatible with any
plurality of co-eternal attributes. Would not that be the Trinity of the
Christians, who before now had explained the three Persons of the One Divine
Being as attributes? In order to avoid this inconvenience they sought
sometimes to derive several attributes out of others by a process of
abstraction, and to refer them to a single one - for instance to Knowledge or Power
- and sometimes to apprehend them each and all as being states of the Divine
essence, or to identify them with the essence itself, in which case of course
their significance nearly disappeared. Occasionally an attempt was made through
refinements of phraseology to save something of that significance. While, for
example, a philosopher, denying the attributes, maintained that God is by his
essence a Being who knows, a Mutazilite dialectian expressed it thus: God is a
Being who knows, but by means of a knowledge, which He himself is.
In the opinion of the Traditionalists the conception of God was in
this way being robbed of all its contents. The Mutazilites hardly got beyond
negative determinations, - that God is not like the things of this world, -
that he is exalted above Space, Time, Movement, and so on; but they held fast
to the doctrine that he is the Creator of the world. Although little could be
asserted regarding the Being of God, it was thought he could be known from his
works.
For the
Mutazilites as well as for their opponents, the Creation was an absolute act of
God, and the existence of the world an existence in time. They energetically
combated the doctrine of the eternity of the world, - a doctrine supported by
the Aristotelian philosophy, and which had been widely spread throughout the
East.
6. We have already found `Speech' or `the Word', given as one of the
eternal attributes of God; and, probably by way of conformity with the
Christian doctrine of the Logos, there was taught in particular the eternity of
the Koran which had been revealed to the Prophet. This belief in an eternal
Koran by the side of Allah, was downright idolatry, according to the
Mutazilites; and in opposition thereto the Mutazilite Caliphs proclaimed it as
a doctrine accepted by the State, - that the Koran had been created Whoever
denied this doctrine was publicly punished. Now although the Mutazilites in
maintaining this dogma were more in harmony with the original Islam than their
opponents, yet history has justified the latter, for pious needs proved
stronger than logical conclusions. Many of the Mutazilites, in the opinion of
their brethren in the faith, were far too ready to make light of the Koran, the
Word of God. If it did not agree with their theories, it received ever new
interpretations. In actual fact reason bad more weight with many than the
revealed Book. By comparing not only the three revealed religions together, but
these also with Persian and Indian religious teaching and with philosophic speculation,
they reached a natural religion, which reconciled opposites. This was built up
on the basis of an inborn knowledge, universally necessary, - that there is one
God, who, as a wise Creator, has produced the world, and also endowed Man with
reason that he may know his Creator and distinguish between Good and Evil.
Contrasted with this Natural or Rational religion, acquaintance with the
teaching of revelation is then something adventitious, -an acquired knowledge.
By this
contention the most consistent of the Mutazilites had broken away from the
consensus of the Muslim religious community, and had thus actually put
themselves outside the general faith. At first they still appealed to that consensus,
- which they were able to do as long as the secular power was favourably
disposed to them. That condition, however, did not last long, and they soon
learned by experience what has often been taught since, - that the communities
of men are more ready to accept a religion sent down to them from on high, than
an enlightened
explanation of it.
7.
Following up this survey let us take a closer view of one or two of the most
considerable of the Mutazilites, that the general picture may not be wanting in
individual
features.
Let us
first glance at Abu-l-Hudhail al-Allaf, who died about the middle of the 9hh century.
He was a famous dialectician, and one of the first who allowed philosophy to
exercise an influence on their theological doctrines.
That an attribute should be capable of inhering in a Being in any way is not conceivable, in the opinion of Abu-l-Hudhail : It must either be identical with the Being or different from it. But yet he looks about for some way of adjustment. God is, according to him, knowing, mighty, living, through knowledge, might and life, which are his very essence; and just as men bad done even before this, on the Christian side, he terms these three predicates the Modi (wudjuh) of the Divine Being. He agrees also that hearing, seeing and other attributes are eternal in God, but only with regard to the world which was afterwards to be created. Besides, it would be easy enough for him and for others, who were affected by the philosophy of the day, to interpret these and similar expressions - such as God's `beholding' on the last day,[11] - in a spiritual sense, since generally they regarded seeing and hearing as spiritual acts. For example, Abu-l-Hudhail maintained that motion was visible, but not palpable, because it was not a body.
The Will of God, however, is not to be regarded as eternal. On the
contrary, Abu-l-Hudhail assumes absolute declarations of Will as being
different both from the Being who wills and the object which is willed. Thus
the absolute Word of Creation takes an intermediate position between the
eternal Creator and the transient created world. These declarations of God's
Will form a kind of intermediate essence, to be compared with the Platonic
Ideas or the Sphere-spirits, but perhaps regarded rather as immaterial powers
than as personal spirits. Abu-l-Hudhail distinguishes between the absolute Word
of Creation and the accidental Word of Revelation, which is announced to men
in the form of command and prohibition, appearing as matter and in space, and
which is thus significant only for this transient world. The possibility of
living in accordance with the Divine word of revelation, or of resisting it,
exists therefore in this life alone. Binding injunction and prohibition
presuppose Freedom of Will and capability of acting in accordance therewith. On
the other hand in the future life there are no obligations in the form of laws,
and, accordingly, no longer any freedom : everything there depends on the
absolute determination of God. Nor will there be any motion in the world
beyond, for as motion has once had a beginning, it must, at the end of the
world, come to a close in everlasting rest. Abu-l-Hudhail, therefore, could not
have believed in a resurrection of the body.
Human actions he divides into Natural and Moral, or Actions of the
members, and Actions of the heart. An action is moral, only when we perform it
without constraint. The moral act is Man's own property, acquired by his own
exertions, but his knowledge comes to him from God, partly through Revelation,
and partly through the light of Nature.
Anterior
even to any revelation man is instructed in duty by Nature, and thus is fully
enabled to know God, to discern Good from Evil, and to live a virtuous, honest
and upright life.
8. Noteworthy as a man and a thinker is a younger contemporary of Abu-l-Hudhail's, and apparently a disciple of his, commonly called Al-Nazzam, who died in the year 845. A fanciful, restless, ambitious man, not a consistent thinker, but yet a bold and honest one, - such is the representation of him given us by Djahiz, one of his pupils. The people considered him a madman or a heretic. A good deal in his teaching is in touch with what passed among the Orientals as the Philosophy of E mpedocles and Anaxagoras (Cf. also Abu-l-Hudhail).
In the
opinion of Nazzam God can do absolutely no evil thing; in fact he can only do
that which he knows to be the best thing for his servants. His omnipotence
reaches no farther than what he actually does. Who could hinder him from giving
effect to the splendid exuberance of his Being? A Will, in the proper sense of
the term, - which invariably implies a need, - is by no means to be attributed
to God. The Will of God, on the contrary, is only a designation of the Divine
agency itself, or of the commands which have been conveyed to men. Creation is
an act performed once for all, in which all things were made at one and the
same time, so that one thing is contained in another, and so that in process of
time the various specimens of minerals, plants and animals, as well as the
numerous children of Adam, gradually emerge from their latent condition and
come to the light.
Nazzam, like the
philosophers, rejects the theory of atoms (v. 11, 3 § 12), but then he can only
account for the traversing of a definite distance, by reason of the infinite
divisibility of space, by postulating leaps. He holds bodily substances to be
composed of `accidents' instead of atoms. And just as Abu-l-Hudhail could not
conceive of the inherence of attributes in an essence, so Nazzam can only
imagine the accident as the substance itself or as a part of the substance. Thus
`Fire' or `the Warm', for instance, exists in a latent condition in wood, but
it becomes free when, by means of friction, its antagonist `the Cold' disappears.
In the process there occurs a motion or transposition, but no qualitative
change. Sensible qualities, such as colours, savours and odours, are, in
Nazzam's view, bodies. Even the soul or the intellect of Man he conceives to be
a finer kind of body. The soul, of course, is the most excellent part of man :
it completely pervades the body, which is its organ, and it must be termed the
real and true Man. Thoughts and aspirations are defined as Movements of the
Soul.
In
matters of Faith and in questions of Law Nazzam rejects both the consensus of
the congregation and the analogical interpretation of the Law, and appeals in
Shiite fashion to the infallible Imam. He thinks it possible for the whole body
of Muslims to concur in admitting an erroneous doctrine, as, for instance, the
doctrine that Mohammed has a mission for all mankind in contradistinction to
other prophets. Whereas God sends every prophet to all mankind.
Nazzam, besides, shares the view of Abu-1-Hudhail as to the knowledge
of God and of moral duties by means of the reason. He is not particularly
convinced of the inimitable excellence of the Koran. The abiding marvel of the
Koran is made to consist only in the fact that Mohammed's contemporaries were
kept from producing something like to the Koran.
He
has certainly not retained much of the Muslim Eschatology. At least the
torments of hell are in his view resolved into a process of consuming by fire.
9. Many syncretistic doctrines, but all devoid of originality, have come down to us from the school of Nazzam. The most famous man, whom it produced was the elegant writer and Natural-Philosopher Djahiz (t 869), who demanded of the genuine scholar that he should combine the study of Theology with that of Natural Science. He traces in all things the operations of Nature, but also a reference in these operations to the Creator of the world. Man's reason is capable of knowing the Creator, and in like manner of comprehending the need of a prophetic revelation. Man's only merit is in his will, for on the one hand all his actions are interwoven with the events of Nature, and on the other his entire knowledge is necessarily determined from above. And yet no great significance appears to accrue to the Will, which is derived from 'knowing'. At least Will in the Divine Being is quite negatively conceived of, that is, God never operates unconsciously, or with dislike to his work.
In all
this there is little that is original. His ethical ideal is `the mean', and the
style of his genius is also mediocre. It is only in compiling his numerous
writings that Djahiz has shown any excess.
10.
With the earlier Mutazilites reflections on Ethics and Natural Philosophy
predominate; with those who come later Logico-metaphysical meditations prevail.
In particular Neo-Platonic influences are to be traced here.
Muammar, whose date cannot be accurately determined, although it may
be set down as about the year 900, has much in common with those who have just
been named. But he is far more emphatic in his denial of the existence of
Divine attributes, which he regards as being contradictory of the absolute
unity of the Divine essence. God is high above every form of plurality. He
knows neither himself nor any other being, for `knowing' would presuppose a
plurality in him. He is even to be called Hyper-eternal. Nevertheless he is to
be recognized as Creator of the world. He has only created bodies, it is true;
and these of themselves create their Accidents, whether through operation of
Nature or by Will. The number of these accidents is infinite, for in their
essence they are nothing more than the intellebtual relations of thought.
Muammar is a Conceptualist. Motion and Rest, Likeness and Unlikeness, and so
on, are nothing in themselves, and have merely an intellectual or ideal
existence. The soul, which is held to be the true essence of Man, is conceived
of as an Idea or an immaterial substance, though it is not clearly stated how
it is related to the body or to the Divine essence. The account handed down is
confused.
Man's
will is free, and, -- properly speaking, - Willing is his only act, for the
outward action belongs to the body (Cf Djahiz).
The
school of Bagdad, to which Muammar seems to belong, was conceptualist. With the
exception of the most general predicates, - those of Being and Becoming, it
made Universals subsist only as notions or concepts. Abu Hashim of Basra (t
933) stood nearer to Realism. The attributes of God, as well as Accidents and
Genus-notions in general, were regarded by him as something in a middle
position between Being and Not-Being: he called them Conditions or Modes. He
designated Doubt as a requisite in all knowing. A simple Realist he was not.
Mutazilite
thinkers indulged in dialectic quibbling even about 'Not-Being'. They argued
that Not-Being, as well as Being, must come to possess a kind of reality,
seeing that it may become the subject of thought : at least man tries to think
of 'Nothing' rather than not think at all.
11. In the 9th century several dialectic systems had been formed in the contest against the Mutazilites, one of which, viz, the Karramite system, held its ground till long after the 10th century. There arose, however, from the ranks of the Mutazilites a man whose mission it was to reconcile antagonistic views, and who set up that doctrinal system which was acknowledged as orthodox first in the East, and, later, throughout the whole of Islam. This was Al-Ashari (873--935), who understood how to render to God the things that are God's, and to man the things that are man's. He rejected the rude anthropomorphism of the Anti-mutazilite dialecticians, and set God high above all that is bodily and human, while he left to the Deity his omnipotence, and his universal agency. With him Nature lost all her efficaciousness; but for man a certain distinction was reserved, consisting in his being able to give assent to the works which were accomplished in him by God, and to claim these as his own. Nor was Man's sensuous spiritual being interfered with: He was permitted to hope for the resurrection of the body and the beholding of God. As regards the Koranic revelation, Ashari distinguished between an eternal Word in God, and the Book as we possess it, which latter was revealed in Time.
In the detailed statement of his doctrines Ashari showed no
originality in any way, but merely arranged and condensed the material given
him, - a proceeding which could not be carried out without discrepancies. The
main thing, however, was that his Cosmology, Anthropology and Eschatology did
not depart too far from the text of the Tradition for the edification of pious
souls, and that his theology, in consequence of a somewhat spiritualized
conception of God was not altogether unsatisfactory even to men of higher
culture.
Ashari
relies upon the revelation contained in the Koran. He does not recognize any
rational knowledge with regard to Divine things that is independent of the
Koran. The senses are not in general likely to deceive us, but on the other
hand our judgment may easily do so. We know God, it is true, by our reason, but
only from Revelation, which is the one source of such knowledge.
According
to Ashari, then, God is first of all the omnipotent Creator. Farther he is
omniscient: he knows what men do and what they wish to do: he knows also what
happens, and how that which does not happen would have happened, if it had
happened. Moreover all predicates which express any perfection are applicable
to God, with the proviso that they apply to him in another and higher sense
than to his creatures. In creating and sustaining the world God is the sole
cause : all worldly events proceed continually and directly from him. Man,
however, is quite conscious of the difference between his involuntary
movements, such as shivering and shaking, and those which are carried out in
the exercise of his will and choice.
12. The
most characteristic theory which the dialectic of the Muslims has fashioned, is
their doctrine of Atoms. The development of this doctrine is still wrapped in
great obscurity. It was advocated by the Mutazilites but particularly by their
opponents before the time of Ashari. Our sketch shows how it was held in the Asharite
school, where partly perhaps it was first developed.
The Atomic doctrine of the Muslim dialecticians had its source, of
course, in Greek Natural Philosophy; but its reception and farther development
were determined by the requirements of theological Polemic and Apologetic. The
like phenomenon may be observed in the case of individual Jews and among
believing Catholics. It is impossible to suppose that Atomism was taken up in
Islam, merely because Aristotle had fought against it. Here we have to register
a desperate struggle for a religious advantage, and one in which weapons are
not chosen at will: It is the end that decides. Nature has to be explained, not
from herself but from some divine creative act; and this world must be regarded
not as an eternal and divine order of things, but as a creature of transient
existence. God must be thought of and spoken of as a freely-working and almighty
Creator, not as an impersonal cause or inactive primeval source. Accordingly,
from the earliest times the doctrine of the creation is placed at the apex of
Muslim dogmatics, as a testimony against the pagan-philosophical view of the
eternity of the world and the efficient operations of Nature. What we perceive
of the sensible world, - say these Atomists, - is made up of passing
`accidents' which every moment come and go. The substratum of this `change' is
constituted by the (bodily) substances; and because of changes occurring in or
on these substances, they cannot be thought of as themselves unchangeable. If
then they are changeable, they cannot be permanent, for that which is eternal
does not change. Consequently everything in the world, since everything
changes, has come into being, or has been created by God.
That is the starting-point. The changeableness of all that exists
argues an eternal, unchangeable Creator. But later writers, under the influence
of Muslim philosophers, infer from the possible or contingent character of
everything finite, the necessary existence of God.
But let
us come back to the world. It consists of Accidents and their substrata, -
Substances. Substance and Accident or Quality are the two categories by means
of which reality is conceived. The remaining categories 'either come under the
category of Quality, or else are resolved into relations, and modifications of
thought, to which, objectively, nothing corresponds. Matter, as possibility,
exists only in thought : Time is nothing other than the coexistence of
different objects, or simultaneity in presentation; and Space and Size may be attributed
to bodies indeed, but not to the individual parts (Atoms), of which bodies are
composed.
But,
generally speaking, it is Accidents which form the proper predicates of
substances. Their number in every individual substance is very great, or even infinite
as some maintain, since of any pair whatever of opposite determinations, and.
these include negatives also, - the one or the other is attributable to every
substance. The negative `accident' is just as real as the positive. God
creates also Privation and Annihilation, though certainly it is not easy to
discover a substratum for these. And seeing that no Accident can ever have its
place elsewhere than in some substance, and cannot have it in another Accident,
there is really nothing general or common in any number of substances.
Universals in no wise exist in individual things: They are Concepts.
Thus there is no connection between substances: they stand apart, in
their capacity of atoms equal to one another. In fact they have a greater
resemblance to the Homoeomeries of Anaxagoras than to the extremely small
particles of matter of the Atomists. In themselves they are non-spatial
(without makan), but they have their
position (hayyiz), and by means of
this position of theirs they fill space. It is thus unities not possessing
extension, but conceived of as points, - out of which the spatial world of
body is constructed. Between these unities there must be a void, for were it
otherwise any motion would be impossible, since the atoms do not press upon one
another. All change, however, is referred to Union and Separation, Movement and
Rest. Farther operative relations between the Atom-substances, there are none.
The Atoms exist then, and enjoy their existence, but have nothing at all to do
with one another. The world is a discontinuous mass, without any living
reciprocal action between its parts.
The
ancients had prepared the way for this conception by their theory, amongst
other things, of the discontinuous character of Number. Was not Time defined as
the tale or numbering of Motion? Why should we not apply that doctrine to
Space, Time and Motion? The Dialecticians did this; and the 'skepsis' of the
older philosophy may have contributed its influence in the process. Like the
substantial, corporeal world, - Space, Time and Motion were decomposed into
atoms devoid of extension, and into moments without duration. Time becomes a
succession of many individual 'Nows', and between every two moments of time
there is a void. The same is the case with Motion: between every two movements
there is a Rest. A quick motion and a slow motion possess the same speed, but
the latter has more points of Rest. Then, in order to get over the difficulty
of the empty space, the unoccupied moment of time, and the pause for rest between
two movements, the theory of a Leap is made use of. Motion is to be regarded as
a leaping onward from one point in space to another, and Time as an advance
effected in the same manner from one moment to another.
In
reality they had no use at all for this fantastic theory of a Leap : it was a
mere reply to unsophisticated questioning. With perfect consistency they had
cut up the entire material world, as it moves in space and time, into Atoms
with their Accidents. Some no doubt maintained, that although accidents every
moment disappear, yet substances endure, but others made no difference in this
respect. They taught that substances, which are in fact points in space, exist
only for a point of time, just like Accidents. Every moment God creates the world
anew, so that its condition at the present moment has no essential connection
with that which has immediately preceded it or that which follows next. In this
way there is a series of worlds following one another, which merely present
the appearance of one world. That for us there is anything like connection or
Causality in phenomena proceeds from the fact that Allah in his inscrutable
will does not choose either to-day or to-morrow to interrupt the usual course
of events by a miracle, - which however he is able at any moment to do. The
disappearance of all causal connection according to the Atomistic Kalam is
vividly illustrated by the classical instance of `the writing man.' God
creates in him, -- and that too by an act of creation which is every moment
renewed - first the will, then the faculty of writing, next the movement of the
hand, and lastly the motion of the pen. Here one thing is completely
independent of the other.
Now if
against this view the objection is urged, that along with Causality or the
regular succession of worldly events, the possibility of any knowledge is taken
away, the believing thinker replies, that Allah verily foreknows everything,
and creates not only the things of the world and what they appear to effect,
but also the knowledge about them in the human soul, and we do not need to be
wiser than He. He knows best.
Allah
and the World, God and Man, - beyond these antitheses Muslim dialectic could
not reach. Besides God, there is room only for corporeal substances and their
accidents. The existence of human souls as incorporeal substances, as well as
generally the existence of pure Spirits, - both of which doctrines were
maintained by philosophers, and, though less definitely, by several
Mutazilites, - would not harmonize properly with the Muslim doctrine of the
transcendent nature of God, who has no associate. The soul belongs to the world
of body. Life, Sensation, Rational endowment, are accidents, just as much as
Colour, Taste, Smell, Motion and Rest. Some assume only one soul-atom:
According to others several finer soul-atoms are mingled with the bodily atoms.
At all events thinking is attached to one single Atom.
13. It was not every good Muslim that could find mental repose in dialectic. The pious servant of God might yet, in another way, draw somewhat nearer to his Lord. This need, - existing in Islam at the very outset, strengthened too by Christian and Indo-Persian influences, and intensified under more highly developed conditions of civilization, - evoked in Islam a series of phenomena, which are usually designated as Mysticism or Sufism.[12] In this development of a Muslim order of Holy men, or of a Muslim Monkish system, the history of Christian monks and cloisters in' Syria and Egypt, as well as that of Indian devotees, is repeated. In this matter then we have at bottom to deal with religious or spiritual practice; but practice always mirrors itself in thought, and receives its theory. In order to bring about a more intimate relationship with the Godhead, many symbolical acts and mediating persons were required. Such persons then endeavoured to discover the mysteries of the symbols for themselves and to disclose them to the initiated, and to establish, besides, their own mediatory position in the scale of universal being. In particular, Neo-Platonic doctrines, - partly drawn from the turbid source of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the holy Hierotheos (Stephen bar Sudaili?) - had to lend their aid in this work. The Indian Yoga too, at least in Persia, seems to have exercised considerable influence. For the most part Mysticism kept within the pale of Orthodoxy, which was always sensible enough to allow a certain latitude to poets and enthusiasts. As regards the doctrine that God works all in all, Dialecticians and Mystics were agreed; but extreme Mysticism propounded the farther doctrine that God is all in all. From this a heterodox Pantheism was developed, which made the world an empty show, and deified the human Ego. Thus the Unity of God becomes Universal Unity; his universal activity Universal Existence. Besides God, there exist at the most only the attributes and conditions of the Sufi souls that are tending towards him. A psychology of feeling is developed by the Sufi teachers. In their view, while our conceptions come to the soul from without, and our exertions amount to the externalizing of what is within, the true essence of our soul consists in certain states or feelings of inclination and disinclination. The most essential of all these is Love. It is neither fear nor hope, but Love that lifts us up to God. Blessedness is not a matter of `knowing' or of 'willing': it is Union with the loved one. These Mystics did away with the world (as ultimately they did with the human soul) in a far more thorough-going fashion than the Dialecticians had done. By the latter the world was sacrificed to the arbitrary character of God in Creation ; by the former to the illuminating, loving nature of the Divine Being. The confusing multiplicity of things, as that appears to sense and conception, is removed in a yearning after the One and Beloved being. Everything, both in Being and Thinking, is brought to one central point. Contrast with this the genuine Greek spirit. In it a wish was cherished for a still greater number of senses, to enable men to get a somewhat better acquaintance with this fair world. But these Mystics blame the senses for being too many, because their number brings disorder into their felicity.
Human
nature, however, always asserts herself. Those men who renounce the world and
the senses, frequently run riot in the most sensual fantasies, till far
advanced in life. We need not wonder after all, that many troubled themselves
very little indeed about religious doctrine, or that the ascetic morality of
the Sufis often went to the other extreme.
The
task of following out in detail the development of Sufism, however, belongs to
the history of Religion rather than to the history of Philosophy. Besides, we
find the philosophical elements which it took up, in the Muslim philosophers
whom we shall meet with farther on.
4. LITERATURE AND HISTORY.
1.
Arabic Poetry and Annalistic were developed independently of the learning of
the schools. But as time went on, Literature and Historical Composition could
not remain untouched by foreign influences. A few notices, confirmatory of this
statement, must suffice us here.
The
introduction of Islam involved no break with the poetical tradition of the Arab
race, such as had been occasioned by Christianity in the Teutonic world. The
secular literature of the times even of the Omayyads handed down many wise
sayings, partly taken from ancient Arabic poetry, which rivalled the preachings
of the Koran. Abbasid Caliphs, like Mansur, Harun and Mamun, had more literary
culture than Charlemagne. The education of their sons was not confined to the
reading of the Koran : it embraced acquaintance also with the ancient poets
and with the history of the nation. Poets and literary men were drawn to the
courts and rewarded in princely fashion. In these circumstances,
Literature underwent the influence of scholarly culture and philosophical
speculation, although, in most cases, in a very superficial manner. The result
is specially exhibited in sceptical utterances, frivolous mockery of what is
most sacred, and gglorification of sensual pleasure. At the same time, however,
wise sayings, serious reflections and mystic speculations made their way into
the originally sober and realistic poetry of the Arabs. The place of the first
natural freshness of representation was now taken by a wearisome play on
thoughts and sentiments, and even on mere words, metres and rhymes.
2. The unpleasant Abu-l-Atahia (748-828), in his
effeminate poetry, is nearly always talking about unhappy love and a longing
for death. He gives expression to his wisdom in the following couplet:
"The mind guide thou with
cautious hesitation :,The sin use the best shield, Renunciation".
Whoever
possesses any faculty for appreciating life and the poetry of Nature will find
little to enjoy in his worldrenouncing songs; and just as little satisfaction
will be afforded him in the verses of Mutanabbi (905-965), frightfully tedious
in their contents, although epigrammatic in their form. And yet Mutanabbi has
been praised as the greatest Arabic poet.
In like
manner people have unduly extolled Abu-l-Ala al-Maarri (973 -1058) as a
philosophic poet. His occasionally quite respectable sentiments and sensible
views are not philosophy, nor does the affected though often hackneyed
expression of these amount to poetry. Under more favourable conditions, - for
he was blind and not surpassingly rich, - this man might perhaps have rendered
some service in the subordinate walks of criticism as a philologist or a
historical writer. But, in place of an enthusiastic acceptance of life's
duties, he is led to preach the joyless abandonment of them, and to grumble
generally at political conditions, the opinions of the orthodox multitude, and
the scientific assertions of the learned, without being able himself to advance
anything positive. He is almost entirely wanting in the gift of combination. He
can analyse, but he does not hit upon any synthesis, and his learning bears no
fruit. The tree of his knowledge has its roots in the air, as he himself
confesses in one of his letters, though in a different sense. He leads a life
of strict celibacy and vegetarianism, as becomes a pessimist. As he puts it in
his poems "all is but an idle toy: Fate is blind; and Time spares neither
the king who partakes of the joys of life, nor the devout man who spends his
nights in watching and prayer. Nor does irrational belief solve for us the
enigma of existence. Whatever is behind those moving heavens remains hidden
from us for ever: Religions, which open up a prospect there, have been fabricated
from motives of self-interest. Sects and factions of all kinds are utilized by
the powerful to make their dominion secure, though the truth about these
matters can only be whispered. The wisest thing then is to keep aloof from the
world, and to do good disinterestedly, and because it is virtuous and noble to
do so, without any outlook for reward".
Other
literary men had a more practical philosophy, and could make their weight more
felt in the world. They subscribed to the wise doctrine of the Theatre-Manager
in Goethe's Faust: "He who brings much, will something bring to
many". The most perfect type of this species is Hariri (1054-1122), whose
hero, the beggar and stroller, Abu Zaid of Serug, teaches as the highest
wisdom:
"Hunt, instead of being
hunted;
All the world's a wood for
hunting. If the falcon should escape you, Take, content, the humble bunting: If
you finger not the dinars,
Coppers still are worth the
counting".[13]
3. The
Annalistic of the ancient Arabs, like their Poetry, was distinguished by a
clear perception of particulars, but was incapable of taking a general grasp of
events. With the vast extension of the empire their view was necessarily
widened. First a great mass of material was gathered together. Their
historical and geographical knowledge was advanced by means of journeys
undertaken to collect traditions, or for purposes of administration and trade,
or simply to satisfy curiosity, more than it could have been by mere religious
pilgrimages. Characteristic methods of research, brought to bear upon the value
of tradition as a source of our knowledge, were elaborated. With the same
subtlety which they displayed in Grammar, they portioned out, in endless
division and subdivision, the extended field of their observation, in a fashion
more truly `arabesque' than lucid ; and in this way they formed a logic of
history which must have appeared to an oriental eye much finer than the
Aristotelian Organon with its austere structure. Their tradition, - in
authenticating which they were, as a rule, less particular in practice than in
theory, - was by many made equal in value to the evidence of the senses, and
preferred to the judgment of the reason, which so easily admitted fallacious
inferences.
There
were always people, however, who impartially handed down contradictory reports,
alongside of one another. Others, although exhibiting consideration for the
feelings and requirements of the present, did not withhold their more or less
well-founded judgment on the past, for it is often easier to be discerning in
matters of history than in the affairs of the living world.
New subjects of enquiry came up, together with new modes of
treatment. Geography included somewhat of Natural Philosophy, for example in
the geography of climate; while
historical composition brought
within the range of its description intellectual life, belief, morals,
literature and science. Acquaintance also with other lands and nations invited
comparison on many points; and thus an international, humanistic or
cosmopolitan element was introduced.
4. A
representative of the humanistic attitude of mind is met with in Masudi, who
died about the year 956. He appreciates, and is interested in, everything that
concerns humanity. Everywhere he is learning something from the men he meets
with : and in consequence the reading of books, which occupies his privacy, is
not without fruit. But it is neither the narrow, everyday practices of life and
religion, nor the airy speculations of Philosophy, that specially appeal to
him. He knows where his strength lies; and up to the last, when he is spending
his old age in Egypt, far from his native home, he finds his consolation, - the
medicine of his soul, -- in the study of History. History for him is the
all-embracing science: it is his philosophy; and its task is to set forth the
truth of that which was and is. Even the wisdom of the world, together with its
development, becomes the subject of History; and without it all knowledge would
long since have disappeared. For learned men come and go; but History records
their intellectual achievements, and thereby restores the connection between
the past and the present. It gives us unprejudiced information about events and
about the views of men. Of course Masudi leaves it often to the intelligent
reader to find out for himself the due synthesis of the facts and the
individual opinion of the author.
A
successor of his, the geographer Maqdasi, or Muqaddasi, who wrote in the year
985, deserves to be mentioned with high commendation. He journeyed through many
countries, and exercised the most varied callings, in order to acquaint himself
with the life of his time. He is a true Abu Zaid of Serug (cf. II, 4 4 2), but
one with an object before him.
He sets
to work in critical fashion, and holds to the knowledge which is gained by
research and enquiry, not by faith in tradition or by mere deductions of the
reason. The geographical statements in the Koran he explains by the limited
intellectual horizon of the ancient Arabs, to which Allah must have seen fit to
adapt himself.
He
describes then, sine ira
et studio, the countries and races he has seen with own eyes. His
plan is to set down, in the first place, results gathered from his own
experience and observation; next, what he has heard from trustworthy people;
and last of all what he has met with in books. The following sentences are
extracted from his characterization of himself.
"I have given instruction in the common subjects of education
and morals : I have come forward as a preacher, and I have made the minaret of the
mosque resound with the call to prayer. I have been present at the meetings of
the learned and the devotions of the pious. I have partaken of broth with
Sufis, gruel with monks, and ship'sfare with sailors. Many a time I have been
seclusion itself, and then again I have eaten forbidden fruit against my
better judgment. I associated with the hermits of Lebanon, and in turn I lived
at the court of the Prince. In wars I have participated : I have been detained
as a captive and thrown into prison as a spy. Powerful princes and ministers
have lent me their ear, and anon I have joined a band of robbers, or sat as a
retail-dealer in the bazaar. I have enjoyed much honour and consideration, but
I have likewise been fated to listen to many curses and to be reduced to the
ordeal of the oath, when I was suspected of heresy or evil deeds".
We are accustomed at the present day to picture to ourselves the
Oriental as a being who, in contemplative repose, is completely bound to his
ancestral faith and usages. This representation is not quite correct, but still
it agrees better with the situation which now exists than it does with the
disposition of Islam in the first four centuries, for during that period it
was inclined to take into its possession not only the outward advantages of the
world, but also the intellectual acquisitions of Mankind.
III. THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.
1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Euclid and Ptolemy,
Hippocrates and Galen, some portion of Aristotle, and, in addition, an abundant
NeoPlatonic Literature,-indicate the elements of Arabic Natural Philosophy. It
is a popular philosophy, which, chiefly through the instrumentality of the
Sabaeans of Harran, found acceptance with the Sbi`ites and other sects, and
which in due course impressed not only court
circles, but also a large body of educated and half-educated people. Stray
portions of it were taken from the writings of the "Logician", -
Aristotle, - e. g. from the "Meteorology", from the work "On the
Universe", which has been attributed to him, from the "Book of
Animals", from the "Psychology", and so on; but its general
character was determined by Pythagorean-Platonic teaching, by the Stoics, and
by subsequent astrologers and alchemists. Human curiosity and piety were fain
to read the secrets of the Deity in the book of his Creation, and they
proceeded in this search far beyond practical requirements, which merely called
for a little arithmetic to serve in the division of inheritances and in trade,
and a little astronomy besides, to determine the proper times for celebrating
the functions of religion.
Men hastened to gather wisdom
from every quarter, and in so doing they manifested a conviction, which Masudi
accurately expressed, when he said : "Whatever is good should be
recognized, whether it is found in friend or foe". Indeed Ali, the prince
of believers, is reported to have said : "The wisdom of the world is the
believer's strayed sheep: take it back, even though it come from the unbelieving".
Pythagoras
is the presiding genius of Mathematical study in Islam. Greek and Indian
elements are mingled in it, it is true, but everything is regarded from a
Neo-Pythagorean point of view. Without studying such branches of Mathematics,
as Arithmetic and Geometry, Astronomy and Music, no one, they said, becomes a
philosopher or an educated physician. The Theory of Numbers, - prized more
highly than Mensuration, because it appeals less to the outward vision, and
should bring the mind nearer the essence of things, - gave occasion to the most
extravagant puerilities. God is, of course, the great Unity, from whom everything
proceeds, who himself is no number, but who is the First Cause of Number. But
above all, the number Four, the number of the elements and so on, -- was held
in high favour by the philosophers; and by-and-by nothing in heaven or earth
was spoken of or written about, except in sentences of four clauses and in
discourses under four heads.
The transition from Mathematics to Astronomy and Astrology was rapid
and easy. The old Eastern methods, which came into their hands, continued to be
applied even by the court-astrologers of the Omayyads, but with still greater
thoroughness at the Abbasid court. In this way they arrived at speculations.
which ran counter to the revealed Faith, and which therefore could never be
approved of by the guardians of religion. The only antithesis which existed for
the Believer was - God and the World, or this life and the next; but for the
Astrologer there were two worlds, one of the Heavens and another of the Earth, while
God and the life beyond were in the far distance. According to the different
conceptions entertained of the relation which subsisted between the heavenly
bodies and sublunary things, either a rational Astronomy was developed, or a
fantastic Astrology. Only a few kept entirely free from Astrological delusions.
As long, in fact, as the science was dominated by the Ptolemaic system, it was
easier for the completely uneducated man to jeer at what was absurd in it than
it was for the learned investigator to disprove the same. For the latter indeed
this earth with its forms of life was a product of the forces of the heavens, a
reflection of celestial light, an echo of the eternal harmony of the Spheres.
Those then who ascribed conception and will to the Spirits of the stars and
spheres, held them as the representatives of Divine providence, and thus traced
to their agency both what is good and what is evil, seeking also to foretell
future events from the situation of their orbs, by means of which they bring their
influence to bear upon earthly things in accordance with steadfast laws.
Others, it is true, had their doubts about this secondary providence, on
grounds of experience and reason, or from the Peripatetic belief that the
blessed existences of the heavens are Spirits of pure intellect, exalted above
conception and will, and in consequence above all particularity that appeals to
the senses, so that their providential influence is directed only
to the good of the whole, but never can have reference to
any individual occurrence.
3. In
the domain of Natural Science Muslim learned men collected a rich body of
material; but hardly in any case did they succeed in really treating it
scientifically. In the separate Natural sciences, the development of which we
cannot follow up in this place, they clung to traditional systems. To establish
the wisdom of God and the operations of Nature, -- which was regarded as a
power or emanation of the World-Soul, - alchemistic experiments were
instituted, the magical virtues of talismans tested, the effects of Music upon
the emotions of men and animals investigated, and observations made on
physiognomy, while attempts were also set on foot to explain the wonders of the
life of sleep and of dreams, as well as those of soothsaying and prophecy,
&c. As might be expected, the centre of interest was Man, as the Microcosm
which must combine in itself all the elements and powers of the world together.
The essential part of Man's being was held to be the Soul; and its relation to
the World-Soul, and its future lot were made subjects of enquiry. There was
also a good deal of speculation about the faculties of the soul and their
localization in the heart and the brain. One or two adhered to Galen, but
others went farther than he did, and made out five inner senses corresponding
to the five outer ones, - a theory which, along with similar natural mysteries,
was traced to Apollonius of Tyana.
Obviously
the most diverse attitudes towards religious doctrine were possible in the
study of Mathematical and Physical Science. But the propaedeutic sciences, as
soon as they came forward on their own account, were always dangerous to the
Faith. The assumption of the eternity of the world, and of an untreated matter
in motion from all eternity, - was readily combined with Astronomy. And if the
movement of the Heavens is eternal, so too are, no doubt, the changes which
take place on earth. All the kingdoms of Nature then, according to many
teachers, being eternal, the race of man is eternal also, wheeling round and
round in an orbit of its own. There is therefore nothing new in the world : the
views and ideas of men repeat themselves like everything else. All that can
possibly be done, maintained or known, has already been and will again be.
Admirable
discourse and lamentation were expended upon this theme, without much advancing
thereby the interests of Science.
4. The
science of Medicine, which on obvious grounds was favoured by the ruling
powers, appears to have proved somewhat more useful. Its interests furnished
one of the reasons, and not the least considerable, which induced the Caliphs
to commission so many men to translate Greek authors. It is therefore not to be
wondered at that the teachings of Mathematics and Natural Science, together
with Logic, also affected Medicine intimately. The old-fashioned doctor was
disposed to be satisfied with time-honoured magical formulae, and other
empirical expedients; but modern society in the ninth century required
philosophical knowledge in the physician. He had to know the
"natures" of foods, stimulants or luxuries, and medicaments, the
humours of the body, and in every case the influence of the stars. The
physician was brother to the astrologer, whose knowledge commanded his respect,
because it had a more exalted object than medical practice. He had to
attend the lectures of the
alchemist, and to practise his art in accordance with the methods of
Mathematics and Logic. It was not enough for the fanatics of education in the
ninth century that a man had to speak, believe and behave in accordance with Qiya8, - that is to say, with logical
correctness: he must, over and above, submit to be treated medically in
accordance with Qiyas. The
principles of Medicine were discussed in learned assemblies at the court of
Wathik (842-847) like the foundations of Doctrine and Morals. The question, in
fact, was asked, prompted by a work of Galen's, whether Medicine relies upon
tradition, experience or rational knowledge, or whether on the other hand it
derives its support from the principles of Mathematics and Natural Science by
means of logical deduction (Qiyas).
5. The
Natural Philosophy, which has just been rapidly sketched, actually stood for
Philosophy with the most of the scholars of the ninth century, as contrasted
with theological dialectic, and was styled Pythagorean. It lasted even into
the tenth century, when its most important representative was the famous
physician Razi (t 923 or 932). Born in Rai he received a mathematical education
and studied Medicine and Natural Philosophy with great diligence. He was
averse to dialectic and was only acquainted with Logic as far as the
categorical figures of the First Analytics. After having practised as director
of the hospital in his native city and in Bagdad, he entered upon his travels
and resided at various princely courts, amongst others at the court of the
Samanid Mansur ibn Ishaq, to whom he de-. dicated a work on Medicine.
Razi
has a high opinion of the medical profession and of the study which it demands.
The wisdom of a thousand years, contained in books, he prizes more than the
experiences of the individual man gained in one short life, but be prefers
even these to deductions of the "Logicians" which have not been
tested by experience.
He
thinks that the relation between the body and the soul is determined by the
soul. And seeing that in this way the circumstances and sufferings of the soul
admit of being discerned by means of the physiognomy, the medical man has to be
at the same time a physician of the soul. Therefore he drew up a system of
spiritual medicine, - a kind of Dietetic of the Soul. The precepts of Muslim
law, like the prohibition of wine, and so on, gave him no concern, but his
freethinking seems to have led him into pessimism. In fact he found more evil than
good in the world, and described inclination as the absence of disinclination.
High
though the value was which Razi put upon Aristotle and Galen, he did not give
himself any special trouble to gain a more profound comprehension of their
works. He was a devoted student of Alchemy, which in his view was a true art,
based on the existence of a primeval matter, - an art indispensable to
philosophers, and which, he believed, had been practised by Pythagoras,
Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and Galen. In opposition to Peripatetic teaching
he assumed that the body contained in itself the principle of movement, a
thought which might certainly have proved a fruitful one in Natural Science, if
it had been recognized and farther developed.
Razi's
Metaphysic starts from old doctrines, which his contemporaries ascribed to
Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Mani and others. At the apex of his system stand five
co-eternal
principles, - the Creator, the
Universal Soul, the First or Primeval matter, Absolute Space, and Absolute Time
or Eternal Duration. In these the necessary conditions of the actually existing
world are given. The individual senseperceptions, generally, presuppose an
existing Matter, just as the grouping of different perceived objects postulates
Space. Perceptions of change farther constrain us to assume the condition of
Time. The existence of living beings leads us to recognize a Soul; and the fact
that slime of these living beings are endowed with Reason, i. e. - have the
faculty of bringing the Arts to the highest perfection, .necessitates our
belief in a wise Creator, whose Reason has ordered everything for the best.
Notwithstanding
the eternity of his five principles, Razi thus speaks of a Creator and even
gives a story of Creation. First then a simple, pure, spiritual Light was
created, the material of Souls, which are simple, spiritual substances, of the
nature of Light. That Light-material or Upper-world, from which souls
descended, is also called Reason, or Light of the Light of God. The Light is
followed by the Shadow, from which the Animal Soul is created, for the service
of the Rational Soul. But simultaneously with the simple, spiritual light,
there existed from the first a composite form, which is Body, from the shadow
of which now issue the four "natures", Warmth and Cold, Dryness and
Moistness. From these four natures at last are formed all heavenly and earthly
bodies. The whole process, however, is in operation from all eternity, without
beginning in time, for God was never inactive.
That Razi was an astrologer is plain from his own utterances. The
heavenly bodies consist indeed, according to him, of the same elements as
earthly things, and the latter are continually exposed to the influences of the
former.
6. Razi
had to maintain a polemical attitude in two directions. On the one side he
impugned the Muslim Unity of God, which could not bear to be associated with
any eternal soul, matter, space or time; and on the other side he attacked the
Dahrite system, which does not acknowledge any Creator of the world. This
system, which is frequently mentioned by Muslim authors, with due aversion of
course, appears to have found numerous representatives, though none of any
importance. The adherents of the 'Dahr' (v. 1, 2, § 2) are represented to us as
Materialists, Sensualists, Atheists, Believers in the transmigration of souls,
and so on ; but we learn nothing more definite about their doctrines. In any
case the Dahrites had no need to trace all that exists to a principle which was
of spiritual essence and creative efficiency. Muslim Philosophy, on the other
hand, did stand in need of such a principle, if it should only conform in some
degree to the teaching of the faith. Natural Philosophy was not suited for the
furtherance of this object, as it showed more interest in the manifold and
often contrary operations of Nature than in the One Cause of all. Such aim was
better attained by Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism, whose logico-metaphysical
speculations endeavoured to trace all existence to one highest existence, or to
derive all things from one supreme operative principle. But before we attend to
this direction of thought, which commenced to appear even in the ninth century,
we have still to give some account of an attempt to blend Natural Philosophy
and the teachings of the Faith into a Philosophy of Religion.
2. THE FAITHFUL BRETHREN OF BASRA.
1. In
the East, where every religion formed a State within the State, a political
party invariably made its appearance in the additional character of a religious
sect, just to gain adherents in some way or other. As a matter of principle
indeed, Islam knew no distinction between men, - no caste or social standing.
But property and education have the same influence everywhere; and in their
train degrees of piety and stages of knowledge began to be set up, according
as a community or party permitted of adjustment. Thus there arose secret
societies having different grades, of which the highest and perhaps the next
highest possessed an esoteric doctrine, which borrowed a good deal from the
Natural Philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreaus. In furtherance of their object,
which was to conquer political power, every expedient was regarded as lawful.
For the initiated the Koran was explained allegorically. They traced their
mystic lore, it is true, back to prophets with Biblical and Koranic names, but
heathen philosophers were at the bottom of it all. Philosophy was completely
transformed into a mythology of politics. The high intelligences and souls,
which theoretic thinkers had recognized in the stars and planets, embodied
themselves in human beings for the work of actual Politics; and it was declared
to be a religious duty to assist these embodied intelligences in the
establishment of an earthly kingdom of righteousness. The associations which acted
in this way may best be compared to societies, which up to the days of
Saint-Simonism and kindred phenomena in last century were wont to appear in
countries where freedom of thought was restricted.
In the
second half of the ninth century Abdallah ibn Maimun, head of the Karmatite
party, was the originator of a movement of this kind. He was a Persian oculist,
trained in the school of the Natural Philosophers. He proved able to associate
both believers and freethinkers in a confederacy to endeavour to compass the
overthrow of the Abbasid government. To the one set he was a conjurer, to the
other a pious ascetic or learned philosopher. His colours were white, because
his religion was that of the pure light, to which the soul was to ascend after
its earthly wanderings. The duties inculcated were contempt for the body,
disregard of the Material, community 9f goods for all the confederate brethren,
as well as selfsurrender to the confederacy, and fidelity and obedience to
their chiefs, even to death, - for the society had its grades. In accordance
with the sequence of existence, viz., God, Reason, Soul, Space and Time, they
conceived the revelation of God to be made in history and in the constitution
of their own brotherhood.
2. The
chief homes of Karmatite activity were Basra and Kufa. Now we find in Basra in
the second half of the tenth century a small association of men, whose confederacy
aims at having four grades. We do
not know, to be sure, how far the brethren succeeded in realizing the ideal
organization of their confederacy. To the first grade belong young men of from
15 to 30 years of age, whose souls are being formed in the natural way : these
must be completely submissive to their teachers. The second grade, - from 30 to
40 years of age - are introduced to secular wisdom, and receive an analogical
knowledge of things. In the third grade, - from 40 to 50 years of age - the
Divine law of the world becomes known in more adequate form : that constitutes
the stage of the prophets. Finally, in the highest grade, when one is over 50
years old, he comes to see the true reality of things, just like the bleed
angels: he is exalted then above Nature, Doctrine and Law.
From
this brotherhood there has come down to us a progressively-advancing
Encyclopaedia of the Sciences of that day. It consists of 51 (originally
perhaps 50) treatises, the contents of which are of such varied nature and
origin that the redactors or compilers have not succeeded in establishing a
complete harmony among them. In general, however, there is found in this
Encyclopaedia an eclectic Gnosticism built on a foundation of Natural Science,
and provided with a political background. The scheme sets out with mathematical
considerations, continually playing with numbers and letters, and proceeds
through Logic and Physics, - referring everything, however, to the Soul and its
powers, - in order to approach at last, in a mystical and magical fashion, the
knowledge of the Godhead. The whole representation is that of the doctrine of a
persecuted sect, with the political features peeping out here and there. We see
also something of suffering and struggle, - something of the oppressions to
which the men of this Encyclopaedia or their predecessors were exposed, and
something of the hope they cherished and the patience they preached. They seek
in this spiritualistic philosophy, consolation or redemption : It is their
religion. `Faithful to death,' - so runs the expression - shall the brethren
be, for to meet death for a friend's welfare, is the true Holy war. In life's
pilgrimage through this world, - thus the obligatory journey to Mecca is
allegorized -, one must aid the other by all the means in his power. The rich
must communicate to others a share of their material goods, and the wise a
share of their intellectual possessions. But yet knowledge, as we have it in
the Encyclopaedia, was probably reserved for initiated members of the highest
grade.
It must
be allowed, however, that this confraternity of the Faithful Brethren of Basra
seems to have led a quiet existence, as perhaps was the case also with a branchsettlement
of theirs in Bagdad. The relation of the Brethren to the Karmatites may have
resembled that of the more peaceful Baptists to the revolutionary Anabaptists
of the `King of Sion'.[14]
The names of the following have been given to us by later writers, as
having been members of the Brotherhood and collaborators of the Encyclopaedia,
viz.: Abu Sulaiman Mohammed ibn Mushir al-Busti, called al-Muqaddasi;
Abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Harun al-Zaudjani; Mohammed ibn Akhmed al-Nahradjuri;
Al-Aufi and Zaid ibn Rifaa. In the time of their activity the Caliphate had
already been forced to make an entire surrender of its secular power into the
hands of the Shiite dynasty of the Bayids. Probably this circumstance was
favourable to the appearance of an Encyclopaedia, in which Shiite and
Mutazilite doctrines together with the results of Philosophy were comprehended
in one popular system.
3. The Brethren themselves avow their eclecticism. They wish to collect the wisdom of all nations and religions. Noah and Abraham, Socrates and Plato, Zoroaster and Jesus, Mohammed and Ali are all prophets of theirs. Socrates, and Jesus and his apostles, no less than the children of Ali, are honoured as holy martyrs of their rational faith. The religious law in its literal sense is pronounced good for the ordinary man, - a medicine for weak and ailing souls : the deeper philosophic insight is for strong intelligences. Though the body is devoted to death, dying means rising again to the pure life of the Spirit, for those who during their earthly existence have been awakened by means of philosophic considerations out of careless slumber and foolish sleep. This is impressed with endless repetition, by means of legends and myths of later-Greek, Judaeo-Christian, Persian or Indian origin. Every transitory thing is here turned into an emblem. On the ruins of positive religion and unsophisticated opinion a spiritualistic philosophy is built up, embracing all the knowledge and endeavour of human kind, so far as these came within the Brethren's field of view. The aim of their philosophizing is given as `the assimilation of the soul to God, in the degree possible for man'.
In this
scheme, the negative tendencies of the Brethren, are kept somewhat in the
background, for reasons which are quite intelligible. But their criticism of
human society and of positive religions is exhibited with least reserve in the
'Book of the Animal and the Man', in which the figurative dress makes it
possible for them to represent animals as saying what might be questionable if
heard from a human mouth.
4. The eclectic
character of the scheme, and the far from systematic method adopted in its
subdivisions render it difficult to give a coherent exposition of the
philosophy of the Brethren. But still the most important tenets, though
sometimes loosely connected, must here be set forth with a measure of order.
The
mental activity of Man falls to be divided, according to the Encyclopaedia,
into Art and Science. Now Science or Knowledge is the form assumed within the
knowing soul by that which is known, or a higher, finer, more intellectual mode
of existence of whatever is realized in outward substance. Art on the other
hand consists in projecting the form from the artist-soul into matter.
Knowledge is potentially present in the soul of the disciple, but it becomes
actual only through the teaching activity of a master, who carries knowledge as
a reality within his own mind. But whence did it come to the first master? The
Brethren answer, that according to the philosophers he gained it by his own
reflection, while, according to the theologians, he received it through
prophetic illumination; "but in our view there are various ways or
instrumentalities by which knowledge may be attained. From the intermediate
position of the soul, between the worlds of body and of mind it results that
there are open to it three ways or sources of knowledge. Thus by means of the
senses the soul is made acquainted with what is beneath it, and through logical
inference with what is above it, and finally with itself by rational
consideration or direct intuition. Of these kinds of knowledge the surest and
the most deserving of preference is knowledge of one's self. When human
knowledge attempts to go farther than this, it proves itself to be limited in
many ways. Therefore one must not philosophize straight away about questions
like the origin or the eternity of the world, but make his first essays with
what is simpler. And only. through renunciation of the world, and righteous
conduct, does the soul lift itself gradually up to the pure knowledge of the
Highest."
5.
After secular instruction in Grammar, Poetry and History, and after religious
education and doctrine, philosophic study should begin with the mathematical
branches. Here everything is set forth in Neo-Pythagorean and Indian fashion.
Not only numbers but even the letters of the alphabet are employed in childish
trifling. It was particularly convenient for the Brethren that the number of
letters in the Arabic alphabet is 28, or 4 multiplied by 7. Instead of
proceeding according to practical and real points of view, they give the rein
to fancy in all the sciences, in accordance with grammatical analogies and
relations of numbers. Their Arithmetic does not investigate Number as such, but
rather its significance. No search is made for any more suitable mode of
expressing number in the case of phenomena; but things are themselves explained
in accordance with the system of numbers. The Theory of number is Divine
wisdom, and is above Things, for things are only formed after the pattern of
numbers. The absolute principle of all existence and thought is the number One.
The science of number, therefore, is found at the beginning, middle, and end
of all philosophy. Geometry, with its figures addressing the eye, serve; merely
to make it more easily understood by beginners, but Arithmetic alone is true
and pure science. And yet Geometry too is divided into a sensible form of it
which deals with lines, surfaces and solids, and a pure or spiritual form which
treats of the dimensions or properties of things, such as length, breadth and
depth. The object both of Arithmetic and Geometry is to conduct the soul from
the sensible to the spiritual.
First
of all then they lead us to consider the stars. Now the Encylopaedia offers us, in its Astrology, - and
nothing else could be expected - teaching which is exceedingly fantastic and
sometimes self-contradictory. The whole of it is pervaded by the conviction
that the stars not merely foretell the future, but directly influence or bring
about every thing that happens beneath the moon. Fortune and misfortune come
equally from them. Jupiter, Venus and the Sun bring fortune; misfortune is
brought, on the other hand, by Saturn, Mars and the Moon; while the effects produced by the planet Mercury
have in them both bad and good. Mercury is the lord of education and science:
we owe to him our knowledge, which comprises bad and good. In the same way too
the other planets have all their several spheres of influence; and man in the
course of life, if he is not prematurely snatched away, experiences successively
the influences of the whole of the heavenly bodies. The Moon causes his body to
grow and Mercury forms his mind. Then he comes under the sway of Venus. The Sun
gives him family, riches or dominion; Mars, .bravery and noble-mindedness.
Thereupon, under the guidance of Jupiter, he prepares, by means of religious
exercises, for the journey to the world beyond, and he attains rest under the
influence of Saturn. Many men, however, do not live long enough, or are not
enabled by circumstances, to develope their natural capacities in unbroken
sequence. God therefore graciously sends them his prophets, by whose teaching
they may, even in a short time and under unfavourable circumstances, form
their natures completely.
6.
According to the Encyclopaedia, Logic is related to Mathematics. In fact just
as Mathematics conducts from the sensible to the intellectual, so Logic takes
an intermediate position between Physics and Metaphics. In Physics we have to
do with bodies; in Metaphysics, with pure Spirits; but Logic treats of the
ideas of the latter as well as of the representations of the former in our
soul. Yet in range and importance Logic is inferior to Mathematics. For the
subject of Mathematics is regarded not merely as an intermediary, but also as
the essence of the All, while on the other hand Logic remains completely
restricted to psychic forms as an intermediary between body and mind. Things
are regulated by numbers, but our presentations and ideas by things.
The
logical observations of the Brethren start from Porphyry's Introduction, and
the Categories, the Hermeneutics and the Analytics of Aristotle. They present
nothing original, or very little.
To the
five terms of Porphyry, a sixth, - the 'Individual' - is added, no doubt for
the sake of symmetry. Three of these, - Genus, Species, Individual, -- are then
called Objective Qualifications and three, - Difference, Property, Accident -
Abstract or Conceptional Qualifications. The Categories are Genus-conceptions,
of which the first is Substance, the other nine denoting its Accidents. The
whole system of Concepts is farther developed by a division into species. But
besides Division, there are three additional logical methods in use: Analysis,
Definition and Deduction. Analysis is the method for beginners, because it
permits a knowledge of what is individual. More subtle, however, as disclosing
to us what is spiritual, - are Definition and Deduction, the former
investigating the essential nature of Species, and the latter that of Genera.
The Senses apprise us of the existence of things; but acquaintance with the
essence of things is gained by reflection. The information which is conveyed to
us by the senses is small, as it were the letters of the alphabet. Of greater
importance considerably are the principles of rational knowledge, just as words
have more significance than letters; but the most important knowledge of all,
lies in the propositions which have been derived from those principles, and
which the human mind gains for itself or appropriates, in contradistinction to
that knowledge which Nature or the Divine revelation has imparted to it.
7. From
God, the highest Being, who is exalted above all distinctions and oppositions
both of the Material and the Spiritual, the whole world is derived by the path
of Emanation. If now and again a Creation is spoken of, that is only to be
understood as a form of adaptation to theological language. The gradation then
of the Emanations is exhibited as follows: 1. The Creative Spirit. (ions, `aql); 2. The Passive Spirit, or the
All-Soul or World-Soul; 3. The First Material; 4. The Operative Nature, a power
of the World-Soul; 5. The Absolute Body, called also, the Second Material; 6.
The World of the Spheres; 7. The Elements of the Sublunary World; 8. The
Minerals, Plants and Animals composed of these elements. These then are the
eight Essences which, - together with God, the Absolute One, who is in everything
and with everything - complete the series of Original Essences corresponding to
the nine Cardinal Numbers.
Spirit,
Soul, Original Matter, and Nature are simple;but with Body we enter the realm
of the Composite. Here all is composed of Matter and Form, or, -- to adopt
another principle of division, - of Substance and Accident. The first
Substances are Matter and Form; the first Accidents or Properties, Space,
Motion and Time, to which in the opinion of the Brethren may perhaps be added
Tone and Light. Matter is one; all plurality and diversity come from the Forms.
Substance is designated also as the constitutive, material Form, while Accident
is the completing, spiritual Form. The Encyclopaedia does not express itself
clearly on these points. But in any case Substantiality is looked for rather in
the Universal than in the Particular, and Form is put before Matter. The
Substantial Form, like a spectre, frightens off every attempt of the
philosopher to investigate thoroughly the domain of the Material. The Forms
wander at their own sweet will like lords through the lower world of Matter. No
trace is discoverable of any inner relation between Matter and Form. Not only
in thought, but also in reality they keep themselves separate.
From
the account which has been given an idea may now be formed of the story of
Nature as the Brethren viewed it. They have been represented as the Darwinists
of the tenth century, but nothing could be more inappropriate, The various
realms of Nature, it is true, yield according to the Encyclopaedia an
ascending and connected series; but, the relation is determined not by bodily
structure, but by the inner Form or Soul-Substance. The Form wanders in mystic
fashion from the lower to the higher and vice
versa, not in accordance with inner laws of formation, or modified to suit
external conditions, but in accordance with the influences of the stars, and,
in the case of Man at least, in accordance with practical and theoretical
behaviour. To give a history of Evolution in the modern sense of the term was
very far from the thought of the Brethren. For example they expressly insist
that the horse and the elephant resemble Man more than the ape does, although
the bodily likeness is greater in the last-named. In fact in their system the body
is a matter of quite secondary consideration : the death of the body is called
the birth of the soul. The soul alone is an efficient existence, which procures
the body for itself.
8. The
teaching of the Brethren concerning Nature is therefore merged almost
completely in Psychology. Let us confine ourselves here to the human soul. It
stands in the centre of the All; and just as the World is a huge man, Man is a
little world.
The
human soul has emanated from the World-soul; and the souls of all individuals taken
together constitute a substance which might he denominated the Absolute Man or
the Spirit of Humanity. Every individual soul, however, is involved in Matter,
and must gradually be formed into spirit. To that end it possesses many
faculties or powers, and of these the speculative faculties are the choicest,
for knowledge is the very life of the soul.
The soul of the child is at first like a white sheet of paper. What
the five senses convey to it is first presented, then judged, and lastly stored
up, in the front, middle, and hinder parts of the brain respectively. Through
the faculty of speech and the art of writing, which make up the number of the
internal senses to five, corresponding to the number of the External, the
contents of Presentation are then realized.
Among the external senses, Hearing takes precedence of Sight; for
Sight, a mere slave of the moment, is occupied with what is actually present to
the sense, whereas Hearing apprehends also what is past, and is conscious of
the harmony of the tuneful spheres. Hearing and Sight constitute the group of
the intellectual senses, whose effect must continue time without end.
While
Man then possesses the external senses in common with the lower animals, the
specific nature of human reason is notified in Judgment, Speech and Action.
Reason judges of good and bad, and in conformity with that judgment the will is
determined. But in particular the significance which Language has for the
soul's life of cognition is to be emphasised. A concept which cannot be
denoted by some expression in some language is not thinkable at all. The word
is the body of the thought, which cannot exist absolutely per
se.
But it
is difficult to see how this understanding of the relation between concept and
expression is to square with other opinions of the Brethren.
9. At
its highest stage the teaching of the Brethren becomes a Philosophy of
Religion. Its purpose is a reconciliation between Science and Life, Philosophy
and Faith. Now in these matters men differ greatly. The ordinary man requires a
sensuous worship of God; but just as the souls of animals and plants are
beneath the soul of the ordinary man, so above it are the souls of the
philosopher and the prophet with whom the pure angel is associated. In the
higher stages the soul is raised also above the lower popular religion with its
sensuous conceptions and usages.
No doubt Christianity and the Zoroastrian faith appeared to the
Brethren to be more perfect religious revelations. ,Our Prophet,
Mohammed', they said, `was sent to an uncivilized people, composed of dwellers
in the desert, who neither possessed a proper conception of the beauty of this
world, nor of the spiritual character of the world beyond. The crude
expressions of the Koran, which are adapted to the understanding of that
people, must be understood in a spiritual sense by those who are more
cultured'.
But the
truth is not presented in its purity even in the other national religions.
There is a rational faith above them all for which the Brethren moreover tried
to find a metaphysical derivation. Between God and his first creature, the
Creative Spirit, there is interposed by way of hypostasis the Divine World-Law (namis). That World-Law extends over
everything, and is the wise arrangement of a merciful Creator, who intends evil
to no one. Belief in a God of Anger, in the punishment of Hell and the like,
the Brethren declare to be irrational. Such a faith does harm to the soul. The
ignorant, sinful soul finds its hell even in this life and in its own body. On
the other hand, Resurrection is the separation of the soul from its body, and
the great Resurrection at the last day is the separation of the Universal soul
from the world, and its return to God. This turning to God indeed is the aim in
all religions.
10. The
ethical system of the Brethren has an ascetic, spiritualistic character,
although here too their eclecticism is shewn. According to it man is acting
rightly, when he follows his proper nature; `praiseworthy is the free act of
the soul; admirable are the actions which have proceeded from rational
consideration; and lastly, obedience to the Divine World-Law is worthy of the
reward of being raised to the celestial world of spheres. But this requires
longing for what is above; and therefore the highest virtue is Love, which
strives after union with God, the first loved one, and which is evinced even in
this life in the form of religious patience and forbearance with all created
beings. Such love gains in this life serenity of soul, freedom of heart and
peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension to Eternal
Light.'
After
all this we need not wonder that the body was depreciated a good deal. `Our
true essence is the soul, and the highest aim of our existence should be to
live, with Socrates, devoted to the Intellect, and with Christ, to the Law of
Love. Nevertheless the body must be properly treated and looked after in order
that the soul may have time to attain its full development.' In this view the
Brethren set up an ideal type of human culture, whereof the features were
borrowed from the characteristics of various nations. `The ideal, and morally
perfect man, should be of East-Persian derivation, Arabic in faith, of Irak, i.
e. Babylonian, education, a Hebrew in astuteness, a disciple of Christ in
conduct, as pious as a Syrian Monk, a Greek in the individual sciences, an
Indian in the interpretation of all mysteries, but lastly and especially, a
Sufi in his whole spiritual life.'
11. The
attempt to establish in this way a reconciliation between knowledge and faith
satisfied neither side. Theological dialecticians looked down upon the interpretation
of the Koran given by the Brethren, just as the divines of our day look down
upon the N. T. exegesis of Count Tolstoi. And the more rigid Aristotelians
regarded the Pythagorean-Platonic tendency of the Encyclopaedia much as a
modern professor of philosophy is wont to look upon Spiritism, Occultism, and
phenomena of that nature. But the writings, or at any rate the opinions, of the
Faithful Brethren of Basra have exercised an important influence on the great
body of the educated or half-educated world, - an influence to which eloquent
attestation is borne by the very fact that so many manuscripts, mostly of
recent date, are to be met with, of this extensive Encyclopaedia. Among many
sects within the world of Islam, such as the Batinites, the Ismaelites, the
Assasins, the Druses, or whatever may be their names, we find again the same
doctrines in the main. In this form Greek wisdom has best succeeded in making
itself at home in the East, while the Aristotelian School-Philosophy would only
thrive, with few exceptions, in the hothouse-cultivation bestowed upon it at
the courts of princely patrons. The great religious father, Gazali, is ready
enough to toss aside the wisdom of the Brethren as mere popular philosophy, but
he does not hesitate to take over what was good in them. He owes more to their
body of ideas than he would perhaps have cared to avow. And their treatises
have been turned to profit by others besides, particularly in Encyclopaediac
works. The influence of the Encyclopaedia continues even yet in the Muslim
East. In vain was it burned in Bagdad. in the year 1150, along with the
writings of Ibn Sina.
IV. THE
NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS
OF THE EAST.
1. KINDI.[15]
1.
Kindi is related in various ways to the Mutazilite Dialecticians and the
Neo-Pythagorean Natural-Philosophers of his time, and we might therefore have
dealt with him among the latter, even before Razi (v. III, 1, § 5). But yet
tradition with one accord represents him as the first Peripatetic in Islam.
What justification exists for this traditionary view will be seen in what
follows, so far as an inference can be drawn from the few and imperfectlypreserved
writings of this philosopher which have come down to us.
Abu
Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (i. e. of
the tribe of Kinda) was of Arabian origin, and therefore was called the
"Arabian" philosopher, to distinguish him from the numerous non-Arab
associates of his, who had taken to the study of secular wisdom. He traced his
genealogy to the old Kinda princes, although whether he was entitled to do so
we need not seek to decide. The South-Arabian tribe of Kinda was in any case
farther advanced in outward civilization than other tribes. Many Kindite families
too had for long been settlers in Iraq (Babylonia); and there, in the town of
Kufa, of which his father was governor, our philosopher was born, probably in
the beginning of the ninth century. He received his education, it would appear,
partly in Basra, and thereafter in Bagdad, and therefore in the headquarters of
the culture of his time. Here he came to put a higher value upon Persian
civilization and Greek wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith.
He maintained even, - no doubt, following others -, that Kakhtan, the ancestor
of the South-Arabians was a brother of Yaunan's, from whom the Greeks were
descended. It was possible to make an observation of that kind in Bagdad at the
Abbasid court, for there they knew of no nationality, and regarded the ancient
Greeks with admiration.
It is not known how long Kindi remained at court, or what position he
held there. He is mentioned as a translator of Greek works into Arabic, and is
said to have revised and improved translations made by others, for example, in
the case of the so-called "Theology of Aristotle". Numerous servants
and disciples, whose names have been handed down to us, were probably set to
this work under his supervision. Farther, he may have rendered services to the
court in the capacity of astrologer or physician, and perhaps even in the
administration of the revenues. But in later years he was dismissed, when he
with others was made to suffer from the restoration of orthodoxy under
Mutawakkil (847-861); and his library was for a long time confiscated. As
regards personal character, tradition reproaches him with having been
niggardly, - a stigma, however, which appears to have rested upon many other
literary men and lovers of books.
The
year of Kindi's death is as little known as that of his birth. He appears thus
to have been out of courtfavour when he died, or at least to have been in a
subordinate position. It is strange that Masudi (v. II, 4 § 4), who had a
great regard for him, is utterly silent on this point; but it seems in the highest
degree probable from one of his astrological treatises that he was still alive
subsequent to the year 870. The expiry of some petty astronomical cycle was
imminent at that date, and this was being utilized by the Karmatites for the
overthrow of the reigning family. In this matter, however, Kindi was loyal
enough to make out the prolongation, for about 450 years, of the State's
existence, menaced though it was by a planetary conjunction. His princely
patron might well be satisfied; and history conformed to the time predicted, to
within half a-century.[16]
2.
Kindi was a man of extraordinary erudition, a Polyhistor: he had absorbed the
whole learning and culture of his time. But although he may have set down and
communicated observations of his own as a geographer, a historian of
civilization and a physician, he was in no respect a creative genius. His
theological views bear a Mutazilite stamp. He wrote specially on Man's power of
action, and the time of its appearance, i. e. whether it was before the act or
whether it was synchronous with the act. The righteousness and the unity of God
he expressly emphasized. In opposition to the theory, - known at that time as
Indian or Brahmanic, - that Reason is the Sole and sufficient source of
knowledge, he defended prophecy, while yet he sought to bring it into harmony
with reason. His acquaintance with various systems of religion impelled him to
compare them together, and he found as a common element in them all the belief
that the world was the work of a First Cause, One and Eternal, for whom our
knowledge furnishes us with no more precise designation. It is however the duty
of the discerning to recognize this First Cause-as divine ; and God himself has
shewn them the way thereto, and has sent them ambassadors to bear witness for
him, who are instructed to promise everlasting bliss to the obedient, and to
threaten corresponding punishment to those who do not obey.
3. Kindi's actual philosophy, like that of his contemporaries,
consists, first and especially, of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, in which
Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism merge into one another. According to him
no one can be a philosopher without studying Mathematics. Fanciful play upon
letters and numbers is frequently met with in his writings. Mathematics he also
applied to Medicine in his theory of the compound remedies. In fact he based
the efficacy of these remedies, like the effect of music, upon geometrical
proportion. It is here a matter of the proportionality of the sensible
qualities, warm, cold, dry and moist. If a remedy has to be warm in the first
degree, it must possess double the warmth of the equable mixture, - in the
second degree, four times as much, and so on. Kindi seems to have entrusted the
decision of this point to Sense, particularly to the sense of Taste, so that in
him we might have a hint of the proportional relation existing between stimulus
and sensation. Yet that view, though quite original, was with him a mere piece
of mathematical play. However, Cardan, a philosopher of the Renaissance, on the
ground of this doctrine, reckoned him among the twelve most subtle-minded
thinkers.
4. In
Kindi's opinion, as has already been said, the world is a work of God, but His
influence in its descent is transmitted through many intermediate agencies. All
higher existence affects the lower, but that which is caused has no influence
upon its cause, standing as this does above it in the scale of Being. In all
the events of the world there is a pervading causality, which makes it possible
for us, from our knowledge of the cause, to foretell the future, - for example,
of the positions of the heavenly bodies. Farther, in any single existing thing,
if it is thoroughly known, we possess a mirror, in which we may behold the
entire scheme of things.
It is
to the Spirit or Mind that the higher reality and all activity belong, and
matter has to dispose itself in conformity with the desire of the Spirit.
Midway between the Spirit of God and the material and bodily world stands the
Soul, and it is the Soul which first called into being the world of the
Spheres. From this Soul of the world the Human Soul is an emanation. In its
nature, that is, in its operations, it is bound to the body with which it is
united, but in its spiritual essence it is independent of the body; and thus
the influences of the stars, which are limited to physical occurrences, do not
affect it. Kindi goes on to say that our Soul is an uncompounded, imperishable
substance, descended from the world of reason into that of the senses, but
endowed with a recollection of its earlier condition. It does not feel at home
here, for it has many needs, the satisfaction of which is denied to it, and
which consequently are attended with painful emotions. Verily there is nothing
constant in this world of coming and going, in which we may be deprived at any
moment of what we love. Only in the world of reason is stability to be found.
If then we desire to see our wishes fulfilled, and would not be deprived of
what is dear to us, we must turn to the eternal blessings of reason, to the
fear of God, to science, and to good works. But if we follow merely after
material possessions in the belief that we can retain them, we are pursuing an
object which does not really exist.
6.
Kindi's theory of knowing corresponds to the ethical and metaphysical duality
of the sensible and the spiritual. According to it our knowledge is either
knowledge conveyed by the senses, or knowledge acquired by the reason: that
which lies between, - the Fancy or Imagination, - is called a mediating
faculty. The senses, then, apprehend the Particular, or the material Form, but
the reason conceives the Universal, - species and genera,- or the
spiritual Form. And just as that which is perceived is one with SensePerception,
so too that which is conceived by the reason is one with Reason itself.
Here
then emerges for the first time the doctrine of the Reason or of the Spirit or
Mind, (voec, 'aql) in a form in
which, merely modified somewhat, it occupies a large space with the later Muslim
philosophers. It continued to be a characteristic feature of philosophy in
Islam throughout its whole course. And just as in the controversy regarding
Universals in the Christian Middle Ages an objective
and scientific interest is made
evident also, so in the philosophical discussions of the Muslims concerning
the thinking Spirit, the subjective requirement of intellectual culture is
brought conspicuously to the front.
Kindi
has a fourfold division of the Spirit:[17] first the Spirit which is ever real, -
the Cause and the Essence of all that is spiritual in the world, - thus without
doubt God or the First Spirit produced ; second, Spirit as the Reasoning
capacity or Potentiality of the human soul; third, as the Habit or actual
possession of the soul, which it can make use of at any moment, just as, for
example, the writer can make use of his art; fourth and last, as Activity, by
which a reality within the soul may be carried over to the reality that is
without. The Activity last named appears, according to Kindi, to be the act of
Man himself, while to the First Cause, - to the ever-existing Spirit, - he
ascribes the, carrying of Potentiality into Habit, or the realisation of the
Possible. The real Spirit or Mind we have thus received from above, and the third
'aql is therefore called 'all mustafad, (Lat. intellectus adeptue eive adquisitus). The
fundamental view of antiquity, - that all our knowledge about things must come
from a source outside of us -, runs, in the form of this doctrine of the 'all mustafad or Spirit which we receive from
above, through the whole of Arabian Philosophy, and thence passes into
Christian Philosophy. Unfortunately the theory is nearly correct, as .far as
this philosophy is itself concerned, for the `Active Spirit', which has created
it, is in reality the NeoPlatonic Aristotle.
Man has
always attributed to his God or Gods the highest of his own possessions. Muslim
theologians directly attribute to the divine agency the moral actions of men.
But in the opinion of the philosophers, Knowing is of more importance than
Doing. The latter, having more to do with the lower world of the senses, may
possibly be Man's own; but his highest knowledge, the pure Reason, comes from
above, - from the Divine Essence.
It is
clear that the doctrine of the Spirit, as it stands in Kindi, goes back to the
'Nous'-doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his second book "On the
Soul". But Alexander expressly maintained that according to Aristotle
there is a threefold `Nous'. Kindi says on the contrary that he is representing
the opinion of Plato and Aristotle. In this the Neo-Pythagorean and the
Neo-Platonic views unite: for in everything the number `Four' must be pointed
out, and Plato and Aristotle brought into agreement.
6. Let
us now sum up : Kindi is a Mutazilite theologian and Neo-Platonic philosopher
with Neo-Pythagorean additions. Socrates, the martyr of Athenian heathenism,
is his ideal: on him, his fate and his teaching he has composed several works;
and he seeks to combine Plato and Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion.
Tradition
nevertheless calls him the first who followed Aristotle in his writings; and
assuredly this representation is not altogether unfounded. In the long list of
his works Aristotle takes a prominent place. He was not satisfied with merely
translating him, but he studied his translated works and endeavoured to improve
and explain them. At all events the Aristotelian Physics, with the commentary
of Alexander of Aphrodisias, had an important influence upon him. Such
assertions as that the world is only potentially unending and not actually so,
and that motion is continuous, and the like, point rather in that direction.
The Natural-Philosophers of that day, as well as the Faithful Brethren, said
for instance, that motion had as little continuity as number. But farther,
Kindi resolutely turned away from the marvel-mongering philosophy of the time,
by declaring Alchemy an imposture. That which nature alone could produce, he
held to be beyond the power of man. Whoever then gives himself up to
alchemistic experiments, is in his opinion deceiving either himself or others.
The famous physician, Razi, attempted to controvert this view of Kindi's.
7. The
influence of Kindi as a teacher and an author has operated mainly through his
Mathematics, Astrology, Geography and Medicine. His most faithful and certainly
his most notable disciple was Akhmed ibn Mohammed al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi (t
899), a government official and
friend of the Caliph Mutadid, to whose negligence or caprice he fell a victim.
He worked at Alchemy and Astrology, strove to gain a knowledge of the wisdom
and might of the Creator from the wonders of creation, and prosecuted the study
of Geography and History. Another disciple of Kindi's has become better known,
- Abu Mashar (t 885), who, however, owes all his reputation to Astrology. He is
said to have become, when 47 years of age, an admirer of Kindi’s, - though up
till then he had been a fanatical opponent of philosophy, - having been
attracted to the pursuit of Astrology, by a superficial study of Mathematics.
Whether this be truth or fiction, such a course of education is at all events
characteristic of that inquisitive grasping at half-understood knowledge, which
peculiarly belongs to the first centuries of Arab Science.
The school
of Kindi went in no way beyond the master. Of its literary activity hardly any
sample has been preserved to us beyond a stray quotation or two. It is of
course possible that in the treatises of the Faithful Brethren, something of it
may have been saved, but this cannot be determined, in the present state of our
knowledge.
2. FARABI.
1. In
the tenth century the Logicians or Metaphysicians are distinguished from the
Natural-Philosophers. The former follow a more rigorous method than the
Dialecticians, and treat of other subjects than those which are dealt with by
the Physical school. They have repudiated Pythagoras, to entrust themselves to
the guidance of Aristotle, of course in Neo-Platonic guise.
We have
here to do with two directions of scientific interest. The Natural-Philosophers
are more or less concerned with the plenitude of the concrete phenomena of
Nature, as in Geography and Ethnology. They investigate in all directions the
effects of things, and think the essential nature of these is only to be
discerned in such effect or working. When they do ascend beyond Nature, Soul
and Spirit, to the Divine Essence, then the definition of it to which they
confine themselves, or which they adopt by preference, is - `the First Cause',
or, -'the wise Creator', whose goodness and wisdom appear from his works.
The Logicians proceed in a very different way. The occurrence of the
Particular has only a subordinate value in their eyes, - the value, merely, of
an illustration of its deducibility from the Universal. While the Physicists
start from effects or operations, the Logicians seek to comprehend things from
principles. Everywhere they enquire after the Idea or Essence of things, up to
the highest. For them, - to make the contrast more intelligible by an example
-, God is not, first of all, `the wise Creator', but first of all `the
necessarily existing Being'.
In
the order of time the Logicians come after the Physical school, just as the
Mutazilite Dialectic on its part (v. II, 3 §§ 4 and 5) brought within the scope
of its consideration first God's Working, and then his Being.
We have already come to recognize Razi as the most important
representative of the philosophical direction taken by the Physicists; and as
for the Logical and Metaphysical efforts, -- for which Kindi and others had
prepared the way, - they culminate with Razi's younger contemporary Abu Nasr
ibn Mohammed ibn Tarkhan ibn Uziag al-Farabi.
2. We cannot say much with certainty about the course of Farabi's
outward life and training. He was a quiet man, devoted to a life of philosophy
and contemplation, sheltered by the powerful, and assuming at last the dress of
a Sufi. His father is said to have been a Persian general, and he himself was
born at Wasidj, a small fortified place in the district of Farab in Turkish
Transoxiana. It was in Bagdad, and partly at the hands of a Christian preceptor
Yohanna ibn Hailan, that he received his education. This embraced both literary
and mathematical subjects, forming the equivalent of the 'Trivium' and 'Quadrivium'
of mediaeval Christendom. One or two of his writings, particularly on Music,
give evidence still of his mathematical training. Legend credits him with
ability to speak in all the languages of the world, seventy in number. That he
understood Turkish and Persian, - an a
priori probability, - is manifest from his works. Arabic he writes clearly,
and with a certain grace, although now and then his fondness for synonyms and
parallel clauses interferes with the precision of philosophical expression.
The philosophy
in which Farabi was initiated sprung from the school of Merv; and perhaps its
members had given greater attention to metaphysical questions than the men of
Harran and Basra with their marked leaning to Natural Philosophy.
From
Bagdad, where he had long lived and worked, he went to Haleb (Aleppo), in
consequence doubtless of political disturbances, and there he settled at the
brilliant court of Saif addaula; but he must have spent his closing years not
at court but in retirement. He died at Damascus, while on a journey, in
December, 950; and it is reported that his prince, attired as a Sufi,
pronounced over him his funeral oration. We are told that he was eighty years
of age, and it is otherwise probable that he was a very old man. His
contemporary, and partner in study, Abu Bishr Matta died ten years before him,
and his pupil Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn Adi in the year 971, at the age of
eighty-one.
3.
The chronological order of the works of Farabi has not been determined. Shorter
treatises in which he comes into touch with the Dialecticians and
Natural-Philosophers, if these are at all genuine ip the form handed down to
us, may have been popular or juvenile productions of his; but his mature powers
were applied to the study of Aristotle's writings, for which reason the name
given him by the East was 'the Second Teacher', that is, 'the Second
Aristotle'.
Since
his day the number and order of the works composed by Aristotle or at least
attributed to him, which have been paraphrased and commented on after Farabi's
example, remain upon the whole fixed. First come the eight Logical treatises,
viz., the Categories; the Hermeneutics; the First Analytics; the Second
Analytics; the Topics; the Sophistics; Rhetoric; and the Poetics: It is to
these that the Isagoge of Porphyry is the introduction. Then follow the eight
treatises which deal with Physical subjects, viz., Auscultatio Physica; De Coelo et Mundo; De Generatione et
Corruptione; the Meteorology; the Psychology; De Sensu et Sensato; the Book of
Plants; and the Book of Animals. Lastly come the Metaphysics, the Ethics, the
Politics and so on.
The
so-called "Theology of Aristotle" was still considered by Farabi to
be a genuine work. In Neo-Platonic fashion, and with some attempt at adaptation
to the Muslim faith, he seeks to demonstrate that Plato and Aristotle harmonize
with one another. The need which he experiences is not for a discriminating
criticism, but for a conclusive and comprehensive view of the world; and the
satisfaction of this need, - which is rather
a religious than a scientific one, - induces him to overlook philosophic
differences. Plato and Aristotle must differ from each other only in method, in
phraseology, and in relation to practical life : their doctrine of wisdom is
the same. They are the 'imams' or 'highest authorities' in philosophy; and
seeing that they were two, independent, original minds, the authority which is
constituted by their agreement has more validity in the eyes of Farabi than the
faith of the whole Muslim community, who with blind confidence follow the
guidance of one.
4.
Farabi is counted among the physicians, but he seems not to have been in actual
practice. He was entirely devoted to the spiritual healing art. Purity of Soul
he denominated the condition and fruit of all philosophizing, and he demanded
love of truth even though it should oppose Aristotle. Then the judgment has to
be trained by means of Geometry and Logic for the study of physical and mental
science. Farabi, however, pays but little heed to the separate branches of
study : his powers are concentrated on Logic, Metaphysics, and the principles
of Physics. Philosophy for him is the science of all Being as such, in the
acquisition of which science we come to resemble the Godhead. It is the one,
all-embracing science, which pictures the world to us as a Universe. Farabi's
charge against the Dialecticians is, that they employ as a basis for their
demonstrations the deliverances of ordinary consciousness without testing them;
and the Natural-Philosophers he blames for continually occupying themselves
merely with the effect of things, and thus never getting beyond the contrasts
of worldly phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of the All. He would
confront the former by setting Thought on a proper foundation; and in
opposition to the latter he would thoroughly investigate the subject of the One
First Cause of all that exists. Consequently we shall be taking the best way to
do justice to his historical and dogmatic position, if we endeavour to give
some account, first of his Logic, next of his Metaphysics, and finally of his
Physics and Practical Philosophy.
5. The
Logic of Farabi is not a mere analysis of scientific thinking : it contains in
addition many remarks on grammar, and discussions on the theory of knowledge.
While grammar is limited to the language of one people, Logic, on the other
hand, has to regulate the expression in language of the aggregate intelligence
of mankind. From the simplest elements of speech it must advance to the most
complex forms, - from the word to the sentence, and on to discourse.
Logic
falls into two divisions, according as its subjects stand related to actuality;
the first of these comprising the doctrine of Ideas and Definitions (tasawwur), and the second, the doctrine
of Judgments, Inferences, and Proofs (tasdiq).
Ideas, -- with which are classed Definitions, though in a mere loose,
outward juxtaposition, - have in themselves no relation to actuality, that is
to say, they are neither true nor false. Among `Ideas' Farabi recognizes here
the simplest psychological forms, that is, both the representations of
individual objects arising from Sense-Perception, and those ideas which have
been stamped upon the mind from the first, such as the Necessary, the Actual,
the Possible. Such representations and ideas are immediately certain. A man's
mind may be directed to these, and his soul made observant of them, but they
cannot be demonstrated to him, nor can they be explained by deriving them from
what is known, seeing that they are already clear in themselves, and that too
with the highest degree of certitude.
By combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these
may be either true or false. To obtain a foundation for these judgments we
have to go back through the processes of Inference and of Proof to certain
propositions originally conveyed to the understanding, immediately obvious, and
admitting of no farther confirmation. Such propositions, - the fundamental
propositions or Axioms of all Science, - there must be for Mathematics, Metaphysics,
and Ethics.
The
doctrine of Proof, by which, starting from what is known and well-established,
we arrive at a knowledge of something formerly unknown, is, according to
Farabi, Logic properly so called. Acquaintance with the leading Concepts (the
Categories), and with their synthesis in Judgment (Hermeneutics) and in
Inference (First Analytics) furnishes only the introduction thereto. And in the
Proof doctrine the chief point is to ascertain the Norms or principles of a
universally valid and necessary Science, which Philosophy has to be. Here the
Law of Contradiction is looked upon as the highest of these principles, by
which law the truth or necessity of a proposition, and at the same time the
untruth or impossibility of the contrary, become known in one single cognitive
act. From this point of view the Platonic Dichotomy is to be preferred, as a
scientific method, to the Aristotelian Polytomy. And Farabi is not content with
the formal side of the doctrine of proof. That doctrine has to be more than a
methodology which points out the right way to the truth : it must itself point
out the truth ; it must generate science. It not only deals with judgments as
material for the syllogism, but it enquires also into the truth which they contain,
with reference to the particular sciences concerned. It is not a mere
implement; it is rather a constituent part of philosophy.
As we have seen, the theory of proof terminates in necessary knowledge, corresponding to necessary existence. But besides this there is the great province of the Possible, from which we can gain only a probable knowledge. The different degrees then of probability, or the modes in which we attain to a knowledge of the Possible, are discussed in the Topics, and with them are associated Sophistic, Rhetoric and Poetics. In other connections these last three subjects are mainly concerned with practical aims, but in Farabi's hands they are combined with the Topics into a Dialectic of the Seeming. He proceeds to say that true science can be built up only on the necessary propositions of the Second Analytics, but that Probability shades off into the mere phantom of truth, from the topical or dialectic judgments down to the poetical. Thus Poetry stands at the very bottom of the scale, being in Farabi's opinion a lying and immoral absurdity.
'In the
addendum to the Isagoge of Porphyry, our philosopher has also given expression
to his views on the question of `Universals'. He finds the Particular not only
in things and in sense-perception but also in thought. In like manner the
Universal exists not merely as an `accident' in individual things, but also as
a `substance' in mind. The mind of man abstracts the Universal from things, but
it had an existence of its own before these. Virtually therefore the triple
distinction of the `ante rem', 'in re' and 'pod
rem' already occurs in Farabi.
Does
mere 'being' also belong to the Universals? Is existence, in effect, a
predicate? This question which caused so much mischief in philosophy was fully
and correctly answered by Farabi. According to him, existence is a grammatical
or logical relation, but not a category of actuality which makes any assertion
about things. The existence of a thing is nothing but the thing itself.
6. The
trend of thought found in the Logic asserts itself also in the Metap laysics.
Instead of the Changeable and the Everlasting, there emerge the ideas of the
Possible. and the Necessary.
Everything in fact that exists, is, in Farabi's view, either a
necessary or a possible thing; there is no third kind of Being. Now since all
which is possible presupposes for its realisation a Cause, while yet the chain
of causes cannot be traced back without end, we see ourselves compelled to
assume that there is a Being, existing of necessity, uncaused, possessing the
highest degree of perfection and an eternal plenitude of reality, self
sufficing, without any change, who as absolute Mind and pure goodness and
thinking, - being the thinking and the thought in one nature, - loves the
all-transcending goodness and beauty of that nature, which is his own. This
Being cannot be proved to exist, because he himself is the proof and first
cause of all things, in whom truth and reality coincide. And it is involved in
the very idea of such a Being, that he should be one, and one only, for if
there were two first and absolute Beings, they would have to be partly alike
and partly different, - in which case, however, the simplicity of each would be
destroyed. A Being who is the most perfect of all, must be one alone.
This first Existence,
one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and since in him all things are
one, without even difference in kind, no definition of his Being can be
supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the noblest names, expressive of all that is
most honoured and esteemed in life, because in the mystic impulse thereto,
words lose their usual significance, transcending all discrepancy. Some names
refer to his essential nature, others to his relation to the world, without
prejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be
understood metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to feeble
analogy. Of God, as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to have also the
most complete idea. At least our mathematical notions are more perfect than
our notions of physics, because the former refer to the more perfect objects.
But with the most perfect object of all we fare as with the most brilliant
light: by reason of the weakness of our eyes we cannot bear it. Thus the imperfections
inherent in Matter cling to our understanding.
7. We
are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceed
from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All, for his
knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of himself the world comes
into being : The cause of all things is not the will of an almighty Creator,
but the knowledge of the Necessary. From eternity the Forms or Types of things
are in God, and from him eternally proceeds also his own image, termed `the
Second All' or `the first created Spirit', which moves the outermost celestial
Sphere. In succession to this Spirit, come, one out of the other, the eight
Spirits of the Spheres, all of which are unique in their several kinds and
perfect, and these are the creators of the celestial bodies. These nine
Spirits, called `Celestial Angels', together form the second grade of Being. In
the third grade stands the Reason, active in Humanity, which is also termed the
Holy Spirit and which unites heaven and earth. The Soul is in the fourth grade.
These two, the Reason and the Soul, do not remain by themselves in their strict
original One-ness, but multiply in accordance with the great number of human
beings. Lastly appear Form and Matter, as Beings of the fifth aid sixth orders
; and with them the series of Spiritual existences is closed. The first three
grades, God, the Spirits of the Spheres, and the Active Reason, remain Spirit per se; but the three which follow, -
Soul, Form and Matter, although incorporeal, yet enter into relation with Body.
The
Corporeal, which is held to originate in the imagination of the Spirit, has
also its six grades: Celestial Bodies, Human Bodies, Bodies of Lower Animals,
Bodies of Plants, Minerals, and Elementary Bodies.
The
influence of Farabi's Christian preceptor is probably still to be seen in these
speculatiogs, following as they do the number Three. That number had the same
significance in them that the number Four had with the NaturalPhilosophers.
The terminology also bears out this idea.
That,
however, is merely external: It is Neo-Platonism that contributes the contents.
Here the Creation, or Emana tion of the world, appears as an eternal,
intellectual process. By the first created Spirit thinking of its Author, the
second Sphere-spirit comes into being; while, by the same Spirit thinking of
itself and thus realizing itself, there proceeds from it the first Body, or the
uppermost celestial Sphere. And so the process goes on in necessary succession,
down to the lowest Sphere, that of the Moon, in entire accordance with the
Ptolemaic Sphere-system, - as it is known to every well-educated person at
least from Dante's "Commedia", - and in the Neo-Platonic manner of
derivation. The Spheres together form an unbroken order, for all that exists is
a Unity. The creation and preservation of the world are one and the same. And
not only is the unity of the Divine Being portrayed in the world, but the
Divine righteousness is also expressed in the beautiful order which there
prevails. The logical order of the world is at the same time a moral order.
8. The
sublunary world of this earth is, of course, wholly dependent on the world of
the celestial spheres. Yet the influence from above bears in the first place,
as we know a priori, upon the
necessary order of the whole, although in the second place the individual thing
also is made to happen, but only according to natural reciprocal action, and
therefore by rules which experience teaches us. Astrology, which attributes
everything that is contingent or extraordinary to the stars and their
conjunctions, is combated by Farabi. There is no certain knowledge of the
Contingent; and, - as Aristotle also has taught, - much of what happens on
this earth possesses in a high degree the character of the Contingent or the
Possible. The celestial world, on the other hand, has another and a more
perfect nature, which operates according to necessary laws. It can bestow upon
this earthly world only that which is good; and therefore it is a complete
mistake to maintain that some stars bring good luck, and others ill luck. The
nature of the heavens is one, and it is uniformly good. The conclusion then at
which Farabi arrives, by these reflections is this: Knowledge, capable of
demonstration, and perfectly certain, is afforded by Mathematical Astronomy
alone; the physical study of the heavens yields a probable knowledge; but the
tenets and vaticinations of Astrology merit an exceedingly hesitating belief.
Over
against the simplicity of the celestial world we have the sublunary kingdom of
the four natures, - the kingdom of contrasts and of change. Even in this realm,
in the midst of its plurality, we meet with the unity of an ascending series,
from the Elements up to Man. Farabi is unable to advance much that is original
on this subject. True to his logical standpoint, he gives himself very little
concern about the Natural Sciences, among which, in reliance upon the original
unity of matter, he seems without any hesitation to have counted Alchemy. We
turn at once to his Doctrine of Man or of the Human Soul, which presents a
measure of interest.
9. The
powers or divisions of the Human Soul are, in Farabi's opinion, not of
co-ordinate rank, but constitute an ascending series. The lower faculty is
Material for the higher; and this again is the Form for the first, while the
highest power of all, viz. Thinking, is non-material, and is Form for all the
Forms which precede. The life of the Soul is raised from things of sense to
thought, by means of the power of Representation; but in all the faculties
there is involved Effort or Will. Every theory has its obverse side in
practice; and Inclination and Disinclination are inseparable from the
perceptions furnished by the senses. To the representations of these the soul
takes up an attitude of assent or dissent, by affirming or denying. Finally,
Thought passes judgment on Good and Bad, gives to the Will its motives, and
constructs Art and Science. All Perception, Representation or Thought is
attended with a certain effort to reach the necessary consequence, just as
warmth radiates from the substance of fire.
The Soul is that which gives
completeness (Entelechia) to the existence of the body; but that which gives
completeness to the existence of the Soul is the Mind, or the Spirit (`aql).
The Spirit only is the real Man.
10.
Accordingly the discusion turns mainly on the Mind or Spirit. In the human
Spirit everything earthly is raised to a higher mode of existence, which is
lifted out of the categories of the Corporeal. Now as a capability or potentiality,
Mind or Spirit is present in the Soul of the Child; and it becomes actual
Spirit in the course of its apprehension of bodily forms in experience by means
of the Senses and the representative faculty. But this transition from possibility
to actuality, - the realisation thus of experience, - is not Man's own act, but
is brought about by the Superhuman Spirit, which has sprung from the last
Sphere-Spirit, that of the Moon. In this way Man's knowledge is represented as
being a contribution from above, and not a knowledge which has been acquired in
mental struggle. In the light of the Spirit which stands above us, our
understanding descries the Forms of the Corporeal; and thereby experience is
amplified into rational knowledge. Experience, in fact, takes in only the Forms
which have been abstracted from the world of Matter. But there are in existence
also, - before and above material things, - Forms and general entities, in the
pure Spirits of the Spheres. Man now receives information from these `detached
Forms': it is only by means of their influence that his actual experience
becomes explicable to him. From God down to the Spirit of Mankind, the higher
Form affects only that which immediately succeeds it. Every intermediate Form
stands in a relation of `receptive' activity to what is above it, and of conferring'
activity to what is below it. In its relation to the Human Spirit, which is
influenced from above ('aql ruala fad), the
Superhuman Spirit, produced from the last Sphere-Spirit, is to be called
`active' or `creative' (`aql fa" al). Yet it is not continually
active, because its effectiveness is restrained by its material. But God is the
completely-real, eternally active Spirit.
The
Spirit in Man is threefold : according as it is (1) Possible, (2) Actual, and
(3) Influenced from above. Now in the sense of Farabi, this means - that (1)
the spiritual potentiality in Man is, by means of (2) realizing the knowledge
which is gained by experience, (3) led to the knowledge of the Supersensible,
which precedes all experience, and itself induces the experience.
The
grades of Spirit and its knowledge correspond to the grades of existence. The
lower strives wistfully to reach the higher, and the higher lifts the lower up
to its own level. The Spirit which stands above us, and which has lent to all
earthly things their Forms, seeks to bring these scattered Forms together that
they may become one in love. First of all he collects them in Man. And indeed
the possibility and truth of human knowledge depend on the fact that the same
Spirit who bestowed upon the Corporeal its figure, also gives Idea to Man. The
scattered Forms of the earthly are found again in the Human Spirit, and thereby
it comes to resemble the last of the Celestial Spirits. Unity with that
Celestial Spirit, - and in this an approach to God, - is the aim and the
blessedness of the Spirit of Man.
Now the question whether such a union is possible before Man's death
is, in Farabi's opinion, either a doubtful one, or one which should be answered
in the direct negative. The highest thing that can be attained in this life, is
rational knowledge. But separation from the body gives to the rational soul the
complete freedom which belongs to spirit. But does it then continue to exist as
an individual soul? Or is it merely a Moment of the higher World Intelligence?
On this point Farabi expresses himself ambiguously, and with a lack of
consistency, in his various writings. Men,- - so the expression runs, -
disappear in death; one generation follows another; and like is joined to like,
each in its own class. And forasmuch as rational souls are not bound to space,
they multiply without end, just as thought is added to thought, and power to
power. Every soul reflects on itself and all others that are like to it; and
the more it so reflects, the more intense is its joy
(Cf. infra, § 13).
11. We
come now to Farabi's practical philosophy. In his Ethics and Politics we are
brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and belief of the Muslims.
One or two general points of view may be brought forward.
Just as Logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge,
so Ethics have to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although, in the
latter, somewhat more value is attached to practice and experience than in the
theory of knowledge. In the treatment of this subject Farabi agrees sometimes
with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; but occasionally, in a mystic and
ascetic fashion, he goes farther than either of them. In opposition to the
Theologians, who recognize, no doubt, a knowledge gained by Reason, but not
rules of conduct taught by Reason, Farabi frequently affirms with emphasis that
Reason decides whether a thing is good or evil. Why should not that Reason,
which has been imparted to us from above, decide upon conduct, seeing that the
highest virtue certainly consists in knowing? In vigorously accentuated terms
Farabi declares that if one man knew everything that stands in the writings of
Aristotle, but did not act in accordance with his knowledge, while another man
shaped his conduct in accordance with Aristotle's teaching, without being
acquainted with it, the preference would have to be assigned to the former.
Knowledge takes a higher position than the moral act; otherwise it could not
decide upon the act.
By its
very nature the Soul desires. In so far as it perceives and represents, it has
a will, just like the lower animals. But man alone possesses freedom of choice,
seeing that this rests upon rational consideration. Pure thought is the sphere
of freedom. Thus it is a freedom which depends upon motives furnished by
thinking, - a freedom which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the
last resort it is determined by the rational nature of God. In this sense
Farabi is a Determinist.
On
account of the opposition offered by matter, the freedom of man, as thus
conceived, can only imperfectly vindicate its lordship over the Sensible. It
does not become perfect till the rational soul has been enfranchised from the
bonds of matter and the wrappings of error, - in the life of the Spirit. But
that is the highest blessedness which is striven after for its own sake, and
consequently it is plainly the Good. Such good the Human Soul is seeking, when
it turns to the Spirit above it, just as the Spirits of the heavens do, when
they draw near to the Highest.
12.
Even in the Ethics little regard is had to actual moral conditions; but in his
Politics Farabi withdraws still farther from real life. In his oriental way of
looking at things, the ideal Republic of Plato merges into `the Philosopher as
Ruler'. Men, having been brought together by a natural want, submit themselves
to the will of a single person, in whom the State, be it good or bad, is, so to
speak, embodied. A State therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as regards the
principles of the Good, either ignorant or in error, or quite depraved. On the
other hand the good or excellent State has only one type, that namely in which
the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi endows his `Prince' with all the virtues
of humanity and philosophy he is Plato in the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed.
In the
description of rulers representative of the ideal Prince, - for there may be
more than one existing together, and Prince and minister may divide governing
virtue and wisdom between them, - we come nearer the Muslim political theory of
that day. But the expressions are wrapped in obscurity : the lineage, for
example, which is proper for a Prince, and his duty of taking the lead in the
holy war, - are not clearly signified. All indeed is left floating in
philosophic mist.
13.
Morality reaches perfection only in a State which at the same time forms a
religious community. Not only does the condition of the State determine the
temporal lot of its citizens, but also their future destiny. The souls of
citizens in an "ignorant" State are devoid of reason, and return to
the elements as sensible Forms, in order to be united anew with other beings, -
men or lower animals. In States which are "in error", and in those
which are "depraved", the leader alone is responsible, and punishment
awaits him in the world beyond; but the souls which have been led into error
share the fate of the ignorant. On the other hand, if the good and `knowing'
souls only maintain their ground, they enter the world of pure Spirit; and the
higher the stage of knowledge to which they have attained in this life, the
higher will their position be after death, in the order of the All, and the
more intense their blessed delight.
In all
likelihood expressions of this kind are only the outer wrapping of a
mystico-philosophical belief in the absorption of the Human Spirit into the
World-Spirit and finally into God. For, - as Farabi teaches, - although the
world, deductively considered (i. e. logically and metaphysically), is
something different from God, yet inductively the present world is regarded by
the soul as being identical with the next,
because in everything, even in his Unity, God is himself the All.
14. If
we now take a general survey of Farabi's system, it exhibits itself as a fairly
consistent Spiritualism, or, - to be more precise, - Intellectualism. The
Corporeal, - that which appeals to the Senses, - as it orginates in the
imagination of the Spirit, might be designated "a confused presentation".
The only true existence is Spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God
alone is entirely unmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally
proceed from him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of
primary Spirits has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and corresponds
to the celestial hierarchy. The farther any one of them is removed from the
first, so much the less part has it in the Being of the pure Spirit. From the
last World-Spirit Man receives his essential nature, that is - Reason. There is
no gap in all the system; the Universe is a beautiful and well ordered whole.
The Evil and the Bad are the necessary consequence of finiteness in individual
things; but the Good which characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder
relief.
Can
this fair order of the Universe, from all eternity emanating from God, ever be
destroyed, or can it even flow back to God P A sustained streaming-back to the
Godhead, there doubtless is. The longing of the Soul is directed to what is
above; and advancing knowledge purifies it and leads it upwards. But how far?
Neither philosophers nor prophets have been able to return a clear answer to
this question. And the wisdom of both of these, - both philosophy and prophecy,
- Farabi derives from the creative World-Spirit above us. Now and again be
speaks of prophecy as if it represented the highest stage of human knowledge
and action. But that cannot be his real view; - at least it is not the logical
consequence of his theoretical philosophy. According to it everything
prophetic, - in dream, vision, revelation and so on, - belongs to the sphere of
the Imagination or Representation, and thus takes an intermediate position
between Sense Perception and pure Rational Knowledge. Although, in his Ethics
and Politics, he attaches a high educational importance to religion, it is
always regarded as inferior in absolute worth to knowledge acquired through
pure reason.
Farabi
lived perpetually in the world of the Intellect. A king in the mental realm, a
beggar in worldly possessions, he felt happy with his books, and with the birds
and flowers of his garden. To his people, - the Muslim community, - he could
be only very little. In his political and ethical teaching there was no proper
place for worldly matters or for the `holy war'. His philosophy did not satisfy
any need appertaining to the senses, while it spoke against the life of
imagination belonging both to the senses and the intellect, as that life gives
special expression to itself in the creations of Art and in religious fancies.
He was lost in the abstractions of pure Spirit. As a pious, holy man, he was an
object of wonder to his contemporaries, and by a few disciples he was honoured
as the personification of wisdom; but by the genuine scholars of Islam he was
always decried as a heretic. There was, of course, ground enough for this: just
as Natural Philosophy easily led to Naturalism and Atheism, the Monotheism of
the Logicians imperceptibly conducted to Pantheism.
15.
Farabi had no great following of disciples: Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn Adi, a
Jacobite Christian, became known as a translator of Aristotelian works; but a
pupil of Zakariya's came to be more spoken of, called Abu Sulaiman Mohammed ibn
Tahir ibn Bahram al-Sidjistani, who gathered about him in Bagdad, in the second
half of the tenth century, the learned men of his time. The conversational
discussions which they conducted, and the philosophical instructions which
were imparted by the master, have been to some extent preserved, and we can
clearly see the outcome of the school. Just as Natural Philosophy drifted into
a secret lore, and the school of Kindi abandoned Philosophy for the separate
branches of Mathematical and Physical Science, so the logical tendency of
Farabi passed into a philosophy of words. Distinctions and definitions form the
subject of these conferences. Individual points in the history of philosophy
and in the several sciences are discussed also, without any systematic
connection; but almost never does any positive interest in these subjects
appear. The Human Soul occupies
the foreground entirely, just as in the case of the Faithful Brethren, except
that these last dealt rather with the marvellous operations of the Soul, while
the Logicians pondered over its rational essence and its elevation to the
Supra-rational. The Sidjistani Society trifled with words and concepts,
instead of with numbers and letters after the fashion of the Brethren; but the
end in both cases was - a mystical Sufism.
It is
therefore no matter of astonishment that in the learned meetings of Abu
Sulaiman, as reported by his pupil Tauhidi (f 1009), Empedocles, Socrates,
Plato and others are oftener mentioned than Aristotle. A very miscellaneous
society came together in those meetings. No question was asked as to the
country from which any one came, or the religion to which he adhered. They
lived in the conviction, - derived from Plato, that every opinion contained a
measure of truth, just as all things shared in a common existence, and all
sciences in an actual knowledge which was one and the same. On that assumption
alone could they have conceived that every one might start with maintaining
that his own opinion was the true one, and that the science which he cultivated
was the science most to be preferred. And for that very reason there is no conflict between Religion and
Philosophy, however vehement the assertions may be on these two sides. On the
contrary Philosophy confirms the doctrines of Religion, just as the latter
brings the results of Philosophy to perfection. If Philosophical Knowledge is
the essence and end of the Soul of man, Religious Belief is its life, or the
way to that end; and as Reason is God's vicegerent on earth, it is impossible
for Reason and Revelation to contradict each other.
It is
not worth while to accentuate particular points in these conversational
discussions, the tenor of which we have given. The appearance of Sidjistani and
his circle is important in the history of culture; but it has no significance
as regards the development of Philosophy in Islam. What was to Farabi the very
life of his Spirit, becomes in this Society a subject merely of clever
conversation.
3. IBN MASKAWAIH.
1. We have arrived at the point of time when the tenth century is
passing into the eleventh. Farabi's school has apparently died out; and Ibn
Sina, - destined to awaken into fresh life the philosophy of his predecessor, -
is still a youth. Here however we have to make mention of a man, more allied,
it is true, to Kindi than to Farabi, but who yet agrees with the latter in
essential points, by reason of employing the same sources with him. He affords
an instance also of the fact that the most sagacious minds of his time were not
disposed to follow Farabi into the region of Logico-Metaphysical speculation.
This
man is Abu Ali ibn Maskawaih, physician, philologist and historian, who was
the treasurer and friend of the Sultan Adudaddaula, and who died full of years
in 1030. Amongst other things he has left us a philosophical system of Ethics
which up to this day is valued in the East. It is a combination of material
taken from Plato, Aristotle, Galen and the Muslim Religious Law, although
Aristotle predominates in it. It commences with a treatise on the Essential
Nature of the Soul.
2. The
Soul of Man, as Ibn Maskawaih explains, is a simple, incorporeal substance,
conscious of its own existence, knowledge and working. That it must be of a
spiritual nature - follows from the very fact that it appropriates at one and
the same time Forms the most opposed to each other, for example, the notions of
white and black, while a body can only take up one of the two forms at a time.
Farther, it apprehends both the forms of the Sensible and those of the
Spiritual in the same spiritual manner, for Length is not `long' in the soul,
nor does it become `longer' in the memory. Accordingly the knowledge and
endeavour of the soul extend far beyond its own body : even the entire world of
sense cannot satisfy it. Moreover it possesses an inborn rational knowledge,
which cannot have been bestowed by the Senses, for it is by means of this
knowledge that it determines the True and the False, in the course of comparing
and distinguishing between the objects presented to it in Sense-Perception, -
thus supervising and regulating the Senses. Finally, it is in Self
Consciousness, or knowing of its own knowing, that the spiritual unity of the
soul is most clearly shewn, - a unity, in which thinking, that which thinks,
and that which is thought - all coincide.
The
human soul is distinguished from the souls of the lower animals particularly by
rational reflection as the principle of its conduct, directed towards the Good.
3. That
by which a Being, possessed of will, attains the end or the perfection of his
nature is, in general terms, `good'. A certain capability, therefore, or
disposition, directed to an end is requisite, in order to be good. But as
regards their capability men differ very essentially. Only a few, - Maskawaih
thinks, - are by nature good, and never become bad, since what is by nature,
does not change; while on the other band, many are by nature bad, and never
become good. Others, however, who at first are neither good nor bad, are
definitely turned either in the one direction or the other, through upbringing
and social intercourse.
Now the
Good is either a general good or a particular good. There is an absolute Good,
which is identical with the highest Being and the highest knowledge; and all
the good together strive to attain to it. But for every individual person a
particular Good presents itself subjectively under the aspect of Happiness or
Pleasure; and this consists in the full and active manifestation of his own
essential nature, - in the complete realisation of his inmost being.
Speaking
generally, - Man is good and happy, if he acts as Man: Virtue is human
excellence. But since humanity is presented as occupying different levels in
different individuals, Happiness or the Good is not the same for all. And
because an individual man, if he were left to his own resources could not
realize all the good things that might otherwise be obtained, it is necessary
that many should live together. As a consequence of this condition, the first
of duties, or the foundation of all the virtues, is a general love for humankind,
without which no society is possible. It is only along with, and among other
human beings that the individual man attains perfection; - so that Ethics must
be Social Ethics. Friendship therefore is not, as Aristotle would have it, an
expansion of Self love, but a limitation of it, or a kind of love of one's
neighbour. And this, like virtue in general, can find a field of exercise only
in society, or in citizenship, and not in the pious monk's renunciation of the
world. The hermit, who thinks he is living temperately and righteously, is
deceived as to the character of his actions: they may be religious, but moral
they certainly are not; and therefore the consideration of them does not
belong to Ethics.
Besides,
in Ibn Maskawaih's opinion, the Religious Law when rightly apprehended,
pre-eminently accords with an Ethics of Benevolence. Religion is a moral
training for the people. Its prescriptions, with regard to the worship of God
in common and the pilgrimage to Mecca for instance, have plainly in view the
cultivation of the love of one's neighbour in the widest acceptation.
In
certain special points Ibn Maskawaih has not been successful in combining
harmoniously the ethical doctrines of the Greeks, - which he incorporates in
his Scheme, - either with one another or with the Law of Islam. That however we
pass over; and in any case we ought not only to praise in general terms his
attempt to give a system of Ethics which should be free from the casuistry of
the Moralists and the asceticism of the Sufis, but also to recognize in the
execution of his design the good sense of a man of wide culture.
4. IBN SINA.
1. Abu Ali al-Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina (Avicenna) was born at Efshene in the neighbourhood of Bokhara, in
the year 980, of a family connected with the public service. He received his
secular and religious education at home, where Persian and anti-Muslim
traditions were still full of life and vigour. Then the youth, precocious alike
in body and in mind, studied philosophy and medicine in Bokhara. He was
seventeen years old when he had the good fortune to cure the prince, Nukh ibn
Mansur, and to obtain the privilege of access to his library. From that time
forward he was his own teacher, in scientific research and in practice, and
proved able to turn to account the life and culture of his time. He kept
continually venturing his fortunes in the political working of the smaller
States: Probably he could never have submitted to a great prince, any more than
to a teacher in Science. He wandered on from court to court, at one time
employed in State-Administration, at another as a teacher and author, until he
became vizir of Shems Addaula in Hamadan. After the death of this prince he was
consigned to prison by his son, for some months. He then proceeded farther a
field, to the court of Ala Addaula in Ispahan. And at last, having returned to
Hamadan, which Ala Addaula had conquered, he died there in 1037, at the age of
57; and there his grave is pointed out to this day.
2. The notion that Ibn Sina pushed on beyond Farabi and reached a
purer Aristotelianism, is perhaps the greatest error which has found a footing
in the history of Muslim Philosophy. What did this our man of the world in
reality care for Aristotle? It was not his concern to commit himself wholly to
the spirit of any system. He took what was to his liking, wherever he found it,
but he had a preference for the shallow paraphrases of Themistius. Thus he
became the great philosopher of accomodation in the East, and the true
forerunner of compendium writers for the whole world. He knew how to group
with skill his material, collected as it was from every quarter, and to present
it in an intelligible form, although not without sophistry. Every moment of his
life was fully employed. In the daytime he attended to State affairs or gave
instruction to his pupils: the evening was devoted to the social enjoyments of
friendship and love; and many a night found him engaged in composition, pen in
hand, and goblet within reach lest he should fall asleep. Time and
circumstances determined the direction of this activity. If at the prince's
court he had the requisite leisure, and a library at hand, he wrote his Canon
of Medicine or the great Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. While travelling, he
composed epitomes and smaller works. In prison he wrote poems and pious
meditations, but always in a pleasing form; in fact his smaller mystical
writings have a poetic charm about them. When commissioned to do so, he put
even Science, Logic and Medicine into verse, - a practice which came more and
more into vogue from the tenth century onwards. Add to this that he wrote
Persian and Arabic at will, and you get the picture of a most accomplished
man. His life was superabundantly rich both in work and in enjoyment. In
geniality, of course he was inferior to his older compatriot, the poet Firdausi
(9401020), and in scientific talent to his contemporary Beruni (v. infra § 9), men still of importance
in our eyes. Ibn Sina, however, was the true expression of his time; and upon
this fact have been founded his great influence and historic position. He did
not, like Farabi, withdraw from common life to become immersed in the
commentators of Aristotle, but he blended in himself Greek science and Oriental
wisdom. Enough commentaries, he thought, had already been written on the
ancient authors: it was now time for men to construct a philosophy of their
own, - in other words, to give a modern form to the ancient doctrines.
3. In
Medicine Ibn Sina gives diligent endeavour to produce a systematic account of
that science, but here he proves by no means an exact logician. He assigns a
large place, at least theoretically, to Experience, and describes in detail the
conditions under which alone, for example, the efficacy of remedies can be
ascertained. But the philosophical principles which are involved in Medicine,
must be taken over in the form of lemmas from Philosophy itself.
Philosophy
proper is divided into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. In its entirety it
embraces the science of all Existence as such, and of the principles of all the
separate sciences, whereby, as far as is humanly possible, the Soul which is
devoted to philosophy, attains the highest perfection. Now Existence is either
spiritual, when it is the subject of Metaphysics, or corporeal, when it is
discussed in Physics, or intellectual, when it forms the theme of Logic. The
subjects of Physics can neither exist, nor be thought of as existing, without
Matter. The Metaphysical, however is quite devoid of Matter; while the Logical
is an abstraction from the Material. The Logical has a certain likeness to the
Mathematical, in so far as the subjects of Mathematics may also be abstractions
from matter. But yet the Mathematical always remains capable of being
represented and constructed, while on the other hand the Logical, as such, has
its existence only in the intellect, as, for instance, Identity, Unity and
Plurality, Universality and Particularity, Essentiality and Contingency, and so
on. Consequently Logic is the Science of the Determinate Forms of Thought.
In the
more detailed treatment of his subject lbn Sina conforms entirely to Farabi's
Logic. This agreement would perhaps be more apparent to us, if the logical
works of his predecessor were extant in a more complete form. He frequently
lays stress on the defectiveness of the intellectual constitution in man, which
is urgently in need of a logical rule. Just as the physiognomist infers from
the external features the character of the nature within, so the logician is
called upon to derive from known premises that which is unknown. How easy it is
for the errors of appearance and desire to insinuate themselves into a process
of that kindl A struggle with Sense is required in order that the life of
representation may be elevated to the pure truth of the Reason, through which
any knowledge of a necessary kind is gained. The divinely-inspired man, but he
alone, can dispense with Logic, precisely as the Bedouin is independent of an
Arabic Grammar.
The
question of Universals is also treated in a manner similar to that which is
adopted by Farabi. Prior to any plurality, every thing has an existence in the
Mind of God and of the Angels (the Sphere-Spirits); then as material form it
enters upon plurality, to be raised finally in the intellect of man to the
universality of the Idea. Now just as Aristotle has distinguished between First
Substance (Individual) and Second Substance (cogitable as a Universal), so Ibn
Sina similarly makes a distinction between First and Second Notion or Intention
(Mdnd, intentio). The First is
referred to the things themselves, the Second to the disposition of our own
thought.
4. In Metaphysics and Physics Ibn Sina is differentiated from Farabi
chiefly through the fact that, by not deriving Matter from God, he places the Spiritual
at a higher elevation above all that is Material, and in consequence heightens
the importance of the Soul as an intermediary between the Spiritual and the
Corporeal.
From
the conception of the Possible and the Necessary, the existence of a Necessary
Being plainly follows. According to Ibn Sina we should not seek to demonstrate
the existence of a Creator from his works, but rather should deduce, from the
possible character of all that is, and all that is thinkable in the world, the
existence of a First and Necessary Being, whose essence and existence are one.
Not
only is every sublunary thing of a `possible' nature, but even the heavens are,
in themselves, merely 'possible'. Their existence becomes 'necessary' through
another existence which transcends all 'possibility' and therefore all
plurality and mutability. The `absolutely Necessary' is an unbending Unity,
from which nothing multiplex can proceed. This first One is the God of Ibn
Sina, of whom many attributes may of course be predicated, such as thought
&c., but only in the sense of negation or relation, and in such a way that
they do not affect the Unity of his essence.
Out of
the first One accordingly, - One only can proceed, viz., - the first World-Spirit. It is in this latter Spirit that Plurality
has its origin. In fact by thinking of its own Cause, it generates a third
Spirit, the governor of the outermost Sphere; when again, it thinks of itself,
a Soul is produced, by means of which the Sphere-Spirit exercises its
influence; and, in the third place, inasmuch as it is in itself a `possible'
existence, there emerges from it a Body, viz., the outermost Sphere. And so the
process goes on: Every Spirit, thus generated, except of course the last of the
series, liberates from itself a trinity, - Spirit, Soul and Body; for, since
the Spirit cannot move the Body directly, it needs the Soul to bring its
effectiveness into operation. Finally comes the Active Spirit (`aql fa’‘al), closing the series, and generating no farther pure (separate)
Spirit, but producing and directing the material of what is earthly, as well as
corporeal forms and human souls.
The
whole of this process, - which is not to be represented as occurring in time,
takes place in a substratum, - that of Matter. Matter is the eternal and pure
possibility of all that exists, and at the same time the limitation of the
operation of the Spirit. It is the principle of all individuality.
Now
this teaching must certainly have presented a dreadful appearance to believing
Muslims. Mutazilite dialecticians had doubtless asserted that God can do
nothing evil, and nothing irrational; but now Philosophy was maintaining that,
God instead of being able to do all that is possible is only in a position to
effect that which is in its own nature possible, and that only the first
World-Spirit proceeds from him directly.
As for the rest Ibn Sina makes every endeavour to conform to the
popular belief. Everything exists, he says, through God's appointment, both the
Good and the Evil, but it is only the former that meets with his glad approval.
Evil is either a non-existent thing, or, - in so far as it proceeds from God, -
an accidental thing. Suppose that He, to avoid the evils which of necessity
cling to the world, had kept it from coming into being, - that would have been
the greatest evil of all. The world could not be better or more beautiful than
it actually is. The Divine Providence, administered as it is by the Souls of
the Heavens, is found in the world's fair order. God and the pure Spirits know the
Universal only, and therefore are unable to attend to the Particular; but the
Souls of the celestial Spheres, to whose charge falls the representation of
what is individual, and through whom Spirit acts upon Body, render it possible
to admit a providential care for the individual thing and the individual
person, and to account for revelation, and so on. Farther, the sudden rise and
disappearance of substances (Creation and Annihilation), in contrast to the
constant movement, - that is, the gradual passing of the Possible into the
Actual, - seem to Ibn Sina to indicate nothing impossible. In general, there is
a predominant want of clearness in his views regarding the relation of the
forms of Existence, - Spirit and Body, Form and Matter, Substance and Accident.
A place at all events is left for Miracle. In passionate forms of excitement in
the Soul, which often generate in ourselves great heat or cold, we have,
according to Ibn Sina, phenomena analogous to miraculous effects produced by
the World-Soul, although it usually follows the course of Nature. Our
philosopher himself, however, makes a very moderate use of any of these
possibilities. Astrology and Alchemy he combated on quite rational grounds; and
yet soon after his death astrological poems were attributed to him; and in
Turkish Romance-Literature he appears as a magician, of course to represent an
ancient Mystic.
Ibn
Sina's theory of Physics rests entirely on the assumption that a body can cause
nothing. That which causes,
-. is in every case a Power, a Form, or a Soul, the Spirit
operating through such instrumentality. In the realm of the Physical there are
accordingly countless Powers, the chief grades of which, from the lower to the
higher, are - the Forces of Nature, the Energies of Plants and Animals, Human
Souls and World-Souls.
6.
Farabi was above all things interested in pure Reason he loved Thinking for its
own sake. lbn Sina, on the other hand, is concerned throughout with the Soul.
In his Medicine it is man's Body which he looks to; and similarly, in his
Philosophy his eyes are fixed on man's Soul. The very name of his great
Philosophical Encyclopaedia is - `The Healing' (that is - of the Soul). His
system centres in Psychology.
His theory of human nature is dualistic. Body and Soul have no essential
connection with one another. All bodies are produced, under the influence of
the stars, from the mingling of the Elements; and in this way the human body
also is produced, but from a combination in which the finest proportion is
observed. A spontaneous generation of the body, just like the extinction and
restoration of the human race, is therefore possible. The Soul, however, is not
to be explained from such mixture of the Elements. It is not the inseparable
Form of the body, but is accidental to it. From the Giver of Forms, that is -
from the Active Spirit over us, every Body receives its own Soul, which is
adapted to it and to it alone. From its very beginning each Soul is an
individual substance, and it developes increasing individuality throughout its
life in the body. It must be admitted that this does not agree with the
contention that Matter is the principle of individuality. But the Soul is the
"infant prodigy" of our philosopher. He is not a credulous man, and
he often cautions us against too ready an acceptance of mysteries in the life
of the Soul; but still he has the art himself of relating many things about the
numerous wonderful powers and possible influences of the Soul, as it wanders
along the highly intricate pathways of life, and crosses the abysses of Being
and Not-Being.
The
speculative faculties are the choicest of all the powers of the Soul.
Acquaintance with the world is conveyed to the rational soul by the External
and Internal Senses. In particular a full account is given by Ibn Sina of his
theory of the Internal Senses, or the sensuous spiritual faculties of
representation, which have their seat in the brain.
Medical
Philosophers commonly assumed three Internal Senses or stages of the
representative process: 1. Gathering the several sense-perceptions into one
collective image in the fore part of the brain; 2. Transforming or remodeling
this representation of the general Sense, with the help of representations
already existing, thus constituting apperception proper, in the middle region;
3. Storing up the `apperceived' representation in the Memory, which was held to
reside in the hinder part of the brain. Ibn Sina, however, carries the
analysis somewhat farther. He distinguishes in the anterior portion of the
brain the Memory of the Sensible, - or the treasure-house of the collective
images, - from the General or Coordinating Sense. Farther, he makes out
Apperception, - the function of the middle region of the brain, - to be in part
brought about unconsciously, under the influence of the sensible and appetent
life, as is the case also with the lower animals, and, on the other hand, to
take place in part consciously, with the co-operation of the Reason. In the
first case the representation preserves its reference to the individual thing,
-thus the sheep knows the hostility of the wolf, - but in the second case, the
representation is extended to the Universal. Then, in the hinder part of the
brain, the Representative Memory, or store-house of the representations formed
by combined Sensuous Impression and Rational Reflection, follows as a fifth
power. In this way five Internal Senses[18]
correspond to the five External Senses, although with quite another reference
than the five Internal Senses of the Faithful Brethren. The question which is
raised - as to whether one should farther separate Recollection, as a special
faculty, from Memory, - remains unanswered.
6. At
the apex of the intellectual powers of the Soul stands the Reason. There is
indeed a Practical Reason also, but in its action we have been only multiplying
ourselves mediately: On the other hand, in Self Consciousness, or the pure
recognition of our essential nature, the unity of our Reason is directly
exhibited. But instead of keeping down the lower powers of the Soul, the Reason
lifts them up, refining Sense-Perception, and generalizing Presentation.
Reason, which at first is a mere capacity for Thought, becomes elaborated
gradually, - in that Material which is conveyed to it by the external and
internal senses, - into a finished readiness in Thought. Through exercise the
capability becomes reality. This comes about through the instrumentality of
experience, but under guidance and enlightenment from above, - from the 'Giver
of the Forms', who as Active Spirit imparts the Ideas to the Reason. The Soul
of man, however, does not possess any memory for the pure ideas of Reason, for
memory always presupposes a corporeal substratum. As often then as the
Rational Soul comes to know anything, that knowledge flows to it on each
occasion from above; and thinking Souls do not differ in the range and contents
of their knowledge, but in the readiness with which they put themselves in
communication with the Spirit over us, in order to receive their knowledge.
The
Rational Soul, which rules over that which is under it, and comes to know the
higher by means of the enlightenment given by the World-Spirit, is then the
real Man, - brought into existence, but as unmixed essence, as individual
substance, indestructible, immortal. On this point the clearness of Ibn Sina's
teaching marks it off from that of Farabi; and, since his time, the assumption
of the individual immortality of the human Souls, which have come into being,
is regarded in the East as Aristotelian, and the opposite doctrine as Platonic.
Thus a better understanding prevails between his philosophy and the accepted
religion. The human body and the whole world of sense furnish the Soul with a
school for its training. But after the death of the body, which puts an end to
this body for ever, the Soul continues to exist in a more or less close
connection with the World-Spirit. In this union with the Spirit over us, -
which is not to be conceived as a complete unification, - the blessedness of
the good, 'knowing' souls consists. The lot of the others is eternal misery;
for just as bodily defects lead to disease, so punishment is the necessary
consequence of an evil condition of Soul. In the same way too, the rewards of
Heaven are apportioned according to the degree of soundness or rationality
which the Soul has attained in its life on earth The pure Soul is comforted
amidst the sufferings of Time by its prospect of Eternity.
The
highest is of course, reached only by a few; for on the pinnacle of Truth there
is no room for the many; but one presses forward after another, to reach the
source of the knowledge of God, welling forth on its lonely height.
7. To
express his view of the Human Reason, Ibn Sina employs and explains poetical
traditions, - a favourite proceeding in the Persian literature. First and
foremost our interest is awakened by the allegorical figure of Hai ibn Yaqzan.
It represents the ascent of the Spirit out of the Elements, and through the
realms of Nature, of the Souls, and of the Spirits, up to the throne of the
Eternal One. Hai presents himself to the philosopher in the form of an old man
with an air of youth about him, and offers his services as guide. The wanderer
has been striving to reach a knowledge of Earth and Heaven, by means of his
outer and inner senses. Two ways open out before him, one to the West, the way
of the Material and the Evil, the other to the Rising Sun, the way of Spiritual
and ever-pure Forms; and along that way Hai now conducts him. Together they
reach the well of Divine wisdom, the fountain of everlasting youth, where
beauty is the curtain of beauty, and light the veil of light, - the Eternal
Mystery.
Hai ibn
Yaqzan is thus the guide of individual, thinking Souls: he is the Eternal
Spirit who is over mankind, and operates in them.
A
similar meaning is found by our philosopher in the frequently remodelled
late-Greek legend of the brothers Salaman and Absal. Salaman is the World-Man,
whose wife (i. e., the World of the Senses) falls in love with Absal, and
contrives by a stratagem to wile him into her arms. But before the decisive
moment, a flash of lightning comes down from heaven, and reveals to Absal the
wantonness of the action which he had nearly committed, and raises him from the
world of sensual enjoyment to that of pure spiritual contemplation.
In
another passage the soul of the philosopher is compared to a bird, which with
great trouble escapes from the snares of the earth, traversing space in its
flight, until the Angel of Death delivers it from the last of its fetters.
That is
Ibn Sina's Mysticism. His soul has needs, for which his medicine-chest provides
no resource, and which the life of a court cannot satisfy.
8 The
theoretical development of Ethics and Politics may be left to the teachers of
the `Iqh'. Our philosopher feels
himself on the level of a inspired person, exalted like a God above all human
laws. Religious or Civil Law is binding only on the Many. Mohammed's object
was, to civilize the Bedouins; and, in order to aid in accomplishing that
object, he preached, among other doctrines, that of the Resurrection of the
Body. They would never have understood the meaning of purely spiritual
blessedness; and so he had to educate them by setting before them the prospect
of bodily pleasure or pain. As for the Ascetics, - not
withstanding their willingness
to renounce entirely the world and the senses, - they chime in with this
sensuous multitude (whose worship of God consists in the observance of outward
forms), in respect that they practise their works of piety with an eye to a
reward also, even though it be a heavenly one. Higher than the many or the
pious stand those who truly worship God in spiritual love, entertaining
neither hope nor fear. Their peculiar possession is Freedom of the Spirit.
But this secret should not be
revealed to the multitude; and the philosopher confides it only to his
favourite pupils.
9. In the course of his travels
Ibn Sina met with many of the learned men of his time; but it would appear that
these interviews did not give rise to any enduring intimacies. Just as he
feels indebted to Farabi alone, of all those who preceded him, so the only
persons of his own day, whom he sees fit to thank, are the princes who patronized
him. He criticized unfavourably lbn Maskawaih (v. IV, 3), whom he met with
still more frequently. With Beruni, his superior in research, he conducted a
correspondence, but it was soon broken off.
Beruni (973-1048) deserves a shot notice here,
to illustrate the character of the time, although Kindi and Masudi have a
better claim to be called his wasters, than Farabi and the younger Ibn Sina. He
was particularly occupied in the study of Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography
and Ethnology; and he was a keen observer and a good critic. For many a
solution of his difficulties, however, he was indebted to Philosophy; and he
continually bestowed attention upon it, as one of the phenomena of
civilization.
Beruni
brings into striking prominence the harmony which exists between the
Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy, Indian wisdom, and many of the Sufi views. No
less striking is his recognition of the superiority of Greek Science, when
compared with the attempts and performances of the Arabs and the Indians.
`India', he says, `not to mention Arabia, has produced no Socrates: there no
logical method has expelled phantasy from science'. But yet he is ready to do
justice to individual Indians, and he quotes with approval the following, as
the teaching of the adherents of Aryabhata: "It is enough for us to know
that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it
should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam
does not reach, the senses do not perceive, and what the senses do not
perceive, we cannot know".
From this we may gather what Beruni's philosophy was: Only
sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, yield sure
knowledge; And for the uses of life we need a practical philosophy, which
enables us to distinguish friend from foe. He doubtless did not himself imagine
that he had said all that could be said on the subject.
10. From the school of
Ibn Sina, we have had more names handed down, than we have had writings
preserved. Juzjani annexes to his Autobiography an account of the life of the
master. And, farther, we have one or two short metaphysical treatises by
Abu-l-Hasan Behmenyar ibn al-Marzuban, which are nearly in complete agreement
with the system of his teacher. But Matter appears to lose somewhat of its
substantiality: as Possibility of Existence it becomes a relation of thought.
According
to Behmenyar, God is the pure, uncaused Unity of Necessary Existence, - not the
living, all-producing Creator. True enough, He is the cause of the world, but
the effect is given necessarily and synchronously with the cause; otherwise the
cause would not be perfect, being capable of change. Essentially, though not in
point of time, the existence of God precedes that of the world. Three predicates
thus pertain to the highest existence, viz, that it is (1) essentially first,
(2) self sufficing, and (3) necessary. In other words God's essential nature is
the Necessity of his Existence. All that can possibly be, - owes its existence
to this Absolutely Necessary Being.
Now
that is quite in harmony with the doctrines of Ibn Sina; and the same is the
case with the disciple's scheme of the world and his doctrine of Souls.
Whatever has once attained to full reality, - the various Sphere Spirits
according to their kind, Primeval Matter, and the individually different Souls
of Men, - all lasts for ever. Nothing that is completely real can pass away,
inasmuch as the completely real has nothing to do with mere possibility.
The
characteristic of all that is spiritual is its knowledge of its own essential
nature. Will is nothing else, in Behmenyar's opinion, than the knowledge of
that which is the necessary outcome of that nature. Farther, the life and the
joy of rational souls consist in self-knowledge.
11. Ibn
Sina achieved a far-reaching influence. His Canon of Medicine was highly
esteemed even in the West, from the 13th century to the 16th, and it is still
the authority for medical treatment among the Persians of the present day. On
Christian Scholasticism his influence was important. Dante placed him between
Hippocrates and Galen; and Scaliger maintained that he was Galen's equal in
Medicine, and much his superior in Philosophy.
For the
East he stood and yet stands as the Prince of Philosophy. In that region
Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism continues to be known under the form which was
given it by Ibn Sina. Manuscripts of his works abound, - an evidence of his
popularity, - while commentaries on his writings, and epitomes of them, are
countless. He was studied by physicians and statesmen, and even by theologians:
It was only a few who went farther back and consulted his sources.
From
the very first, of course, he had many enemies, and they were more noisy in
their demonstrations than his friends. Poets cursed him: theologians either
chimed in with him, or tried to refute him. And in Bagdad in the year 1150, the
Caliph Mustanjid consigned to the flames lbn Sina's writings, as part of a
certain judge's philosophical library.
5. IBN AL-HAITHAM.
1.
After the days of Ibn Sina and his school, little more attention was paid to
the cultivation of Speculative Philosophy in the Eastern regions of the Muslim
empire. In these lands Arabic was forced more and more to yield to Persian,
both in life and in literature. That the Persian tongue is not so well adapted
for abstract logical and metaphysical discussion - might be only of quite
secondary importance, in connection with this decline in speculation; but the
conditions of civilization, and with them the subjects which interested men,
were sadly changed.
Ethics and Politics came more
to the front, although without assuming an actually new form. But in the later
Persian literature the predominant place was unmistakably held by Poetry,
partly of a free-thinking tendency, partly, and indeed preponderatingly, of a
mystic kind, which satisfied the need for wisdom, experienced by people of
culture.
From
about the middle of the 10th century, the scientific movement which originated
at Bagdad had in part turned westward. We have already found Farabi in Syria,
and Masudi in Egypt: In the latter country Cairo was becoming a second Bagdad.
2. In
Cairo, at the beginning of the 11th century, we come upon one of the most
considerable mathematicians and physicists in all the Middle Ages, Abu Ali
Mohammed ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Haitham (Alkazen).
He had formerly been a government-official in Basra, his native town.
Confiding too much in the practical value of his mathematical knowledge, he
imagined that he could regulate the inundations of the Nile; but having been
summoned on that account by the Caliph al-Hakim, he became aware, soon after
his arrival, of the futility of his efforts. Thereupon he fell into disgrace as
a public official, and went into hiding till the Caliph's death, in 1021. From
that time he devoted himself to literary and scientific work, up to his own
death, in 1038.
His
chief strength is shown in mathematics and its practical application; but he
also devoted great attention to the writings of Galen and Aristotle, nor did he
confine that attention to the physical treatises. By his own confession he
had, in a spirit of doubt about everything, been engaged, from his youth up, in
considering the various views and doctrines of men, until he came to recognize
in all of them more or less successful attempts to approximate to the truth.
Moreover truth for him was only that which was presented as material for the
faculties of senseperception, and which received its form from the understanding,
being thus the logically-elaborated perception. To seek such truth was his aim
in the study of philosophy. In his view philosophy should be the basis of all
the sciences. He found it in the writings of Aristotle, inasmuch as that sage
had best understood how to knit sense-perception into a coherent whole with
rational knowledge. With eagerness therefore he studied and illustrated
Aristotle's works, for the use and profit of mankind, as well as to exercise
his own intellect and provide a treasure and consolation for his old age. Of
these labours, however, nothing seems to have been preserved for us.
The
most important of Ibn al-Haitham's writings is the "Optics", which
has come down to us in a Latin translation and redaction. In it he shows
himself to be an acute mathematical thinker, always taking pains with the analysis
of hypotheses and of the actual examples. A Western, belonging to the 13th century
(Vitello), was able to give a more methodical account of the whole subject; but
yet in keenness of observation on specific points, Ibn al-Haitham may be
reckoned his superior.
3. Ibn
al-Haitham's thinking is expressed in quite a mathematical style. The Substance
of a body consists, according to him, of the sum of its essential attributes,
just as a whole is equal to the sum of its parts, and a concept to the sum of
its marks.
In the
"Optics" the psychological remarks on Seeing and on Sense-Perception
in general - are of special interest for us. Her-, he exerts himself to
separate the individual Moments of the Perception, and to give prominence to
the condition of Time as characterizing the whole process.
Perception
then is a compound process, arising out of (1) sensation, (2) comparison of
several sensations or of the present sensation with the memory-image which has
been gradually formed in the soul as a result of earlier sensations, and (3)
recognition, in such fashion that we recognize the present percept as
equivalent to the memoryimage. Comparison and recognition are not activities
of the Senses, which merely receive impressions passively, but they devolve
upon the Understanding as the faculty of judgment. Ordinarily the-
whole process goes forward unconsciously or semi-consciously, and it is only
through reflection that it is brought within our consciousness, and that the
apparently simplex is separated into its component parts
The process of Perception is gone through very quickly. The more
practice a man has in this respect, and the oftener a perception is repeated,
the more firmly is the memory-image stamped upon the soul, and the more rapidly
is recognition or perception effected. The cause of this is that the new
sensation is supplemented by the image which is already present in the soul.
One might thus be disposed to think that Perception was an instantaneous act,
at least after long practice. That, however, would be erroneous, for not only
is every sensation attended by a corresponding change localized in the
sense-organ, which demands a certain time, but also, between the stimulation
of the organ and the consciousness of the perception an interval of time must
elapse, corresponding to the transmission of the stimulus for some distance
along the nerves. That it needs time, for example, to perceive a colour, is
proved by the rotating circle of colours, which shows us merely a mixed colour,
because on account of the rapid movement we have no time to perceive the individual
colours.
Comparison
and Recognition are, according to Ibn al-Haitham, the significant Mental
Moments of Perception. On the other hand Sensation 'tallies with the Material;
and the Sense experiencing the sensation exhibits a passive attitude. Properly
all sensation is in itself a kind of discomfort, which ordinarily does not make
itself felt, but which emerges into consciousness under very strong stimuli,
for example, through too bright a light. A pleasurable character accrues only
to the completed perception, that is to the recognition which lifts the
material given in sensation, up to the mental form.
The
comparison and recognition, which are put in operation in Perception,
constitute an unconscious judgment and conclusion. The child is already
drawing a conclusion, when of two apples he chooses the finer one. .&a
often as we comprehend a connection, we are concluding. But, since judging and
concluding are quickly settled, men are easily misled in this matter, and
frequently they regard as an original concept that which is merely a judgment
derived by a process of ratiocination. In the case of everything which is
announced to us as an axiom, we should be on our guard and trace it up, to see
whether it cannot be derived from something more simple.
4. This appeal of our philosopher had little effect in the East. It is true that in Mathematics and Astronomy he created somewhat of a school; but his Aristotelian philosophy had comparatively few admirers. We know only one of his scholars who is counted among the Philosophers, Abu-1-Wafa Mubasshir ibn Fatik al-Qaid, an Egyptian emir, who in the year 1053 produced a work made up of proverbial wisdom, anecdotes in illustration of the history of philosophy, and so on. Hardly anything can be traced in it which is the result of his own thinking. It should have been pleasant reading. And the inhabitants of Cairo in after times found edification, - more even than in such a work, - in the tales of the Thousand and One Nights.
The East set the stigma
of heresy upon Ibn al-Haitham and his works, and now it has almost completely
forgotten him. A disciple of Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher, relates that
he was in Bagdad on business, when the library of a certain philosopher, (who
died in 1214) was burned there. The preacher, who conducted the execution of
the sentence, threw into the flames, with his own hands, an astronomical work
of Ibn al-Haitham, after he had pointed to a delineation therein given of the
sphere of the earth, as an unhappy symbol of impious Atheism.
V. THE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY IN
THE EAST.
1. GAZALI.
1. We
have already seen that the theological movement in Islam was strongly
influenced by Philosophy. Not only the Mutazilite, but also the Anti-mutazilite
Dialectic drew its opinions and the arguments with which it supported its own
teaching or disputed that of its opponents, for the most part out of the
writings of the philosophers. Out of these one took just what he was able to
make use of: the rest he left in peace, or else he endeavoured to refute it.
Thus numerous writings came into existence, directed against some particular
philosophical doctrine, or some individual philosopher. No attempt, however,
had been made before the time of Gazali, to direct an attack from general
points of view and after thorough-going study, against the entire system of
Philosophy which had been built up in the East on a Greek foundation.
Gazali's undertaking had also a positive side. Along with the
Dialectic which sought to make the doctrines of the Faith intelligible, or even
to provide them with a rational basis, there were movements in Islam of a mysticism
which tended to a conception of dogma, profound and full of feeling. Its wish
was, not to comprehend or demonstrate the contents of the Faith, but to learn
them by experience and live in them through the Spirit. The highest certitude
ought to belong to the Faith. Ought it then to be in the power of any to
transform it into a derived knowledge? Or must its tenets be principles of the
Reason, neither capable of farther proof, nor requiring it? But the fundamental
principles of the Reason, when once they are known, must be universally
recognized; and universal recognition is lacking in the case of the tenets of
the Faith. From what other source does unbelief arise? Thus the questioning
proceeded; and it seemed to many that the only way out of these doubts was to
base religious doctrine upon an inner, supra-rational illumination. At first
this came about unconsciously, under a mystic impulse, whereby the contents of
moral and religious teaching were often brought into neglect. Gazali took part
in this movement also. That which had perhaps been typified by the Salimites
and Karramites, Antimutazilite sects, he set forth completely and in a
dignified style; and ever since his time Mysticism both sustains and crowns the
Temple of Learning in Orthodox Islam.
2. The
story of this man's life is a remarkable one; and, in order to understand the
effectiveness of his work, it is absolutely essential to examine it with a
measure of detail. He was born at Tos in Khorasan in the year 1059, being thus
a countryman of the great poet Firdausi. And just as the latter furnishes a
proof of the old glory of the Persian nation, so Gazali was destined to be a
"testimony and ornament" for all future Islam. Even his early education,
- obtained after his father's death, in the house of a Sufi friend, - was
rather cosmopolitan than national in its direction. Farther, any limitation was
displeasing to the youth's restless and fanciful spirit. He did not feel at
home in the hair-splitting casuistry of the teachers of Morals with their
precise formulas: he regarded it as a worldly knowledge, from which he turned
away, to immerse his spirit in the knowledge of Allah. Then he studied theology
in Nishabur with the Imam al-Haramain, who died in 1085; and at the same time
he may himself have begun to write and to teach, and, perhaps even thus early,
to entertain doubts of his own science. Thereafter he was in attendance at the
court of Nizam al-Mulk, the Vizir of the Seldjuk prince, until in 1091 he was
appointed a Professor in Bagdad. It was during this time at all events that he
busied himself most with philosophy. But it was not pure love for the science,
which impelled him to that study, but the longing of his heart to find a solution
of the doubts which assailed his understanding. Not any explanation of the
events of the world, nor any clearing up of his own thinking, but peace of mind
and the experience of a higher reality constituted the object which he strove
to reach. He subjected to a thorough study the writings of the philosophers, in
particular those of Farabi and Ibn Sina; and, following chiefly the system of
the latter, he composed a Compendium of Philosophy, regarding it objectively,
but still with some appearance of sympathy with its contents. He said, - at
first in a kind of whisper to pacify his own mind, but afterwards publicly in
selfdefence, - that he composed that work in order that he might follow up the
statement of the doctrines of philosophy with the refutation of the same. And
that refutation did appear, probably not long after. It was the famous
"Destruction of the Philosophers", - which was composed in all
likelihood while he was still in Bagdad, or shortly after he had left it.
But by
the end of four years, viz in 1095, Gazali had discontinued his work of
teaching in Bagdad, attended though it had been with outward success. His mind,
continually in a state of doubt, probably found no satisfaction in dogmatic
prelections. He was alternately attracted and repelled by his own brilliant
position, and he came to think that he could, and that he should, fight against
the world and its wisdom in some other way, to more purpose. Ambition with him
embraced far more than this world. Profounder still his musings became; and
during an illness of his, the inner call presented itself to his soul. He had
secretly to prepare for the work, by means of Sufi exercises, -- perhaps even
to assume the character of a religious and political reformer. At the very
time that the Crusaders were equipping themselves in the West against Islam,
Gazali was preparing himself to be the spiritual champion of the Muslim faith.
His conversion was not of a violent character, like that of St. Augustine, but
was rather to be compared to the experience of St. Jerome, who was summoned in
a dream from his Ciceronian predilections to practical Christianity.
For ten
years Gazali travelled here and there, dividing his time between pious
exercises and literary work. In the first part of that period it may be
conjectured that he wrote his principal theologico-ethical work, "The
Revival of Religious Sciences" : towards the end he endeavoured to
exercise influence as a reformer. His journeyings led him by way of Damascus
and Jerusalem - before it was taken by the Crusaders, -- Alexandria, Mecca and
Medina, back to his home.
After
his return Gazali once more engaged in teaching for a short time in Nishabur;
and he died in Tus, his native town, on the 19th of December, 1111. His closing
years were chiefly devoted to pious contemplation and the study of the
Traditions, which as a youth he could never remember. A beautifully complete
and rounded life, in which the end comes back to the beginning!
3.
Gazali passes in review the spiritual tendencies of his time. These are: the
Dialectic of the Theologians; Sufi Mysticism; Pythagorean Popular Philosophy;
and Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism. That which Dialectic desires to establish is
also the object of his own faith; but its arguments appear to him rather weak,
and many of its assertions on that account open to question. He feels most in
sympathy with the Sufi Mysticism: to it he owes his dearest possession, viz,
the establishment of his own faith in Personality, - so that he can postulate
as an inner experience that which the Dialecticians attempt to derive by a
process of reasoning. He thanks also the Popular Philosophy for the instruction
it gives, particularly in Mathematics, which he fully recognizes as a science,
together with its Astronomical deductions. He concedes the validity of its
Physics, where that is not in conflict with the Faith. But Aristotelianism, -
as it has been taught by Farabi and Ibn Sina, with as much subservience to
authority as has been exhibited by the Theologians, - seems to him to be the
enemy of Islam ; and in the name of all the Muslim schools and tendencies of
thought together, he feels bound to do battle with it, as from a
catholic
standpoint. And in truth he does this with Aristotle's own weapons, - those of
Logic; for the axioms of thought which Logic lays down are, in his eyes, just
as firmly established as the propositions of Mathematics. Fully alive to this,
he starts from the Principle of Contradiction, to which, according to his
contention, God himself submits. Of the Physico-Metaphysical doctrines of
Philosophy then, he attacks three in particular: 1. That the world is eternal;
2. That God takes cognizance only of the Universal, and that consequently there
is no special providence; 3. That the Soul alone is immortal, and therefore a
Resurrection of the Body is not to be looked for. In the refutation of these
doctrines Gazali is in many respects dependent on the Christian commentator on
Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who also has written. against the doctrine of
the eternity of the world maintained by Proclus.
4. (1) The world, according to the philosophers, is a sphere of
finite extent but of infinite duration. From all eternity, it proceeds from
God, even as the effect is in existence at the same time with the cause. Gazali,
on the contrary, is of opinion that it is not admissible to put such different
constructions on the notions of Space and Time respectively; and he holds that
the Divine Causality should be defined as free Creative Might.
First
then as to Space and Time : we are as little able to imagine an outermost
boundary of Space as a beginning or end of Time. He who believes in an endless
Time, must, in consistency with that notion of his, assume also the existence
of an infinite Space. To say that Space answers to the external sense, and Time
on the other hand to the internal, - does not alter the case, for we do not
after all get rid of the Sensible. Just as Space bears a relation to Body, so
does Time to the movement of Body. Both are merely relations of things, created
in and with the things of the world, or rather relations between our
conceptions, which God creates in us.
Still
more important is that which Gazali advances about Causality. The Philosophers
distinguish between an operation of God, of Spiritual Beings endowed with
will, of the Soul, of Nature, of Chance and the like; but for Gazali, just as
for the orthodox Kalam, there is really only one causality, that of the
`Willing' Being. He completely puts aside the causality of Nature, which is
reducible without remainder into a relation of Time. We see one definite
phenomenon (Cause) regularly succeeded by another definite phenomenon (Effect);
but how the latter results from the former is left an enigma for us. Of
operation in the objects of Nature we know nothing. Farther, any alteration is
in itself inconceivable. That any one thing should become a different thing is
incomprehensible to thought, which may just as well ask about facts as about causes. A thing either exists, or it does
not exist; but not even Divine Omnipotence can transform one existing thing
into another thing. It creates or else annihilates.
And yet it is a fact of our consciousness that we do effect
something. If we `will' anything, and possess the power to carry it out, we
claim the result as our act. Action, proceeding from a free will, and conscious
of the exertion of power, is the only causality of which we know; and we argue
from this to the Divine Being. But by what right? The warrant for such a
conclusion Gazali thinks that he finds in his own personal experience of the
image of God in his soul; while on the other hand he declines to credit Nature
with the likeness to God which belongs to his own soul.
For him
accordingly, God, in so far as he can be known from the world, is the Almighty
Being, free in will and efficient in operation. No spatial limit may be set to
his causative activity, which yet the philosophers do, when they grant only his
influence in his first created work. But on the other hand He can limit his own
work both in Space and Time, so that this finite world has only a finite
duration. That God should call the world into existence out of nothing by an
absolute act of creation - seems to the Philosophers to be absurd. They
recognize only an exchange of Accidents or Forms in the one material, a
passing of the actual from possibility to possibility. But does nothing new
ever come then into being? Is not every apprehension of the senses, - asks
Gazali, - and every spiritual perception, something entirely new, which either
exists or else does not exist, but at whose coming into existence the contrary
does not cease, and at whose vanishing from existence, the opposite does not
make its appearance? Consider farther the numerous individual souls which,
according to Ibn Sina's system, must be in existence ; have not these come into
being, absolutely new?
There is no end to the putting of questions. The representative process wanders about in all directions and far; and thought leads us on ad infinitum. The chain of causation can nowhere be brought to an end, any more than Space or Time. In order then that there should be a definite, final Existence, - and in postulating this, Gazali is at one with the Philosophers -, we need an Eternal Will as First Cause, different from everything else. We may at all events make this acknowledgement to Gazali, that Ibn Sina's fantastic doctrine of Forms and Souls makes no stand against his criticism.
5. (2) We have now come to the idea of God. In the view of the Philosophers, God is the highest Being, and his essence is Thought. That which He knows, comes into existence, emanating from his abundance; but he has not positively `willed' it, for all Willing presupposes a deficiency, - a need -, and is conditioned by some change in the Being that wills. Willing is movement in the material: completely real Spirit wills nothing. Therefore God beholds his creation in a contemplation which is undisturbed by any wish. He recognizes himself, or even his first Creature, or, according to Ibn Sina, the Universal, the eternal Genera and Species of all things.
But according to Gazali there must eternally belong to God a Will, as one of his eternal attributes. In a conventional way he grants, it is true, that in metaphysical and ethical considerations knowing precedes willing, but he is convinced that unity of Being does not more reside in knowing than in willing. Not only the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, and their different relations to the knowing Subject, but even Self Consciousness, or knowing about the knowing, considered per ae, is an endless process. An act of will is absolutely necessary to bring it to a conclusion. In directing the attention and in self communing an original "Willing" is in operation; and thus even Divine knowledge comes to a conclusion as a coherent unity, in its Personality, by means of an original eternal Will. In place of the assertion of the Philosophers that God wills the world, because he thinks of it as the best, Gazali substitutes the statement: "God has cognizance of the world because he wills it and in his willing it".
Must
not then He, who wills and creates all, have cognizance of his work down to the
smallest part of its material? Just as his eternal will is the cause of all
individual things, so his eternal knowledge embraces at one and the same time
every particular thing, without the unity of his nature being thereby taken
away. There is consequently a Providence.
To the
objection that Divine Providence makes every particular event a necessary
event, Gazali, like St. Augustine, replies that this fore-knowledge is not
distinguishable from knowledge in memory, - that is to say, that God's
knowledge is exalted above every distinction of time.
It may
be questioned whether, in order to save the eternal, almighty, creative Will,
Gazali has not sacrificed to that absolute might both. the temporary character
of the world, which he would like to prove, and the freedom of human action,
from which he sets out, and which he would not altogether surrender. This world
of shadows and images, as he calls it, vanishes for the sake of God.
6. (3)
The third question, with regard to which Gazali separates himself from the
Philosophers, has less philosophic interest. It refers to the Resurrection of
the Body. According to the Philosophers it is only the Soul that is immortal,
either in its individuality or as a part of the World-Soul: The Body on the
other hand is perishable. Against this Dualism, which in theory led to an
ascetic Ethics, but which in practice was easily converted into Libertinism,
the religious and moral feeling of Gazali rose in rebellion. If the flesh is to
have its obligations, it must in turn be invested with its rights. The
possibility of the Resurrection cannot be denied, for the reunion of the Soul
with its (new) bodily frame is not more wonderful than its first union with the
earthly body, which has been assumed even by the Philosophers. Surely then
every soul at the resurrection-time may obtain a new body suited to it. But in
any case Man's real essence is the Soul; and it is of little consequence what
the material is, out of which its heavenly body is formed.
7. Even
from these last propositions it is clear that Gazali's theology did not remain
unaffected by philosophical speculation. Like the Fathers of the Western
Church, he had, whether consciously or unconsciously, appropriated a good deal
from philosophy; and for that reason his theology was long proscribed as a
heretical innovation by the Muslims of the West. In reality his teaching
regarding God, the World, and the human Soul exhibits many elements which are
foreign to the oldest type of Islam, and which may be traced back, - partly
through the intervening agency of Christian and Jewish writers and partly
through that of more recent Muslim authors, - to heathen wisdom.
Allah, Lord of the
Worlds, God of Mohammed, is for Gazali a living personality it is true, but yet
far less anthropomorphic than he appeared to simple Faith or in the
Anti-mutazilite dogma. The surest way of coming to know him must be to refuse
to attribute to him any of the properties of his creatures. But that does not
mean that he posssesses no attributes : the very reverse is the case. The
plurality of his qualities does not prejudice the Unity of his Being. Analogies
are presented in the bodily world: A thing certainly cannot be both black and
white at the same time, but it may well be cold and also dry. Only, if the
qualities of men are attributed to God, they must be understood in another and
higher sense, for he is pure Spirit. Besides omniscience and omnipotence, pure
goodness and omnipresence belong to Him. By means of this omnipresence this
world and the next are brought in a manner nearer to one another than by the
usual representation.
The
conception of God is thus spiritualized. But resurrection and the future life
are also regarded as being much more spiritual in character than the present
life. Such a conception is facilitated by the doctrine of the Gnostic
Philosophy, that there are three or four worlds. One above the other in regular
order rise the Earthly and Sensible World of Men, the World of Celestial
Spirits, to which our Soul belongs, the World of Supra-celestial Angels, and
lastly God himself, as the World of purest Light and most perfect Spirit. The
pious and enlightened Soul ascends from the lower world through the heavens
till it is face to face with God, for it is of spiritual nature and its
resurrection-body is of celestial essence.
In a
manner corresponding to the different worlds and grades of Souls, men themselves
differ from one another. The man of sensuous nature must be content with the
Koran and Tradition: he should not venture beyond the letter of the Law. The
study of duty is his bread of life; philosophy would be a deadly poison to him.
He who cannot swim should not venture into the sea.
However there are always people who go into the water for the purpose of learning to swim. They want to elevate their faith into knowledge, but in the process they may easily fall into doubt and unbelief. For them, in Gazali's opinion, a useful remedy may be found in the study of Doctrine and Polemics directed against Philosophy.
Those,
however, have reached the highest degree of human perfection, who, without any
laborious cogitation, experience in themselves by means of an inward and
Divine illumination the truth and the reality of the Spiritual World. Such are
the prophets and pious mystics, among whom Gazali himself may be reckoned. They
see God in everything, -- Him, and Him alone -, and in Nature just as in the life
of their own Soul; but they see Him best in the Soul, for although it is not
Divine it has at least a likeness to the Divine. How altered now is every
outward thing! That which seems to be in existence outside of us, becomes a
condition or a property of the Soul, which in the consciousness of its union
with God, advances to the highest bliss. All things then become one in Love.
The true service of God transcends fear of punishment and hope of reward,
attaining to Love of God in the Spirit. The perfect servant of God is raised
above endurance and thanksgiving, - which constitute the obligation of the
pious wanderer upon the earth, so long as he remains imperfect -, so that even
in this world he loves and praises God with joy of heart.
8. From what has been said it follows that there are three stages of Belief or Certainty: First, the belief of the multitude, who believe what some man worthy of belief declares to them, for instance, that So-and-so is in the house; secondly, the knowledge of the learned, gained by deduction: they have heard So-and-so speaking, and conclude that he is in the house; but thirdly we have the immediate certainty of the `knowing' ones, for they have entered the house and seen the person with their own eyes.
In
contradistinction to the Dialecticians and Philosophers, Gazali everywhere lays
stress upon experience. The former, with their Universal Ideas, in the first
place fail to do justice to the multiplicity which attaches to this world of
sense. The sensible qualities of things, - even the number of the stars for
example, - we come to know only through experience, and not from pure Ideas.
Much less,- however, do such Ideas exhaust the heights and depths of our inner
being. That which the friend of God knows intuitively, remains hidden for ever
from the discursive intellect of the learned. A very small number attain to
this height of knowledge, where they meet with the Apostles of God and Prophets
of all times. It is the duty then of the Spirits who stand at a lower level to
strive to follow them.
But now
how are we to recognize the superior Spirit whom we need as our guide? That is
a question, on which every religiously-determined system, which cannot do without
human intermediaries, must founder, if considered purely in the light of the
understanding. Even Gazali's answer is indecisive This much is certain to him,
that grounds furnished by the reason alone cannot decide this question. The
Prophet and Teacher who has been actually inspired by God is recognized by
merging ourselves in his peculiar personality, through the experience of an
inward relationship. The truth of Prophecy is authenticated by the moral
influence which it exercises upon the Soul. Of the truthfulness of God's word
in the Koran we acquire a moral, not a theoretical certainty. The detached
miracle is not capable of convincing; but the revelation as a whole, together
with the personality of the Prophet, through whom the revelation has been
conveyed, produce an irresistible impression upon the kindred soul. Then, wholly
carried away by such impression, the soul renounces the world, to walk in the
way of God.
9.
Gazali is without doubt the most remarkable figure in all Islam. His doctrine
is the expression of his own personality. He abandoned the attempt to
understand this world. But the religious problem he comprehended much more
profoundly than did the philosophers of his time. These were intellectual in
their methods, like their Greek predecessors, and consequently regarded the
doctrines of Religion as merely the products of the conception or fancy or even
caprice of the lawgiver. According to them Religion was either blind obedience,
or a kind of knowledge which contained truth of an inferior order.
On the other hand Gazali represents Religion as the experience of his
inner Being. It is for him more than Law and more than Doctrine : it is the
Soul's experience.
It is not every one who has this experience of Gazali's. But even
those who cannot follow him in his mystic flight, when he transcends the
conditions of any possible experience, will at least be constrained to
acknowledge that his aberrations in searching for the highest are not less
important for the history of the Human Mind than the apparently surer paths
taken by the philosophers of his time, through a land which others had
discovered before them.
2. THE EPITOMISTS.
1. In a
history of scholarly Education as conducted in the Muslim nations, this subject
would necessarily have a larger space assigned it : but here we shall dismiss
it in a few words.
That
Gazali has annihilated philosophy in the East, for all time to come, is an
assertion frequently repeated but wholly erroneous, and one which evidences
neither historical knowledge nor understanding. Philosophy in the East has
since his day numbered its teachers and students by hundreds and by thousands.
The teachers of the Faith have no more discontinued their dialectical arguments
in support of Doctrine than the teachers of Morals have abandoned their
hair-splitting casuistry. General culture too has adopted an element of
philosophical learning.
But it
is true that Philosophy did not succeed in conquering for itself a commanding
position, or in retaining the consideration which it once enjoyed. According to
an Arab anecdote a Philosopher, who had been thrown into prison, on being asked
what he was fit for, by a man who wanted to purchase him as a slave, is said to
have replied : "For freedom". Philosophy needs freedom. And where was
this Freedom to be met with in the East? Freedom from material cares, freedom
to exemplify unprejudiced thinking, tended continually to dwindle away from
regions where no enlightened despots were to be found, able to warrant and
protect it. But that is just a symptom of the general decay of civilization.
And although travellers from the West in the twelfth century praised highly the
culture of the East, it had, in comparison with earlier times, at least begun
to decline. In no department did they pass the mark which had been reached of
old: Minds were now too weak to accomplish such a feat. Literary production
became stagnant, and the only merit which belongs to the voluminous compilers
of the following centuries is that of elegant selection. Ethical and religious
doctrine had ended in Mysticism; and the same was the case with Philosophy.
After the time of Ibn Sina, the Prince of Philosophy, no one felt called upon
to come forward with independent views. The day had come for Abridgements,
Commentaries, Glosses, and Glosses upon Glosses. The learned world occupied
their time in school with work of that nature, while the believing multitude
placed themselves more and more under the guidance of the Dervish orders.
2. That
which general education borrowed most from philosophical Propaedeutics was a
little Mathematics &c., naturally exceedingly elementary as a rule. By
sectaries and mystics a good deal was taken over from PythagoreanPlatonic
wisdom. In particular these doctrines had to be drawn upon in order to support
the belief in saints and miracles; and a barren syncretistic Theosophy was tricked
out therewith. The system even enrolled Aristotle among its teachers, of course
the spurious Aristotle, but it turned him into a disciple of Agathodaemon and
Hermes.
The more sober-minded thinkers, on the other hand, kept to
Aristotelianism, so far as it agreed with their own views or with the orthodox
Faith. The system of Ibn Sina was almost universally followed by them ; and it
was only a few that went back to Farabi, or that endeavoured to combine the
two. Very little notice was taken of Physical and Metaphysical doctrines:
Ethics and Politics were rather more attended to. Logic was the only subject
universally studied; for it could be admirably conveyed in scholastic form;
and, as pure Formal Logic, it was an instrument which every one was able to make
use of. In fact with the resources of Logic everything might be proved; and
even if the demonstration should be recognized as faulty, there was this
consolation that the averment might still be true, although its demonstration
had not been properly conducted.
Even in
the Encyclopaedia of Abu Abdallah al-Khwarizmi, a production of the last
quarter of the tenth century, a larger space was assigned to Logic than to
Physics and Metaphysics. The very same thing was done in many later
encyclopaedias and compilations. The Dogmatists also commenced their system
with logical and epistemological considerations, in which a traditional eulogy
was pronounced over "knowing". And from the twelfth century onwards
there arose a whole multitude of separate arrangements of the Aristotelian
Organon. Here may be mentioned only, - as being much used, commented on, and so
forth, - the works of Abhari (t 1264), who gave a short summary of the whole
`Logic' under the title of "Isagudji" (eioayray~); and the works of Qazwini (t 1276).
At the
greatest University in the Muslim world, that of Cairo, the Epitomes of the
13th and 14th centuries are used, up to this day. There the word still is, as
for a long time it was with ourselves: "First of all a College of
Logic", and, we need scarcely add, with no better result. They indulge
themselves, within the limits of the Law, in the luxury of studying the rules
of thinking discovered by the ancient philosophers, but all the while they
smile at these men and at the Mutazilite Dialecticians, who "believed in
Reason !"
1. BEGINNINGS.
1.
Western North-Africa, Spain and Sicily are reckoned as forming the Muslim West.
North-Africa, to begin with, is of subordinate importance: Sicily is regulated
by' Spain, and is soon overthrown by the Normans of Lower Italy. For our
purpose Muslim Spain or Andalusia first falls to be considered.
The
drama of culture in the East passes here through a second representation. Just
as Arabs there intermarried with Persians, so in the West they intermarry with
Spaniards. And instead of Turks and Mongols we have here the Berbers of
North-Africa, whose rude force is flung into the play of more refined
civilization with a blighting influence ever on the increase.
After the fall of the Omayyads in Syria (750), a member of that
House, Abderrahman ibn Moawiya, betook himself to Spain, where he contrived to
work his way up to the dignity of Emir of Cordova and all Andalusia. This
Omayyad overlordship lasted for more than 250 years, and after a passing system
of petty States, it attained its greatest brilliancy under Abderrahman III
(912-961), the first who assumed the title of Caliph, and his son al-Hakam II (961-976). The tenth century was for Spain, what
the ninth was for the East, - the time of highest material and
intellectual civilization. If possible, it was more fresh and native here than
in the East, and, if it be true that all theorizing betokens either a lack or a
stagnation of the power of production, it was more productive also: The sciences,
and Philosophy in particular, had far fewer representatives in Spain. Speaking
generally, we may say that the relations of intellectual life took a simpler
form. There was a smaller number of strata in the new culture than in the old.
No doubt there were, besides Muslims, Jews and Christians in Spain, who in the
time of Abderrahman III played their part in this cultivated life, of the
Arabic stamp, in common with the rest. But of adherents of Zoroaster, atheists
and such like, there were none. Even the sects of Eastern Islam were almost
unknown. Only one school of Law, that of Malik, was admitted. No Mutazilite
dialectic troubled the peace of the Faith. True enough the Andalusian poets
glorified the trinity of Wine, Woman and Song; but flippant freethinking on
the one hand, and gloomy theosophy and renunciation of the world on the other,
rarely found expression.
On the
whole, intellectual culture was dependent upon the East. From the tenth century
onwards many journeys in search of knowledge were undertaken thither from
Spain, by way of Egypt and as far as Eastern Persia, for the purpose of
attending the prelections of scholars of renown. And farther, educational
requirements in Andalusia attracted to it many a learned Eastern who found no
occupation in his own home. Besides, al-Hakam II caused books to be copied, all
over the East, for his library, which is said to have contained 400,000
volumes.
The
West was mainly interested in Mathematics, Natural Science, Astrology and
Medicine, precisely as was the case at first in the East. Poetry, History and
Geography were cultivated with ardour. But the mind was not yet "sicklied
o'er with the pale cast of thought", for when Abdallah ibn Masarra of
Cordova, under Abderrahman III, brought home with him from the East a system of
Natural Philosophy, he had to submit to see his writings consigned to the
flames.
2. In
the year 1013 Cordova, "the Gem of the World", was laid waste by the
Berbers, and the kingdom of the Omayyads was split up into a number of minor
States. Its second bloom fills up the eleventh century, - the Medicean age of
Spain, in which Art and Poetry still flourish in luxuriant growth at the courts
of the various cities, upon the ruins of ancient splendour. Art grows refined;
poetry becomes sage, and scientific thought subtle. Intellectual nutriment
continues to be fetched from the East; and Natural Philosophy, the writings of
the Faithful Brethren, and Logic from the school of Abu Sulaiman al-Sidjistani
find admission one after the other. Towards the close of the century it is
possible to trace the influence even of the writings of Farabi, and the
"Medicine" of lbn Sina becomes known.
The beginnings of
philosophical reflection are found chiefly with the numerous men of culture
among the Jews. Eastern Natural Philosophy produces a powerful and quite
singular impression upon the mind of lbn Gebirol, the Avencebrol of Christian
authors; and Bakhya ibn Pakuda is influenced by the Faithful Brethren. Even the
religious poetry of the Jews is affected by the philosophical movement; and
what speaks therein is not the Jewish Congregation seeking after God, but the
Soul rising towards the Supreme Spirit.
Among
the Muslims, however, the number of those who addressed themselves to a
thorough study of Philosophy was very limited. No master gathered about him a
numerous band of disciples; and meetings of the learned, for the discussion of
philosophical subjects, were scarcely ever held. The individual thinker must
have felt very lonely in these circumstances. In the West, just as in the East,
Philosophy was developed subjectively; but here it was more the concern of a
few isolated individuals; and, besides, it stood more apart from the faith of
the mass of the people. In the East there were countless intermediary agencies
between faith and knowledge, - between the philosophers and the believing
community. The problem of the individual thinker, confronted by political
society and the faith of narrowminded fanatical multitudes, was accordingly
realized more acutely in the West.
2. IBN BADDJA.
1.
Towards the end of the eleventh century, when Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Yakhya ibn al-Saig ibn Baddja (Avempace) was born in Saragossa, the
fair kingdom of Andalusia was approaching the time of its disappearance in a
system of petty States. It was threatened from the North by the less civilized
but yet powerful and brave Christian knights. But the Berber dynasty of the
Almoravids came to the rescue, who were not only firmer in the faith but also
wiser in their policy than the voluptuous ruling race of Spain. Then the time
of refined culture and free enquiry seemed gone for ever. Only traditionalists,
of the strictest rite, ventured to make a public appearance, while philosophers,
unless they kept concealed, were persecuted or put to death.
2. But
barbarous lords have their caprices, being fond of appropriating, at least
superficially, the culture of those who have been subjugated by them. Thus Abu
Bekr ibn Ibrahim, brother-in-law of the Almoravid prince Ali, - who was for
some time Governor of Saragossa, made Ibn Baddja his intimate friend and first
minister, thereby giving great offence to his Faqihs and soldiers. Now this was a man, skilled both in the theory
and practice of the Mathematical Sciences, particularly Astronomy and Music, as
well as an adept in Medicine, and one who was devoted to speculative studies in
Logic, Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics; and in the opinion of the fanatics
he was an utterly abandoned atheist and immoral person.
We know nothing more of
the outward life of Ibn Baddja except that he was in Seville in the year 1118,
after the fall of Saragossa, and that he composed several of his works there,
afterwards betaking himself to the Almoravid court in Fez, where he died in
1138. According to tradition he met his death by poison, administered at the
instigation of a jealous physician. His short life, as he himself confesses,
had not been a happy one; and he had often longed for death, as a final refuge.
Material want, and, above all, intellectual isolation, may have weighed down
his spirits. His extant writings abundantly evince
that he was unable to feel at home in that day and that
environment.
3. He
conforms almost entirely to Farabi, the quiet, solitary Eastern. Like him he
was little given to systematizing. His original treatises are but few in
number; and they consist chiefly of brief expositions of Aristotelian and other
philosophical works. His observations are of a desultory character: Now he
makes a beginning in one place; again, he starts afresh in another. In
continually renewed approaches he endeavours to get nearer Greek thought, and
to penetrate from every possible side to ancient science. He does not discard
philosophy, and he does not deal conclusively with it. On a first glance, that
produces a puzzling impression; but, in the sombre impulse which is upon him,
the philosopher has become aware of the path he is pursuing. In searching for
truth and righteousness, he is coming upon another thing, - unity and joy in
his own life. In his opinion, Gazali took the matter much too easily, when he
thought he could be happy only in the full possession of the truth comprehended
by means of Divine illumination. In his love for the truth, which is concealed
rather than revealed by the sensuous images of religious mysticism, the
philosopher must be strong enough to renounce that happiness. Only pure
thinking, undisturbed by any sensuous desire, is privileged to behold the
supreme Godhead.
4. In
his logical writings Ibn Baddja hardly departs from Farabi. Even his physical
and metaphysical theories agree generally with the views of the master. But
perhaps the mode, in which he represents the history of the development of the
human spirit and the position of man in knowledge and in life, may claim a
measure of interest. There are two kinds of existence, according to his view, -
one which is moved, and one which is not moved. That which is moved is
corporeal and limited, but its everlasting movement cannot be explained by
finite Body. On the contrary, in order to explain this endless movement, an
unending power is needed, or an eternal essence, namely Spirit.
Now
while the corporeal or the natural is moved from without, and the Spirit,
itself unmoved, confers movement upon the corporeal, the Soul-substance
occupies a middle position, being that which moves itself. The relation between
the natural and the psychical presents as little difficulty to lbn Baddja as
to his predecessors; but the great problem is this: - `How are the Soul and the
Spirit related to each other, that is to say in Man?'
5. Ibn
Baddja starts with the assumption that Matter cannot exist without some Form,
while Form may exist by itself, without Matter. Otherwise, in fact, absolutely
no change is thinkable, because that is rendered possible only by the coming
and going of substantial Forms.
These
Forms then, from the hylic up to the purely spiritual, constitute a series, to
which the development of the human spirit corresponds, in so far as it realizes
the rational ideal. Man's task is to comprehend all the spiritual Forms
together; first the intelligible Forms of all that is corporeal, then the
sensible-spiritual presentations of the Soul, next the human Spirit itself and
the Active Spirit over it, and lastly the pure Spirits of the celestial spheres.
By rising through successive stages from the individual and sensible, the
presentation of which constitutes the material on which the Spirit operates,
Man attains to the superhuman and the Divine. Now his guide in this process is
Philosophy, or the knowledge of the universal, which issues from knowledge of
the particular through study and reflection, aided however by the enlightening
Spirit from above. Contrasted with this knowledge of the universal or the
infinite, - in which Being, and becoming the object of cognition coincide, -
all perception and presentation prove deceptive. Thus it is by rational
knowledge, and not by religious and mystical dreaming, with the sensuous
invariably clinging thereto, that the human Spirit arrives at perfection. Thinking
is the highest bliss, for its very purpose is to reach all that is
intelligible. But since that is the universal, the continued existence of
individual human Spirits beyond this life cannot be assumed. It may be that the
Soul, - which apprehends the particular in the life of sensuous-spiritual
presentation, and notifies its existence in separate desires and actions, - has
the faculty of continuing that existence after death, and of receiving reward
or punishment; but the Spirit or the rational part of the Soul is one in all.
It is only the Spirit of the entirety of Mankind, or, in other words, the one
Intellect, Mind or Spirit in Humanity, - and that too in its union with the
active Spirit over it, - which is eternal. This theory, which made its way into
the Christendom of the Middle Ages, under the name of Averroes' Theory, is thus
found even with Ibn Baddja, if not quite distinctly conceived, at all events
more clearly given than with Farabi.
6.
Every man does not rise to such a height of contemplation. The greater number
grope about continually in the dark; they merely see the adumbrations of
things, and like shadows they will pass away. Some see the Light, it is true,
and the coloured world of things, but very few indeed recognize the essence of what
they have seen. It is only the latter, the blessed ones, who attain to life
eternal, -in which state they themselves become Light.
But
now, bow does the individual man get to this stage of knowledge and blessed
existence? Through action directed by reason, and the free cultivation of his
intellectual powers. Action directed by reason is free action, that is, action
in which there is a consciousness of purpose. If one, for instance, breaks a
stone to pieces, because he has stumbled against it, he is behaving without
purpose, like a child or a lower animal; but if he does this in order that
others may not stumble against the stone, his action must be called manlike,
and directed by reason.
In
order to be able to live as a man should, and to act in a rational way, the
individual man, must as far as circumstances permit, withdraw from society. The
name borne by the Ethics of Ibn Baddja is "Guidance to the Solitary".
It demands self culture. Generally, however, one may avail himself of the
advantages attending social life in man, without including in the bargain its
disadvantages. The wise may associate themselves in larger or smaller unions;
such indeed is their duty, if they light upon one another; and then they form a
State within the State. Naturally they endeavour to live in such a manner that
neither physician nor judge is necessary among them. They grow up like plants
in the open air, and do not stand in need of the gardener's skill. They keep at
a distance from the lower enjoyments and sentiments of the multitude. They are
strangers to the movements of worldly society. And as they are friends among
themselves, this life of theirs is
wholly
determined by Love. Then too as friends of God, who is the Truth, they find
repose in union with the superhuman Spirit of Knowledge.
3. IBN TOFAIL.
1. The
sovereignty over Western Tslam remained with the Berbers, but the Almohads
speedily took the place of the Almoravids. Mohammed ibn Tumart, the founder of
the new dynasty, had, from the year 1121, come forward as Mahdi. Under his
successors Abu Yaaqub Yusuf (1163-1184) and Abu Yusuf Yaaqub (1184-1198),
their sovereignty, which was centred in Marocco, reached its
culminating point.
The
Almohads brought with them a startling novelty in theology: The system of
Ashari and Gazali, which till then had been branded as heretical, was adopted
in the West. That meant an infusion of intellectualism into the teaching of the
Faith, - a proceeding which could not be altogether satisfactory either to the
adherents of the old Faith or to freethinkers, but which may have incited many
to farther philosophizing. Hitherto an attitude of repudiation had been
maintained towards all reasoning in matters of faith; and, even later, many
politicians and philosophers were of opinion that the faith of the multitude
should not be violently disturbed, nor elevated to knowledge, but that the
provinces of Religion and of Philosophy should be kept scrupulously separate.
The
Almohads were interested in questions of theology, but yet Abu Yaaqub and his
successors manifested, as far as political conditions permitted, such an
appreciation of secular knowledge, that philosophy was enabled to enjoy a brief
period of prosperity at their court.
2. We
find Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Abdalmalik ibn Tofail al-Qaisi (Abubacer) in the position of Vizir and BodyPhysician to Abu
Yaaqub, after holding an appointment as Secretary in Granada. His place of
birth was the small Andalusian town of Guadix, and he died in Marocco, the seat
of Government, in the year 1185. The life that lies between appears to have
been by no means eventful. He was fonder of books than of men, and in his
sovereign's great library he gathered, 'by reading, much information which he
required for his art, or which met his ardent thirst for knowledge. He was the dilettante of the philosophers of the
West, and was more given to contemplative enjoyment than scientific work.
Rarely did he set himself to write. We need not perhaps put absolute faith in
his assertion that he could have fundamentally improved the Ptolemaie system.
Many Arabs made a like assertion, without carrying it into effect.
Of Ibn
Tofail's poetic ventures, one or two poems have been preserved to us. But his
principal endeavour, like that of Ibn Sina, was to combine Greek Science and
Oriental Wisdom into a modern view of the world. That was to him a personal
concern, just as it was to Ibn Baddja. He too occupied his mind with the
relation of the individual man to Society and its prejudices. But he went
farther: lbn Baddja, as a rule made out the individual thinker or a small
association of independent thinkers, as constituting a State within the State,
- a copy, as it were, of the great total, or a model for happier times.: Ibn
Tofail on the other hand, turned to consider the original.
3. He states the case clearly, in his work "Hai ibn
Yaqzan". The scenery is contributed by two islands, on one of which he
sets human society with its conventions, and on the other an individual man,
who is being developed naturally. This society as a whole is governed by lower
impulses, subjected only to some measure of outward restraint by a grossly
sensuous religion. But out of this society two men, called Salaman and Asal (Abeal, cf. IV, 4 § 7), rise to rational
knowledge and control of their desires. Accomodating himself to the popular
religion, the first, who is of a practical turn of mind, contrives to rule the
people; but the second, being of speculative disposition and mystic leanings,
wanders off to the island which lay opposite, and which he imagines to be
uninhabited, - there to devote himself to study and ascetic discipline.
On that
island, however, our Hai ibn Yaqzan, - i. e. `the Active one, the son of the
Vigilant', - had been trained into a perfect philosopher. Cast upon the island
when a child, or else brought into existence there by spontaneous generation,
he had been suckled by a gazelle, and then had been in the course of time left,
like a Robinson Crusoe, and that entirely, to his own resources. Yet he had
secured a material existence, and farther, by observation and reflection, had
acquired a knowledge of Nature, the heavens, God, and his own inner being,
until after seven times seven years he had attained to that which is highest,
viz., the Sufi vision of God, the state of ecstasy. In this situation he was
found by Asal. After they had come to understand each other, - for at first Hai
was still without speech, - it was found that. the philosophy of the one and
the religion of the other were two forms of the same truth, except that in the
first form it was somewhat less veiled. But when Hai came to know that on the
opposite island an entire people continued in darkness and error, he resolved
to proceed thither and reveal the truth to them. Here, however, he was brought
to learn by experience that the multitude were incapable of a pure apprehension
of the truth, and that Mohammed had acted wisely in giving the people sensuous
forms instead of full light. After this result therefore he repaired again with
his friend Asal to the uninhabited island; to serve God in spirit and in truth
till the hour of death.
4.
Ibn Tofail has devoted by far the largest portion of his romance to the course
of Hai's development; but he cannot certainly have thought that the individual
man, left to himself, is able, with the resources of Nature alone and without
the help of society, to advance so far as Hai did. And yet his conception is
perhaps rather more historical, than certain views which have been entertained
since his day, e.g. by some of the Rationalists of the 18th century. Many
little touches in his work shew that Hai was intended to represent humanity as
it stands outside of revelation. That which is accomplished in him, is the
development of Indian, Persian and Greek wisdom. One or two hints pointing in that
direction, but which cannot be farther followed out here, may help to lend
probability to this view. Thus it is significant, to begin with, that Hai lives
on the island of Ceylon, the climate of which was held to be such as to render
spontaneous generation possible, where also, according to the legend, Adam, the
first man, had been created, and where the Indian king came to the Wise Man.
Then Hai's first religious sentiment of wonder, after he had struggled up out
of the primary, animal stage, through shame and curiosity, is elicited by fire,
which has been discovered by him, - a circumstance which recalls to us the
Persian religion. And his farther speculations are borrowed from Greco-Arabic
Philosophy.
The
affinity to Ibn Sina's Hai, which Ibn Tofail himself indicates, is clear:
Only, the figure of Hai in this case presents a more human appearance. With Ihn
Sina the character of Hai represents the Superhuman Spirit, but the hero of Ibn
Tofail's romance seems to be the personification of the natural Spirit of
Mankind illuminated from above; and that Spirit must be in accordance with the
Prophet-Soul of Mohammed when rightly understood, whose utterances are to be
interpreted allegorically.
Ibn
Tofail has thus arrived at the same result as his Eastern predecessors.
Religion must still be kept up for the ordinary man, because he cannot go
beyond it. It is only a few who rise to an understanding of religious symbols;
and very rarely indeed does any one attain to the unrestrained contemplation of
the highest reality. This last truth he accentuates with the greatest emphasis.
Even if we do find in Hai the representative of human nature, we cannot gainsay
this truth; for the representation given sets forth the supreme perfection of
Man as consisting in submerging his own self in the World-Spirit, in the most
lonely quietude, and withdrawn from all that is sensuous.
It is true that this condition is attained only in mature age, in
which, besides, a human friend has been met with; and attention to what is
material, and to the arts and sciences, forms the natural preliminary stage of
spiritual perfection. Thus Ibn Tofail is permitted to look back without regret
or shame upon his life spent at court.
5. We have already met frequently with the philosophical views, which
Hai developed in his seven life-periods. But even his practical behaviour is
specially considered by Ibn Tofail. Sufi exercises, as they are still observed
among the religious orders of the East, and as they had been recommended even
by Plato and the Neo-Platonists,
have
taken the place of the observances of religious worship enjoined by the Muslim
Law. And Hai forms for himself in the seventh period of his life a system
of Ethics which has a Pythagorean appearance.
Hai has
set before him as the aim of his action, - to seek for the One in all things
and to unite himself to the absolute and the self existing. He sees in fact all
Nature striving to reach this Highest Being. He is far above the view that
everything on the earth exists for the sake of Man. Animals and plants likewise
live for themselves and for God; and thus he is not permitted to deal
capriciously with them. He now restricts his bodily wants to what is absolutely
necessary. Ripe fruits are preferred by him, the seeds of which he piously consigns
to the soil, taking anxious precaution that no kind may die out through his
avidity. And only in extreme need does he touch animal food, in which case he
seeks in like manner to spare the species. 'Enough for life, not enough for
sleep' is his motto.
That has reference to
his bodily attitude towards the earthly; but the living principle binds him to
the heavens, and, like the heavens, he strives to be useful to his surroundings,
and to keep his own life pure. He therefore tends the plants and protects the
animals about him, in order that his island may become a paradise. He pays
scrupulous attention to the cleanliness of his person and his clothing, and
endeavours to give a harmonious turn to all his movements, in conformity with
those of the heavenly bodies.
In this
way he is gradually rendered capable of elevating his own self above earth and
heaven to the pure Spirit. That is the condition of ecstasy, which no thought,
no word, no image has ever been able to comprehend or express.
4. IBN ROSHD.
1. Abu-l-Walid
Mohammed ibn Akhmed ibn Mohammed ibn Roshd (Averroes) was born at Cordova, of a family of lawyers, in
the year 1126. There too he made himself master of the learned culture of his
time. In 1153 he is said to have been presented to the prince Abu Yaaqub by Ibn
Tofail; and we possess a report of that occurrence, full of character. After
the introductory phrases of politeness the prince asked him : "What is
the opinion of philosophers about the heavens? Are they eternal, or have they
been brought into existence?" Ibn Roshd cautiously replied that he had not
given attention to philosophy. Thereupon the prince commenced to discuss the
subject with Ibn Tofail, and, to the astonishment of the listener, spewed that
he was acquainted with Aristotle, Plato, and the philosophers and theologians
of Islam. Then Ibn Roshd also spoke out freely, and won the favour of his highplaced
master. His lot was fixed: He was destined to interpret Aristotle, as no one
before him had done, that mankind might be put in complete and genuine
possession of science.
He was, besides, a jurist and a physician. We find him in 1169 in the
position of judge in Seville, and shortly afterwards in Cordova. Abu Yaakub,
now Caliph, nominates him his Body-Physician in the year 1182; but, a short
time after, he is again judge in his native city, as his father and grandfather
had been. Circumstances, however, change for the worse. Philosophers are
pronounced accursed, and their writings are committed to the flames. In his old
age Ibn Roshd is banished by Abu Yusuf to Elisana (Lucena, near Cordova), but
yet be dies in Marocco the capital, on the 10th December, 1198.
2. It
was upon Aristotle that his activity was concentrated. All that he could
procure of that philosopher's works, or about them, he subjected to diligent
study and careful comparison. Writings of the Greeks, which are now lost either
entirely or in part, were still known to lbn Roshd in translated form. He goes
critically and systematically to work: He paraphrases Aristotle and he
interprets him, now with comparative brevity, and anon in greater detail, both
in moderate-sized and in bulky commentaries. He thus merits the name of
"the Commentator", which also is assigned to him in Dante's
"Commedia"[19]. It
looks as if the Philosophy of the Muslims had been fated in him to come to an
understanding of Aristotle, just that it might then expire, after that end had
been attained. Aristotle for him is the supremely perfect man, the greatest
thinker, the philosopher who was in possession of an infallible truth. New
discoveries in Astronomy, Art or Physics could make no alteration in that
respect. Of course it is possible to misunderstand Aristotle : Ibn Roshd
himself came to have a different and better understanding of many a point which
he took from the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina; but yet he lived continually in
the belief that Aristotle, when rightly understood, corresponds to the highest
knowledge which is attainable by man. In the eternal revolution of worldly
events Aristotle has reached a height which it is impossible to transcend. Men
who have come after him are frequently put to the cost of much trouble and
reflection to deduce the views which readily disclosed themselves to the first
master. Gradually, however, all doubt and contradiction are reduced to silence,
for Aristotle is one who is more than man, destined as it were by Providence to
illustrate how far the human race is capable of advancing in its approximation
to the World-Spirit. As being the sublimest incarnation of the Spirit of
Mankind, Ibn Roshd would like to call his master the `Divine' Teacher.
It will
be shewn by what follows, that even in the instance of Ibn Roshd, unmeasured
admiration for Aristotle did not suffice to bring about a perfect comprehension
of his thoughts. He allows no opportunity to pass of doing battle with Ibn
Sina, and, upon occasion, he parts company with Farabi and Ibn Baddja, - men
to whom he owes a great deal. He carps at all his predecessors, in a far more
disagreeable fashion than Aristotle did in the case of his teacher Plato. And
yet he himself is far from having got beyond the interpretation of Neo-Platonic
expositors and the misconceptions of Syrian and Arab translators. Frequently
he follows even the superficial Themistius in opposition to the judicious
Alexander of Aphrodisias, or else he tries to combine their views.
3. Ibn
Roshd is above all a fanatical admirer of the Aristotelian Logic. Without it
one cannot be happy, and it is a pity that Plato and Socrates were ignorant of
it! The happiness of men is measured by the degree of their logical
attainments. With the discernment of a critic he recognizes Porphyry's
"Isagoge" as superfluous, but he still counts the
"Rhetoric" and the "Poetics" as forming part of the
Organon. And then the oddest misapprehensions are met with. For example,
Tragedy and Comedy are turned into Panegyrics and Lampoons; poetical
probability has to be content with signifying either truth capable of demonstration,
or deceptive appearance; recognition on the stage (avayv4to) becomes Apodictic
judgment, and so on. Of course he has absolutely no conception of the Greek
world; and that is venial, for he could not have had any notion of it. And yet
we do not readily excuse one who has been so severe a critic of others.
Like
his predecessors, Ibn Roshd lays especial emphasis upon Grammar, as far as it
is common to all languages. This common principle, and therefore the universal
one, Aristotle, he thinks, keeps always before him in his Hermeneutics, and
even in the Rhetoric. Accordingly the Arab philosopher is also bound to adhere
to it, although in illustrating universal rules he may take his examples from
the Arabic language and literature. But it is universal rules which form his
object, for science is the knowledge of the universal.
Logic smooths the path for the ascent of our cognition from sensuous
particularity to pure rational truth. The multitude will always live in the
sensuous element, groping about in error. Defective mental parts and poor
education, and depraved habits to boot, prevent them from making any advance.
But still it must be within the power of some to arrive at a knowledge of
truth. The eagle looks
the sun in the face, for if no
being could look at him, Nature would have made something in vain. Whatever
shines there is meant to be seen; and so whatever exists is meant to be known,
were it only by one single man. Now truth exists; and the love for it which
fills our hearts would have been all in vain, if we could not approach it. Ibn
Roshd thinks that he has come to know the truth in the case of many things, and
even that he has been able to discover absolute Truth. He would not, with
Leasing, have cared to resign himself to a mere search for it.
Truth,
in fact, has been given him in Aristotle; and from that standpoint he looks
down upon Muslim theology. Certainly he recognizes that religion has a truth of
its own, but theology is repugnant to him. It wants to prove what cannot be
proved in this way. Revelation, as contained in the Koran, - according to the
teaching of Ibn Roshd and others, and similarly of Spinoza in later times, -
does not aim at making men learned, but at making them better. Not knowledge,
but obedience or moral practice is the aim of the lawgiver, who knows that
human welfare can only be realized in society.
4. That
which especially distinguishes lbn Roshd from those who preceded him, and in
particular from lbn Sina, is the unequivocal mode in which he conceives of the
world as an eternal process of `becoming'. The world as a whole is an eternally
necessary unity, without any possibility of non-existence or of different
existence. Matter and Form can only be separated in thought. Forms do not
wander like ghosts through dull Matter, but are contained in it after the
manner of germs. The Material Forms, in the guise of natural forces, operate in
an eternal process of generation, never separated from matter, but yet
deserving to be called divine. Absolute origination or extinction there is
none, for all happening is a transition from potentiality to actuality, and
from actuality back to potentiality, in which process like is ever generated by
like and by that alone.
But
there is a graded order in the world of Being. The material or substantial Form
stands midway between mere Accident and pure (or separate) Form. Substantial
Forms also exhibit varieties of degree, - intermediate conditions between
potentiality and actuality. And, finally, the whole system of Forms, from the
nethermost hylic Form up to the Divine Essence, the original Form of the whole,
constitutes one compact structure rising tier upon tier.
Now the eternal process of Becoming, within the given System,
presupposes an eternal movement, and that again an eternal Mover. If the world
had had an origin, we might have reasoned from it to another and a similarly
originated corporeal world, which had produced it, and so on without end. If
again it had been a `possible' entity, we might have inferred a `possible'
entity out of which it had proceeded, and so on ad infinitum. And according to Ibn Roshd, it is only the
hypothesis of a world -moved as a unity and of eternal necessity,
that yields us the possibility of inferring a Being, separate from the world,
yet eternally moving it, who in his continually producing that movement and
maintaining the fair order of the All, may legitimately be called the Author of
the world, and who in the Spirits that move the Spheres, - for every separate
kind of movement demands its separate principle, - possesses agents to give
effect to his activity.
The
essence of the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the Sphere-Spirits, is
found by Ibn Roshd in Thought, in which unity of Being is given him. Thought
which is identical with its object is the sole positive definition of the
Divine Essence; but Being and Unity absolutely synchronize with such Thought.
In other words, Being and Unity are not annexed to the Essence, but are given
only in Thought, just like all universals. Thought produces everywhere the
general in the particular. It is true that the universal as a disposition is
operative in things, but the universal qua universal exists in the
understanding alone. Or, in possibility (or potentiality) it exists in things,
but it exists actually in the understanding, - that is, it has more Being, - a
higher kind of existence, - in the understanding than in things.
If now
the question is asked, - `Does Divine Thought take in merely the general, or
does it take in the particular too?', Ibn Roshd replies, `It does not directly
take in either the one or the other, for the Divine Essence transcends both of
them. Divine Thought produces the All and embraces the All. God is the
principle, the original Form, and the final aim of all things. He is the order
of the world, the reconciliation of all opposites, the All itself in its
highest mode of existence. It follows of course from this theory, that there
can be no talk of a Divine Providence in the ordinary sense of the term.
5. Two kinds of Being we
know : one which is moved, and one which causes motion, though itself unmoved,
- or a corporeal and a spiritual. But it is in the spiritual that the higher
unity or perfection of all Being lies, and that too in graded order. It is thus
no abstract unity. The farther the Sphere-Spirits are from the First, so much
the less simple are they. All know themselves, but in their knowledge there is
at the same time a reference to the First Cause. The result is a kind of
parallelism between the corporeal and the spiritual. There is something in the
lower Spirits which corresponds to the composition of the corporeal out of
Matter and Form. What is mingled with the purely spiritual is of course no
mere Matter, that could suffer any thing, but yet it is something resembling
Matter, - something which has the faculty of taking to itself something else.
Otherwise the multiplicity of inlelligibilia
could not be brought into harmony with the unity of the Spirit which
apprehends them. Matter suffers, but Spirit receives. This parallelism, with
its subtle distinction, has been introduced by Ibn Roshd with special reference
to the human Spirit.
6.
Ibn Roshd is firmly of opinion that the human soul is related to its body, as
Form is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point. The theory of
numerous immortal souls he most decidedly rejects, combating Ibn Sina. The soul
has an existence only as a completion of the body with which it is associated.
As regards empirical
psychology he has anxiously endeavoured to keep by Aristotle, in opposition to
Galen and others; but in the doctrine of the "noun" be diverges from his master not inconsiderably,
without being aware of it. His conception, - springing from Neo-Platonic views,
- of the Material Reason, is peculiar. It is not a mere aptitude or capacity
of the human soul, neither is it equivalent to the sensuous-spiritual life of
presentation, but it is something above the soul, and above the individual.
The Material Reason is eternal, imperishable Spirit, as eternal and
imperishable as the pure Reason or the Active Spirit over us. The ascription of
a separate existence to Matter in the domain of the corporeal, is here transferred
by Ibn Roshd, -- following of course Themistius and others, -- to the region of
the spiritual.
The Material Reason is thus eternal
substance. The natural aptitudes, or the capacity of the human individual for
intellectual knowledge Ibn Roshd denominates the Passive Reason. That comes
into being and disappears, with men as individuals, but the Material Reason is
eternal, like Man as a race.
But a measure of obscurity
remains, and it could hardly have been otherwise, about the relation between
the Active Spirit and the Receptive Spirit, (if we may for the time use this
last term for the Material Reason). The Active Spirit renders intelligible the
presentations of the human soul, while the Receptive Spirit absorbs these intelligibilia. The life of the soul in
individual men thus forms the meeting place of this mystic pair of lovers. And
such places differ very greatly. It depends on the entire capacity of a man's
soul, and on the disposition of his perceptions, in what degree the Active
Spirit can elevate these to intelligibility, and how far the Receptive Spirit
is in a position to make them a portion of its own contents. This explains why
men are not all at the same stage of spiritual knowledge. But the sum of
spiritual knowledge in the world continues unaltered, although the partition of
it undergoes individual variations. By a necessity of nature, the Philosopher
re-appears, without fail, whether an Aristotle or an Ibn Itoshd, in whose brain
Being becomes Idea. It is true that the thoughts of individual men occur in the
element of time, and that the Receptive Spirit is changeable, so far as the
individual has a part in it; but considered as the Reason of the Human Race,
that Spirit is eternally incapable of change, like the Active Spirit from the
last Sphere above us.
7. On the whole, three great heresies set the
system of Ibn Roshd in opposition to the theology of the three world-religions
of his time : first, the eternity of the material world and of the Spirits that
move it; next, the necessary causal nexus in all that happens in the world, so
that no place is left for providence, miracle, and the like; and, thirdly, the
perishable nature of all that is individual, by which theory individual
immortality is also taken away.
Considered logically the assumption of a
number of independent Sphere-Spirits under God does not appear to have any
sufficient basis. But Ibn Roshd, like his predecessors, gets over this
difficulty by asserting that these Sphere-Spirits do not differ individually
but only in kind. Their sole purpose was to explain the different movements in
the system of the world, so long as its unity was still unknown. After the
Ptolemaic system of the world had been put aside, and these intermediary
Spirits had become superfluous, men identified the Active Spirit with God, as,
for the matter of that, they had even in earlier times attempted to do, on
speculative and religious grounds. It was merely one step farther, to identify
even the eternal Spirit of Man with God. Ibn Roshd did neither of these things,
at least according to the strict letter of his writings; but his system, when
consistently carried out, made it possible to take these steps, and in this way
to arrive generally at a Pantheistic conception of the world. On the other hand
Materialism might easily find support in the system, however decidedly our
philosopher contended against such a view; for where the eternity, form and
efficacy of all that is material are so strongly emphasized, as was done by
him, Spirit may indeed still receive the name of king, but seemingly by the
favour merely of the material.
Ibn Roshd deserves at all events to be called a bold and consistent
thinker, although not an original one. Theoretical philosophy was sufficient
for him; but yet he owed it to his time and his position to come to an understanding
with religion and practice. We may devote a few words to this point.
8. Ibn Roshd often takes the opportunity of expressing himself
against the -uneducated rulers and obscurantist theologians of his own day; but
he continues to prefer life as a citizen to a solitary life. He even thanks his
opponents for many a piece of instruction, - and that is a pleasing touch of
character. He thinks that the solitary life produces no arts or sciences, and
that one can at the most enjoy in it what has been gained already, or perhaps
improve it a little. But every one should contribute to the weal of the whole
community: even women as well as men should be of service to society and the
State. In this opinion Ibn Roshd agrees with Plato (for he was not acquainted
with the Politics of Aristotle), and he remarks with entire good sense that a
great deal of the poverty and distress of his time arises from the circumstance
that women are kept like domestic animals or house plants for purposes of
gratification, of a very questionable character besides, instead of being
allowed to take part in the production of material and intellectual wealth, and
in the preservation of the same.
In his
Ethical system our philosopher animadverts with great severity upon the
doctrine of the professors of Law, that a thing is good or bad only because God
so willed it. On the contrary, says he, everything has its moral character from
nature or in conformity with reason. The action which is determined by rational
discernment is moral. It is not, of course, the individual Reason, but the
Reason which looks to the welfare of the community or State, to which appeal
must be made in the last instance.
Ibn Roshd regards religion also from a statesman's point
of view. He values it on account of its moral purpose. It is Law, not Learning.
He is therefore constantly engaged in fighting the Theologians, who wish to
understand intellectually, instead of obeying with docile faith. He makes it a
reproach to Gazali, that he has allowed philosophy to exercise an influence
upon his religious doctrine, and thereby has led many into doubt and unbelief.
The people should believe, exactly in accordance with what stands in the Book.
That is Truth, - Truth meant no doubt for a bigger sort of children, to whom we
convey it in the form of stories. Whatever goes beyond this, comes of evil. For
example, the Koran has two proofs of the existence of God, which are evident to
every one, viz: the Divine care of everything, especially, of human beings, -
and the production of life in plants, animals, &c. These deliverances
should not be disturbed, nor should the literal acceptation of revelation be
quibbled about, in the theological fashion. For, the proofs which theologians
adduce of the existence of God can make no stand against a scientific
criticism, any more than the proof which is furnished from the notion of the
possible and the necessary, in Farabi and Ibn Sina. All this leads to Atheism
and Libertinism. In the interests of morality, and therefore of the State, this
semi-theology should be fought against.
On the
other hand, philosophers who have attained to knowledge are permitted to
interpret the Word of God in the Koran. In the light of the highest truth they
understand what is aimed at therein; and they tell merely just so much of it
to the ordinary man as he is capable of apprehending. In this way the most
admirable harmony results. Religious precept and philosophy are in agreement
with one another, precisely because they are not seeking the same thing. They
are related as practice and theory. In the philosopher's conception of
religion, he allows its validity in its own domain, so that philosophy by no
means rejects religion. Philosophy, however, is the highest form of truth, and
at the same time the most sublime religion. The religion of the philosopher,
in fact, is the knowledge of all that exists.
But yet
this view has the appearance of being irreligious; and a positive religion can
never be content to recognize the leading position of philosophy in the realm
of truth. It was only natural that the theologians of the West, like their
brethren of the East should seek to profit by the favour of circumstances, and
take no rest until they had reduced the mistress to the position of the
handmaid of Theology.
1. IBN KHALDUN.
1. The
Philosophy of Ibn Roshd, and his interpretation of Aristotle, have had
extremely little effect upon the Muslim world. Many of his works, in the
original, are lost, and we have them only in Hebrew and Latin translations. He
had no disciples or followers. In retired corners no doubt many a free-thinker
or Mystic might be met with, to whose mind it looked sufficiently fantastic to
toil earnestly with philosophic questions of a theoretical kind; but Philosophy
was not permitted to influence general culture or the condition of affairs.
Before the victorious arms of the Christians the material civilization as well
as the intellectual culture of the Muslims retreated farther and farther. Spain
became like Africa, where the Berber was ruler. The times were serious: the
very existence of Islam in these regions was at stake. Men made ready for
fighting against the enemy, or even against one another; and pious brethren
everywhere formed unions for mystic observances. In the Sufi orders of these
people, a few philosophical formulae at least were still preserved in safety.
When, towards the middle of the thirteenth century, the emperor Frederick II
submitted a number of philosophical questions to the Muslim scholars of Ceuta,
the Almohad Abdalwahid charged Ibn Sabin, founder of a Mystic order, to reply
to them. He did so, drawling forth in a pedantic tone the views both of ancient
and recent philosophers, and affording a glimpse of the Sufi secret, - that God
is the reality of all things. The only thing, however, which we can learn from
his answers, may be said to be, that Ibn Sabin had read books, of which he
thought the Emperor Frederick had not the faintest notion.
2. In
small State-systems, the Muslim civilization of the West drifted away, now
rising, now falling. But before it vanished completely, a man appeared, who
endeavoured to discover the law of its formation, and who thought to found
therewith a new philosophical discipline, -- the Philosophy of Society or of
History. That remarkable man was Ibn Khaldun, born at Tunis is the year 1332,
of a family belonging to Seville. There he also received his upbringing, and
there he was next instructed in philosophy, partly by a teacher who had been
trained in the East. After studying all known sciences, he occupied himself
sometimes in the service of the Government, and sometimes in travel, proving
everywhere an excellent observer. He served various princes in the capacity of
secretary, and he was ambassador at several courts in Spain and Africa: as such
he visited the Christian court of Peter the Cruel in Seville. He was also at
the court of Tamerlane in Damascus. He had thus acquired a wide and full
experience of the world, when he died at Cairo in the year 1406. In character
perhaps he does not take a high rank; but a measure of vanity, dilettantism and
the like, may readily be forgiven to the man who, above all others in his
time, lived for Science.
3. Ibn
Khaldun was not satisfied with the School Philosophy, as he bad come to know
it. His picture of the world would not fit its conventional framing. If he had
been somewhat more given to theorizing, he might no doubt have constructed a
system of Nominalism. Philosophers pretend to know everything; but the
universe seems to him too great to be capable of being comprehended by our
understanding. There are more beings and things, infinitely more, than Man can
ever know. "God. creates what you know nothing of". Logical deductions
frequently do not agree with the empirical world of individual things, which
becomes known by observation alone. That we can reach truth by merely applying
the rules of Logic, is a vain imagination : therefore reflection on what is
given in experience is the task of the scientific man. And he must not rest
satisfied with his own individual experience; but, with critical care he must
draw upon the sum of the collected experience of mankind, which has been handed
down.
By nature the soul is devoid of knowledge; but yet by nature it has
the power of reflecting on the experience which is given, and elaborating it.
In the course of such reflection, there frequently springs forth, as if by
inspiration, the proper middle term, by means of which the insight which has
been gained may be arranged and explained according to the rules of Formal
Logic. Logic does not produce knowledge: it merely traces the path which our
reflection ought to take: it
points out how we arrive at knowledge; and it has the farther value of being
able to preserve us from error, and to sharpen the intellect and keep it to
accuracy in thinking. It is therefore an auxiliary science, and ought to be
cultivated even for its own sake by one or two qualified men, called specially
to that task; but it does not possess the fundamental importance which is
attributed to it by the Philosophers. The path which it indicates for our
reflection to take, is at need followed by scientific talent in any individual
science, quite independently of logical guidance.
Ibn
Khaldun is a sober thinker. He combats Alchemy and Astrology on rational
grounds. To the Mystic rationalism of the Philosophers he opposes frequently
the simple doctrines of his religion, whether from personal conviction, or from
political considerations. But religion exercises no greater influence upon his
scientific opinions than NeoPlatonic Aristotelianism. Plato's Republic, the
Pythagorean Platonic Philosophy, but without its marvel-mongering outgrowths,
and the historical works of his oriental forerunners, particularly of Masudi,
have had most influence on the development of his thoughts.
4. Ibn
Khaldun comes forward with a claim to establish a new philosophical
discipline, of which Aristotle had no conception. Philosophy is the science of
what exists, developed from its own principles or reasons. But what the
Philosophers advance, about the high Spirit-world and the Divine Essence, does
not correspond thereto: that which they say on these subjects is incapable of
proof. We know our world of men much better; and a more certain deliverance
may be given regarding it, by means of observation and inner mental experience.
Here facts permit of being authenticated, and their causes discovered. Now, so
far as the latter process is feasible in History, i. e. so far as historical events are capable of being traced back
to their causes, and historical laws capable of being discovered, History
deserves actually to be called Science and a part of Philosophy. Thus the idea
of History as Science clearly emerges. It has nothing to do with curiosity,
frivolousness, general benefit, edifying effect &c. It should, although in
the service of the higher purposes of life, determine nothing except facts,
endeavouring to find out their causal nexus. The work must be done in a
critical, unprejudiced spirit. The governing principle which rules here is
this, - that the cause corresponds to the effect, - that is to say, that like
events presuppose the same conditions, or, that under the same circumstances of
civilization the like events will occur. Now, as it is a probable assumption
that the nature of men and of society undergoes no change by the advance of
time, or no considerable change, a living comprehension of the present is the
best means of investigating the past. That which is fully known and is under
our very eyes permits us to form retrospective conclusions in regard to the
less fully known events of an earlier time: it promises even a glance into the
future. In every instance, therefore, tradition must be tested by the present;
and if it tells us of things which are impossible now, we must for that very
reason doubt its truth. Past and Present are as like one another as two drops
of water. If understood absolutely, that might have been said even by lbn
Roshd. But according to Ibn Khaldun it is only quite generally valid as a
principle of research. In detail it suffers many a limitation; and in any case
it has itself to be established by facts.
5. What then is the subject of History as a philosophical
discipline? Ibn Khaldun answers that it is the Social life, - the collective,
material and intellectual culture of Society. History has to show how men work
and provide themselves with food, why they contend with each other and
associate in larger communities under single leaders, how at last they find in
a settled life leisure for the cultivation of the higher arts and sciences,
how a finer culture comes into bloom in this way out of rude beginnings, and
how again this in time dies away.
The forms of Society which replace one another are, in the opinion of
Ibn Khaldun; 1) Society in the Nomad condition; 2) Society under a Military
Dynasty; and 3) Society after the City type. The first question is that of
food. Men and nations are differentiated by their economical position, as
nomads, settled herdsmen, agriculturists. Want leads to rapine and war, and to
subjection to a monarch who will lead them. Thus dynastic authority is
developed. This again founds for itself a city, where division of labour or
mutual assistance produces prosperity. But this prosperity leads to degenerate
idleness and luxury. Labour has in the first place brought about prosperity;
but now, at the highest stage of civilization, men get others to labour for
them, and often without any direct equivalent, because regard or even servility
to the upper classes, and extortionate treatment of the lower, secure success.
But, all the same, men are coming to depend upon others. Needs are always
growing more clamant, and taxes more oppressive. Rich spendthrifts and
tax-payers grow poor, and their unnatural life makes them ill and miserable.[20] The
old warlike customs have been refined away, so that people are no longer
capable of defending themselves. The bond, - formed by a sense of belonging to
one community, or the bond of Religion, - by the help of which the necessity
and the will of the chief knit the individual members together in older days,
is relaxed, for the citizens are not pious. Everything, therefore, is ready to
break up from within. And then appears a new and powerful nomad race from the
desert, or a people not so greatly over-civilized, but possessed of a firmer
public spirit; and it falls upon the effeminate city. Thereafter a new State is
formed, which appropriates the material and intellectual wealth of the old
culture, and the same history is repeated. It fares with States and the larger
associations of men, just as with single families: their history is brought to
a close, in from three to six generations. The first generation founds; the
second maintains, as perhaps the third or even farther generations also do; the
last demolishes. That is the cycle of all civilization.
6. According to August Miller the theory of lbn Khaldun is in
conformity with the history of Spain, West Africa and Sicily, from the eleventh
to the fifteenth century, - from the study of which, in fact, it was taken. His
own historical work is a compilation, it is true. In detail he is often at
fault, when he criticizes tradition with the help of his theory; but there is
an abundance of fine psychological and political observation in his
philosophical Introduction, and as a whole it is a masterly performance. The
ancients never dealt thoroughly with the problem of History. They have
bequeathed to us great works of art in their historical compositions, -but
no philosophical establishment of History as a Science. That mankind, though
existing from all eternity, long failed to attain to much of the higher civilization,
was explained by elementary occurrences, such as earthquakes, floods, and the
like. On the other hand Christian philosophy regarded History with its
vicissitudes as the realization of, or the preparation for, the kingdom of God
upon the earth. Now Ibn Khaldun was the first to endeavour, - with full
consciousness and in a statement amply substantiated, - to derive the development
of human society from proximate causes. The conditions of race, climate,
production of commodities, and so on, are discussed, and are set forth in their
effect upon the sensuous and intellectual constitution of man and of society.
In the course which is run by civilization he finds an intimate conformity to
law. He searches everywhere for natural causes, with the utmost completeness
which was possible for him. He also asserts his belief that the chain of causes
and effects reaches its conclusion in an Ultimate Cause. The series cannot go
on without end, and therefore we argue that there is a God. But this deduction,
as he calls it, properly means this, - that we are not in a position to become
acquainted with all things and the manner of their operation: it is virtually a
confession of our ignorance. Conscious ignorance is even a kind of knowledge;
but knowledge should be pursued, as far as possible. In clearing the way for
his new science, Ibn Khaldun considers that he has merely indicated the main
problems, and merely suggested generally the method and the subject of the
science. But be hopes that others will come after him to carry on his
investigations and propound fresh problems, with sound understanding and sure
knowledge.
Ibn
Khaldun's hope has been realized, but not in Islam. As he was without
forerunners, he remained without successors. But yet his work has been of
lasting influence in the East. Many Muslim statesmen who, from the fifteenth
century onwards, drove so many a European sovereign or diplomatist to despair,
had studied in our philosopher's school.
2. THE ARABS AND SCHOLASTICISM.
1. To
the victor belongs the bride. In the wars which were waged in Spain between
Christians and Muslims, the former had often come under the influence of the
attractions of Moorish fair ones. Many a Christian knight had celebrated
"the nine-days' religious rite" with a Moorish woman. But besides
material wealth and sensual enjoyment, the charm of intellectual culture had
also its effect upon the conqueror. And Arab Science thus presented the appearance
of a lovely bride to the eyes of many men who felt their want of knowledge.
It was
the Jews especially who played the part of matchmakers in the transaction. The
Jews had participated in all the transformations of Muslim intellectual
culture: many of them wrote in Arabic, and others translated Arabic writings
into Hebrew; not a few philosophical works by Muslim authors owe their
preservation to the latter circumstance.
The
development of this Jewish study of philosophy culminated in Maimonides (1135-1204), who
sought, chiefly under the influence of Farabi and Ibn Sina, to reconcile Aristotle
with the Old Testament. In part he expounded the doctrines of philosophy from
the text of revelation, and in part he restricted the Aristotelian philosophy
to what belongs to this earth, while a knowledge of that which is above it, had
to be gained from the Word of God.
In the
various Muslim States, at the time when they were most flourishing, the Jews
had shewn an interest in scientific work, and they had not only been tolerated,
but even regarded with favour. Their position, however, was altered, when those
States were together overthrown, and when the decline of their civilization
ensued. Expelled by fanatical mobs they fled for refuge to Christian lands, and
particularly to Southern France, there to fulfil their mission as the
disseminators of culture.
2. The
Muslim world and the Christian world of the West came into contact at two
points, - in Lower Italy and in Spain. At the court of the Emperor Frederick II
in Palermo, Arab science was eagerly cultivated and made accessible to
Latinists. The Emperor and his son Manfred presented the Universities of
Bologna and Paris with translations of philosophical works, partly rendered
from the Arabic, and partly direct from the Greek.
Of much
greater importance and influence, however, was the activity of translators in
Spain. In Toledo, which had been re-captured by the Christians, there existed a
rich Arabic Mosque-library, the renown of which, as a centre of culture, had
penetrated far into the Christian countries of the North. Arabs of mixed lineage
and Jews, some of them converts to Christianity, worked together there, along
with Spanish Christians. Fellow-workers were present from all countries. Thus
co-operated as translators, for example, Johannes Hispanus and Gundisalinus
(first half of the twelfth century), Gerard of Cremona (1114-1187), Michael
the Scot and Hermann the German (between 1240 and 1246). We are not yet in possession
of sufficiently detailed information regarding the labours of these men. Their
translations may be called faithful, to the extent that every word in the
Arabic original, or the Hebrew (or Spanish?) version has some Latin word
corresponding to it; but they are not generally distinguished by an intelligent
appreciation of the subject matter. To understand these translations
thoroughly is a difficult thing, for one who is not conversant with Arabic.
Many Arabic words which were taken over as they stood, and many proper names,
disfigured beyond recognition, flit about with the air of ghosts. All this may
well have produced sad confusion in the brains of Latinist students of
Philosophy; and the thoughts, which were being disclosed afresh, had themselves
at least an equally perplexing tendency.
The
activity of translators kept pace generally with the interest shewn by Christian
circles, and this interest followed a development similar to that which we had
occasion to observe in Eastern and Western Islam (cf. VI, 1 ' 2). The earliest
translations were those of works on Mathematical Astrology, Medicine, Natural
Philosophy, and Psychology, including Logical and Metaphysical material. As
time went on, people restricted themselves more to Aristotle and commentaries
upon him; but, at first, a preference was shewn for everything that met the
craving for the marvellous.
Kindi
became known chiefly as a physician and an astrologer. Ibn Sina produced a
notable effect by his `Medicine', and his empirical psychology, and also by his
Natural Philosophy and his Metaphysics. Compared with him, Farabi and Ibn
Baddja exercised a less considerable influence. Lastly came the Commentaries of
Ibn Roshd (Averroee); and the
reputation which they gained, along with that which was secured by lbn Sina's
Canon of Medicine, has been longest maintained.
3. What
then does the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages owe to the Muslims? The
answer to this question lies properly outside the scope of the present
monograph. It is a special task, which necessitates the ransacking of many
folios, none of which I have read. In general terms it may be affirmed that in
the translations from the Arabic a twofold novelty was disclosed to the
Christian West. In the first place men came to possess
Aristotle, both in his Logic and in his Physics and Metaphysics, more
completely than they had hitherto known him. But still this circumstance was
only of passing importance, though stimulating for the moment, for erelong all
his writings were translated much more accurately, direct from the Greek into
Latin. The most important result, however, was - that from the writings of the
Arabs, particularly of Ibn Roshd, a peculiar conception of the Aristotelian
doctrines, as constituting the highest truth, came to the knowledge of men.
This was bound to give occasion for contradiction, or for compromise, between
theology and philosophy, or even for denial of the Church's creed. Thus the
influence of Muslim Philosophy upon the scholastic development of Church dogma
was partly of a stimulating, partly of a disintegrating character; for, in the
Christian world, philosophy and theology were not yet able to proceed side by
side in an attitude of mutual indifference, as doubtless happened in the case
of Muslim thinkers. Christian Dogmatic had adopted too much Greek Philosophy
already in the first centuries of its development, to admit of such an attitude
: it could even assimilate a little more. It was therefore relatively easier to
get the better of the simple teachings of Islam than the complicated dogmas of
Christianity.
In the
twelfth century, when the influence of the Arabs commenced to operate in that
field, Christian Theology exhibited a Neo-Platonic, Augustinian character. That
character continued to be kept up with the Franciscans, even in the thirteenth
century. Now the PythagoreanPlatonic tendency, in Muslim thought, harmonized
well with this. Ibn Gebirol (Avencebrol, v. VI, 1 § 2) was, for Duns Scotus, an
authority of the first rank. On the other hand, the great
Dominicans, Albert and Thomas, who decided the future of the doctrine of the
Church, adopted a modified Aristotelianism, with which a good deal out of
Farabi, but especially out of Ibn Sina and Maimonides, agreed quite well.
A more profound influence emanates from Ibn Roshd, but not till about
the middle of the thirteenth century, and, in fact, in Paris, the centre of the
Christian scientific education of that time. In the year 1256 Albertus Magnus
writes against Averroes; and fifteen years later Thomas Aquinas controverts the
Averroists. Their leader is Siger of Brabant (known from 1266), member
of the Parisian Faculty of Arts. He does not shrink from the rigorous, logical
results of the Averroist system. And just as Ibn Roshd censures Ibn Sina, so
Siger criticizes the great Albert and the saintly Thomas, although in terms of
the utmost respect. It is true that he asseverates his submission to
Revelation; but still, his reason confirms what Aristotle, - as he is
expounded, in doubtful cases, by Ibn Roshd, - has taught in his works. This
subtle intellectualism of his, however, does not please the theologians. At the
instance of the Franciscans, it would seem, who perhaps wished also to strike
at the Aristotelianism of the Dominicans, he was persecuted by the Inquisition,
till he died in prison at Orvieto (circa 1281-1284). Dante, who possibly knew nothing
of his heresies has placed Siger in Paradise as the representative of secular wisdom. The two
champions of Muslim Philosophy, on the other hand, he met with in the vestibule
of the Inferno, in the company of the great and wise men of Greece and Rome.
Ibn Sina and Ibn Roshd there end the series of the great men of heathendom,
towards whom succeeding ages, like Dante, have so often lifted up their eyes in
admiration.
[1] S. Mum,
"Mélanges de Philosophie juive et arabe", Paris 1859.
[2] CARRA DE VAUX, "Avicenne", Paris 9900.
[3] [Translator's Note:
In this version the transliteration has been adapted as far as possible to
English sounds].
[4] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, "Mekka", II, p. 228 sq.
[5] Job
XXXVIII.
[6] Gen. XV :
5.
[7] The
dialogue has received this name from the circumstance that during the
conversation Aristotle holds in his hand an apple, the smell of which keeps
awake what remains of his vital powers. At the close, his hand drops powerless,
and the apple falls to the ground.
[8] Farther, an epitome of the rroexEIwo c 9eoAovsI4 of Proclus, was held even in later times to
be a genuine work of Aristotle's.
[9] Examples of both methods occur, but usually Qiyas
is equivalent to Analogy. However, in
the philosophical terminology which owes its origin to the Translators, Qiyas
always stands for ovAAOyiop6c, while avaAoyla is rendered by the Arabic mithl.
[10] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje in ZDMG, LIII p. 155.
[11] For this the Mystics introduced a sixth sense.
[12] Ascetics were called Sufis, from their coarse woollen garment, or Sic f
[13] V. Rockerts Uebeis. d. Makamen II, p. 219.
[14] [Translator's note. - 'John of Leyden'].
[15] Cf. my Article "On Kindi and his School" in Stein's 'Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie %III', p. 953 sqq., from which I have taken over, without much alteration, not a little that appears in this chapter.
[16] [Translator's note. - The Bagdad Caliphate lasted up to the death of Mustassim (A. H. 656 or A. D. 1258), i. e. for 400 Islamic years after A. II. 256 or A. D. 870].
[17] The Arabic `aql (rovg) is usually translated by
Reason and Intelligence (Lat. intellectus and intelligentia). I prefer however
the rendering, Geist, Spirit or Mind, because the expression includes God and
the pure (separate) spirits of the spheres. Moreover it is hard to decide how
far the personification of Reason was carried by individual thinkers.
[18] [Translator's note. - Accordingly Ibn Sina's Five
Internal Senses are: 1. The General or Co-ordinating Sense; 2. Memory of the
Collective sense-images; 3. Unconscious Apperception, referring to individuals;
4. Conscious Apperception, with generalization; 5. Memory of the higher
apperceptions]
[19] 'Averrois, che'1 gran'comento feo" Canto IV.
[20] Ibn Khaldun speaks only of rich people who have
grown poor, and says nothing of the misery of the proletariate, and that which
prevails in large cities, as we know it. He lived too in smaller cities, for
the most part, and till late in life admired Cairo from a distance.
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