THE PHILOSOPHY OF IBN RUSHD
THE EVOLUTION OF THE
PROBLEM OF THE INTELLECT IN THE WORKS OF IBN RUSHD:
FROM PHILOLOGICAL EXAMINATION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Scholarly
study has failed, as yet, to explore the full range and significance of Ibn
Rushd's philosophy, and this adds to the difficulties of providing a precise
and satisfactory treatment of the subject within such a brief paper as this. I
have therefore felt it appropriate to focus on a single theme in Ibn Rushd's
writings, and to attempt to establish, around this, the preliminary outlines of
a new strategy for studying the Rushdi corpus and the philosophical system
contained within it.
Several aspects of
Ibn Rushd's thought might have served as such a focus. Of particular interest,
for example, would be an examination of his metaphysical writings in the light
of his evolving perspectives on any one of the philosophical problems in these
works; or a consideration of his works on logic with respect to the development
of a theory of knowledge and demonstrative proof. This paper, however, is
concerned with the evolution of the problem of the intellect, a subject
selected on account of its prominence in the history of medieval philosophy,
and also because of the increasing interest now also felt by present-day
writers in a subject clearly likely to give rise to fruitful research. This
will further permit us to evaluate other related types of philosophical
questions which have hitherto escaped the attention of ancient and modern
scholars.
The question of the
intellect occupies an obviously important place both in the general history of
philosophy and in the particular context of the historical study of Ibn Rushd.
No other aspect of the Rushdi discourse, indeed, has such a unique and
distinguished history behind it; and while other aspects have failed to leave
lasting reverberations, this one led on to the crucially important intellectual
current subsequently known as Latin Averroism.
I should like, from
the very outset, to stress this twofold aspect: we have to consider, on the one
hand, the intrinsic question of the problem of the intellect in the Rushdi
corpus; and, on the other, the place this question assumes within the history
of medieval philosophy among the Latins. The latter aspect should not, however,
lead us to overestimate the significance of the problem itself, nor should one
stretch the problem beyond its own natural context by seeing it exclusively in
terms of its role as an axis of Averroism. Still more importantly, the problem
should not be seen as the defining element for comparing Ibn Rind's philosophy
with other philosophical systems; to do so would be to give the reader the
impression that other Rushdi topics and questions are insignificant, and that
Averroism in its entirety can, in the final analysis, be reduced to a theory of
the intellect. No doubt the problem of the intellect was a central feature, if
still not the most important one, of Latin Averroism, but it was not a key
element within Ibn Rushd's original Arabic writings, or within the historical
context in which he lived. As such I believe we must first develop a reading of
the problem of the intellect as embedded in the Rushdi corpus itself. I do not
intend, here, to undertake a critical review of work carried out in this area,
but rather to establish a different framework for considering Ibn Rushd's
heritage, focusing, to this end, on a single theme in his psychological
writings.
In a previous work' I set out a
general strategy for the reading of the Rushdi corpus based on a comparative
survey of Ibn Rushd's writings, particularly those in the original Arabic. It
was maintained that there exist different yet correlating levels in the corpus,
these correlations involving aspects of the following selected writings: Al-Mukhtasarat (the Epitomes), Al-Jawami‘ (the Short Commentaries), Al-Talakhis (the Middle Commentaries)
and various other commentaries and treatises. At this point I should like to
re-examine2 this thesis, in order to analyse how far the development
of the definition of the intellect in Ibn Rushd's writings can in fact be
determined.
Before presenting brief
conclusions on the subject, derived from discussions and from my own research,3
I should like to draw attention to a centrally important principle which is
often overlooked: namely, that the foundations of the Rushdi corpus have to be
properly established before we are in a position to analyse Ibn Rushd's
thought. An appreciation of this will set the present study on a proper
footing, and will also shed critical light on the current state of Rushdi
scholarship. Present-day students of Ibn Rushd are all too ready to apply the
"synthetic approach" (al-nazar
al-tarkibi) to his writings, or to probe his philosophical depth and
ideological intention, without realising that much more fundamental textual
work still needs to be done. While not wishing to curb the legitimate
aspirations of such scholars, I feel that their work is really premature; that
the present state of Rushdi studies firmly precludes systematic analysis of
this kind.4
Clearly, then, several
difficulties have to be met. First, there is the particular difficulty of
determining what, in the writings of Ibn Rushd, the problem of the intellect
actually is, the barrier here being a linguistic obscurity which at times makes
the author's intended meaning impossible to discover -all the more so when we
are working with the translation of a lost original text, as is the case with
the main textual fragment forming the basis of the theory of the intellect in
his writings, i.e., Al-Sharh al-kabir (the
Long Commentary) of the De Anima (Kitab
al-nafs). Still more problematic is the fact that the surviving primary
sources, Ibn Rushd's psychological writings themselves, exist in manuscripts
which still remain unedited by recognised standards of editions-a discipline which requires the researcher first to
undertake the work of the philologist. To this end the text and its manuscripts
must be compared with the aim, on the one hand, of establishing a sound text
and, on the other, of critically analysing the variants between the
manuscripts. Such work is a prerequisite both for a general study of Ibn Rushd
and for a specific examination of the problem of the intellect.
This, then, must be our starting
point for any serious study of the question; and until this first phase is
accomplished, none of our efforts will achieve fully satisfactory results, if
indeed they achieve any worthwhile results at all. While it is no inalienable
rule that philological and historical examination should precede philosophical
examination, it is nonetheless our task, as students of the history of
philosophy, to lay the proper groundwork for the study of philosophy and
philosophical theory; and this will only be possible if we first focus on
improving and correcting the primary tools of research. It is essential, in
this case, that we assemble all the manuscripts at our disposal and verify
their authenticity.
This first section of the paper
will investigate a group of texts which form the basis of Ibn Rushd's
psychological studies, and will attempt to clarify long-standing obscurities
and confusions surrounding it. The examination will be restricted to those
texts preserved in the original Arabic, namely, Al-Mukbtasar (the Epitome) and Al-Talkhis
(the Middle Commentary) (Al-Sharh
al-kabir (the Long Commentary) will be examined in a subsequent section,
where an attempt will be made to assess the influence of Averroism on the
subject). Only the relevant chapters in the texts, namely those concerned with
the question of the intellect, will be considered, and these will be examined
as if with a view to publication according to the scientifically recognised
principles of editing. In the second section I shall attempt to assess what developments,
if any, may be discerned between the positions advocated by Ibn Rusted in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talklis and those in Al-Sharh
al-kabir. Our re-reading of the original texts in the first section will,
therefore, prepare us for the analysis provided in the second; and it is for
this reason that the subtitle "from philological examination to
philosophical analysis" has been chosen for this paper.
1.1 Al-Mukhtasar on psychology
Al-Mukhtasar (the Epitome) on psychology has a
special significance as against the other Al-Mukhtasarat
(Epitomes) and Al-Jawami? (Short
Commentaries). In addition to being an analysis of Aristotle's De Anima, it examines the entire
peripatetic heritage on psychology, thus also introducing themes present in Al-Jawami`;6 for Ibn Rushd had intended the latter
to be an inventory of Aristotle's scientific statements as extracted from the
dialectical arguments dispersed through the latter's writings. However, this Muliftasar does not endeavour to deduce
demonstrative proofs from De Anima: the
prime motive behind the text is not, as is the case in Al-Jawami` al-tabi`iyya, to provide an abstract of Aristotle's
opinions, but rather to defend his position concerning the problem of the
intellect.? This intention is reiterated at several points in the text and will
become more evident in the course of our analysis. Yet, having established the
thematic relationship of this text to Al-Jawami`,
we are now precluded from seeing it as part of the Mukhtasarat; for the Muff
tasarat were all written prior to Ibn Rushd's study of Aristotle and thus
the text-contrary to what I previously affirmed in my study Al-Matn al-Rushdi-is an anomaly.
With this established, we should
now be in a better position to approach the work; and I hope, indeed, to return
to the whole question in another study of the "Problematic of the Rushdi
Text". What I wish to do here is to point out the difficulties involved in
the reading of the text.
Two problems seem to me to be of
central importance. The first of these will be briefly summarised and the
second elaborated in greater detail thereafter.
The first difficulty concerns the
actual wording of the text. Ibn Rushd covers a wide range of ideas, leading the
reader on from discussions of the theoretical intellect (al-`aql al-nazari) to a consideration of theoretical intelligibles
(al-ma`qulat al-nazariyya), then
shifting to an expose on the matter and the form of these intelligibles, and
also examining the role of imaginary representations (al-ma`ani 'l-k_luryaliyya) in the process of intellection (`amaliyyat al-ta`agqul) and the problem
of conjunction (ittisal) in the light
of what had been affirmed by Ibn
Bajja in his famous epistle on the subject. The course of the discussion may be
summed up as follows: he begins with the theoretical intellect, then moves on
to the theoretical intelligibles which serve as the pivot of the problem, and
this subject is studied in depth, before he next moves on to a discussion of
the active intellect (al-'aql at
fa"al), which is defined and examined in relation to the material
intellect (al-'aql al-hayulani); he
then concludes by defining the problem of conjunction within the context of the rational faculty (al-quwwa 'I-nafiga).
It is important to
note that the order of subjects followed by Ibn Rusted in this text differs
from that established by Aristotle in his investigation of the rational faculty
in De Anima-this indicating that Ibn
Rushd was not examining the book of the First Teacher (Aristotle) as he had
done in the Jawami` texts and in both
the Talkhhis of De Anima and Al-Sharh
al-kabir (Long Commentary) on it. For this reason the text is unique when
set against the other types of Rushdi commentary.
The second
difficulty in reading this text arises from the presence of several manuscripts,8 together with different printed
editions of the text .9 A
comparative analysis of the
manuscripts yields its own peculiar difficulties, which will be examined in
detail later, but first I should like to point out the related difficulties
associated with the printed editions. For example, the Egyptian edition has
prepared a text from a synthesis of two very different manuscripts (Cairo and
Madrid). 10 Yet the difference between these manuscripts is
substantial enough to have warranted treating them separately; it would have
been more appropriate to choose and print one manuscript, with the text of the
other being reproduced in the margins. Preserving the distinctiveness of each
manuscript would allow us to differentiate between what was written first and
the later additions; and it is in fact these later additions that have
convoluted the meaning of the text, thereby further confusing and misguiding
the reader in his attempts at interpretation.
It is obvious, then, that the
text should be studied in the light of all the different manuscripts at our
disposal-only so can we claim to have met the requirements of scientific
research and reliability. Moreover, familiarity with the manuscripts brings to
the surface differing interpretations which cannot be reduced merely to a
matter of identifying common differences; the only way, in fact, to make sense
of these differences is to assume that the text, subsequent to its composition,
has been subject to revision, modification and augmentation. It is regrettable
that the present state of Rushdi studies makes reiterations of this kind
necessary. Such matters could simply have been dispensed with had the editors
prepared the groundwork properly, and so provided the researcher with accurate
and academically verified material.
We may surmise, therefore, that
the manuscripts, collectively or individually, do not lend themselves to
amalgamation into one, coherent text; attempts to do so will in fact only
further remove us from an understanding of the content and aims of the work,
and may also distort and exaggerate the force of the questions raised by Ibn
Rushd. The only sure way of proceeding is, as indicated earlier, to make a
scrupulous distinction between the earliest version and later accretions; and
the manuscripts should then be read in the light of Al-Talkhis and, in particular, of Al-Sharh al-kabir.
Thus there
definitely exists, I believe-especially with regard to those chapters dealing
with the problem of the intellect-a first version of the book, in which Ibn
Rushd drafted his initial thoughts, and within which a set of specific
amendments and additions was later incorporated in the light of his subsequent
writings, particularly Al-Sharh al-kabir.
This would appear to provide the most probable explanation for the
differences, in spite of Ibn Rushd's own assertion, in one of the Madrid
manuscript copies, that he had not deleted anything he had originally written
about the material intellect-a statement made in the context of certain other
changes he had made in that manuscript on the subject of the rational faculty.
I believe that the amendments in question were indeed made, but went
unacknowledged, possibly because they were incorporated long after the time of
the work's initial composition. An examination of the extant manuscripts yields
specific clues enabling us to differentiate between the first version and the
later additions. II Some editors have been aware of variants among the
manuscripts, and of the distinction between an earlier and a later version, but
they have not fully grasped the intellectual significance of these variants,
with the result that the latter have hitherto remained unanalysed.
A careful comparative study of
the manuscripts leads me to conclude that specific additions stem from his
subsequent intellectual development, which saw a profound change in his
position on the problem of the intellect; a change that involved a
reformulation of his position on the nature of the theoretical intellect, and
represented, too, a shift in his position on the nature of the material
intellect and its relationship to imaginative forms. Ibn Rushd's psychological
theory constitutes a very well defined structure, to the extent that a change
in any one of the constituent elements will radically alter the structure as a
whole; as such, his shifting positions constitute a reformulation of the entire
system, and a careful effort has therefore been made to differentiate those
elements within the manuscripts which are traceable to the first version and
those which represent later amendments. Let us now consider the distinctiveness
of this text vis-3-vis the other psychological writings of Ibn Rushd.
The major distinctive differences
between the two versions can best be summed up12 by saying that the
first constitutes a coherent and well organised text, while the second contains
additions to the first which create uncertainties over the actual meaning.
Moreover, such uncertainties and dissonances manifest themselves throughout the
text, so that it is in fact unintelligible in more than one place. The second
part of this study will demonstrate in detail how sense may be made of these
incongruities in the light of a perceived evolution in Ibn Rushd's own
perspectives.
The differences between the two
versions may be treated with respect to six specific factors, two of these
involving the first version and the others the second.
The peculiar features of the first version are as
follows:
(1) The analogy of the tablet is
used to define the capacity of the imaginative faculty (al-quwwa 'I-khayaliyya) to accept intelligibles, which are
represented by the writing on the tablet,13 while the subjective
self (al-nafs al-mawdk`a) of this
capacity is represented by the tablet itself. It is clear that parts of this
analogy reflect certain perspectives on the material intellect, imaginary
representations and the theoretical intellect different from those set out in Al-Talkhis, and significantly different
from the conclusions reached in Al-Sharh
al-kabir.14 Interestingly, these perspectives are similar to
those held by Ibn Bajja. The absence or omission of this analogy from the other
manuscript copies is the first indication of Ibn Rushd's changing position on
the structure of the material intellect (I am not postulating this evolution
simply on the basis of one passage in one manuscript, which would be clearly
unacceptable: the hypothesis is further supported by another version of the
analogy in Al-Talkhis and a third
version in Al-Sharh al-kabir).15
(2) The long chapter discussing
the rational faculty is divided into two parts: in the first part Ibn Rushd summarises
a portion of ibn Bajja's Risalat
al-ittisal, while in the second he sets out what appears to be a summary of
Ibn Bajja's method-in such a way as to suggest support for it. The conspicuous
absence or omission of these passages from later versions can be interpreted as
a disavowal, by Ibn Rushd, of Ibn Bajja's theory of conjunction. A probable
explanation for this is to be found not in Al-Talkhis
but in relevant sections within Al-Sharh
al-kabir of De Anima,16 with further evidence also to be found
in the Sharh ma bad al-tabi`a (Commentary
on the Metaphysics) under the heading Al-Ta'
and Al-um. 17
If we now turn our attention to
the later manuscript, we find additions and amendments characterised by four
features. The first of these is well known, because it is explicitly dealt with
in the manuscripts, while the remaining three have been deduced by comparing
the text not simply with the manuscript copies, but also with Al-Talkhis and Al-Sharh al-kabir.
The first feature is the
amendment with which he concludes the chapter on the rational faculty, 19
replacing the sections summarising portions of Ibn Bajja's Risalat al-ittisal. In this amendment Ibn Rushd clearly states that
his earlier position on the material intellect, as set out in Al-Mujasar, was incorrect, and that his
revised opinion can be found in Al-Sharh
al-kabir of De Anima-the
implication being that Ibn Bajja had been responsible for leading him into
error. Although this amendment is so well known, it has not been sufficiently
considered by scholars, who have thus failed to conclude that Ibn Rushd, having
initially upheld Ibn Bajja's position, later relinquished it.
It has already been pointed out
that Ibn Rushd's psychological theory is framed within a highly integrated
structure, so that tampering with any one of its elements will affect all the
other elements of the system; and, as such, the amendments to Ibn Rushd's
positions on the theoretical intellect and theoretical intelligibles, and also
on the subject of the material intellect and imaginary representations, must be
seen as embodying a reformulation of his whole psychological theory. The
amendments cited thus far are not in themselves sufficient basis for
postulating such a reformulation, but it is hoped that the ensuing analysis of the
remaining features will provide further evidence to this end.
Perhaps the most important of
these is the twofold amendment relating to the material intellect and
theoretical intelligibles. The first version, reflecting Ibn Bajja's influence,
defines the material intellect as being that potentiality in imaginative forms
through which intelligibles are received. In his amendment, however, he sets
out, in the form of an overall summary, a viewpoint similar to that which he
had demonstrated in Al-Sharh al-kabir, stating
that
he no longer considers the material intellect to be a
capacity within imaginative forms, but rather a substance which represents, in potentia, all intelligibles, but
which in itself is not anything. Had he still been in agreement with Ibn Bajja,
these differences would not have existed. He further confirms the amendments by
linking theoretical intelligibles with two objects: one of them the material
intellect, which he regards as eternal, and the other the imaginative forms,
which are viewed as a corruptible entity. An examination of Al-Sharh al-kabir reveals a
contradiction with the position taken in the earlier version, where he had
concluded that these intelligibles were material, contingent, generating,
corrupting, multiple and changeable. The fourth amendment focuses on the
conception of Man as possessor of a capacity linked to imaginative forms, which
enables Man alone, and no animal, to accept intelligibles. This amendment,
though less valuable than the preceding one, is nonetheless important because
it indicates a change in Ibn Rushd's position, if only in connection,
apparently, with the role played by imaginative forms. The gist of his argument
is that imaginative forms are not stationary but in motion, and this leads on
to the formulation of what is effectively a new and specific position, in which
he proclaims his disagreement with two major schools within the history of
Aristotelianism,19 and further states that commenting on these two
schools and judging between them will require far more extensive analysis than
is possible within the confines of the Mukhtasar.
This new position is developed in two successive stages, the first
represented in Al-Talkhis, and the
second transmitted through Al-sharh
al-kabir, which will be examined in the second part of this study.
These, very briefly, are the most
important deductions from my reading of this unique work, the general
conclusion being that it would be an error to regard Al-Mukhtasar as a single well-ordered text, or as a reliable source
for establishing Ibn Rushd's position on the problem of the intellect. We may
further conclude that, with regard to the problem of the intellect, and in
particular to the question of the material intellect, he was influenced by Ibn
Bajja and other commentators on Aristotle-such a position being incompatible
with what he writes later in Al-Talkhis
and Al-Sharh al-kabir, where he
returns to reading the original texts of Aristotle (although, it should be
noted that his position in Al-Talkhis is
closer to Al-Mukhtasar than to Al-Sharh).
The parameters of the work will
now become clearer to us, and we shall be forced to choose between two
alternatives: we can either, when examining the problem of the intellect, focus
solely on Al- jarh and use Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talk/is as
supplementary works; or, on the other hand, Al-Mukhtasar
may be viewed as an initial, fundamental fragment permitting us to examine
the evolution of the problem of the intellect in the writings of Ibn Rushd-in
which case the three texts will be treated initially as of equal value for our
research, with preference given to Al-sharh
al-kabir, as the most important, at a subsequent stage.
We might, also, examine the
evolution of Ibn Rushd's position, or try to demonstrate the structure of the
Rushdi system. In this case we would have to rely on Al-Mukhtasar as a primary text, or use it in conjunction with other
texts containing similar passages and perhaps even addressing similar
questions. I do not, however, believe that such an approach would be warranted
by the texts.
1.2 The Talkhis (Middle
Commentary) of De Anima
This Talkhis occupies an intermediate position between Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Sharh, exhibiting similarities and differences, vis-it-vis these
texts, in both form and content. With respect to form, Al-Talkhis is a commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, being in fact Ibn Rushd's
first commentary on this work 20 and its structure differs from that
of Al-Mukhtasar, while bearing some
similarities to that of Al-Sharh. With
respect to content, particularly in its conceptualisation of the problem of the
intellect, Al-Talkhis is closer to Al-Mukhtasar and differs from Al-sharh.21
It is immediately clear that the
various positions of Al-Talk his,
particularly in its first version, may reasonably be regarded as an extension
of those adopted in the minor Mukhtasar. The
text is of crucial importance, not only because it records a shift in Ibn
Rushd's position, but also on account of the distinctive style in which it is
written. However, the primary consideration of this study is to identify the
problems and difficulties the text places before the reader; and these are
similar to the ones encountered in the preceding analysis of Al-Mukhtasar.
Al-Talkhis does
indeed differ from Al-Mukhtasar in
two significant ways: in the varying number of extant manuscripts22 and
by the fact that Al-Talkhis still
only exists in manuscript form. Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in
reconstructing the two texts are similar in principle, although they are less
evident in Al-Talkhis. It should be
pointed out at the outset that, whereas our analysis and conclusions concerning
Al-Mukhtasar were based on
significant variants among the manuscript copies, the two important manuscripts
of Al-Talkbis agree more closely with
each other. Yet I have concluded that the Talkhis
manuscripts represent two different versions, with one manuscript,
particularly in respect of those chapters relevant to this study, representing
an earlier version, and the other containing additions and amendments made to
the text at a later date. The differences between the two manuscripts will be
discussed later in this paper.
The distinction between earlier
and later version is indicated in the first and third chapters of the text,
where it becomes evident that revision has taken place following the completion
of Al-sharh al-kabir. However, this
cannot in itself be taken as sufficient confirmation of the differences: we
must undertake a detailed examination of the text, particularly of those
passages devoted to the problem of the intellect.
I have concluded that Al-Talklis advances two mutually
contradictory positions on the nature of the material intellect, which can only
be reasonably explained as reflecting a later revision. In his first position
one can trace the influence of the Alexandrian school of commentators, which
claimed that the material intellect was a potentiality in which nothing exists.
Yet it does not appear that Ibn Rushd adopted the position of the Alexandrian
school in its totality: rather, 'he simply adopted some of the well-known
conclusions of Alexander, the ancient commentator himself. His position can
thus be seen as shifting from that of Al-Mukhtasar,
in which he follows the school of Ibn Bajja, to that of Al-Talklis,
where he inclines towards the Alexandrian school.
As for the second position, this
emerges in an important subsequent amendment in Al-Takhhis, which represents a break from his previous view that
the material intellect is solely a potentiality. Here, for the first time, he
postulates the material intellect to be a separate substance in and of itself,
and, in addition, he advocates a doctrine of reconciliation between the
opinions of Alexander and those of Themistius. This doctrine, which he refers
to as madhhab al jam` ("doctrine
of synthesis"), will be examined later when considering the amendments
from Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Sharh.
These amendments and additions,
which I take as evidence of a new position, change the meaning of the text as
preserved in the first version. Moreover, they change the definition of
important concepts in such a way as to align them with definitions advanced in Al-Sharh. Two additions in particular
reflect the influence of the latter.
The first of these, cited in the
first chapter, concerns the theoretical intellect and the habituated intellect (al-'aql bi 'I-malaka) 23 The
amendment concisely summarises the positions found in Al-,sharh, namely that the theoretical intellect is neither
generating nor corrupting, but is rather a corruptible entity due to the matter
(mawd&`) which acts within it.
The second addition, of less significance than the first, clarifies Themistius'
stand on "the intellect
which is within us''.24
There are two other amendments
relating to the material intellect and, to some extent, to the active
intellect, although no reference, explicit or implicit, is made to Al-Sharh. The likelihood that they were
composed at the same period is heightened by the fact that the second amendment
refers to the first and that they both convey his new position on the material
intellect. The later amendment summarises arguments that the intellect is
potential, and is other than a faculty or a capacity, this being clearly
contrary to the position expressed more than once in the first version of Al-Talkhis.
All this would suggest that the
revision of the text was completed at different periods, the first amendment
being added before the completion of Al-Sharh and the second thereafter,
and it heralds an enormous change in Ibn Rushd's conception of the material
intellect. The new position cannot, it is true, be readily equated with that
found in Al-Sharh al-kabir, nonetheless,
it represents a decisive break with the position advanced in the first version
of Al-Talkhis, and also with that of Al-Mukhtasar.
Al-Talklis is, therefore, a text of basic importance for
understanding the developing treatment of the problem of the intellect in the
writings of ibn Rushd. Al-Talkhis and
Al-Mukhtasar, in all their versions,
are to be seen as embodying preliminary perspectives which were later
superseded by the final version set out in Al-Sharh
al-kabir. This is the main conclusion to be reached through an examination
of his psychological writings as a whole.26
Let us now, in the
light of this conclusion, briefly review the positions articulated in the three
texts in question, with a view to laying the foundations (as suggested above)
of a new strategy for approaching the Rushdi corpus.
II
Introduction
From the above analysis, we can
deduce two different stages in the evolution of Ibn Rushd's view of the
intellect. The first, which may be referred to as the Ibn Bajja-Alexandrian
phase, can be traced back to the two original versions of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis,
i.e., those versions containing no amendments or additions; the second is
that embodied in Al-sharh, and may be
called the Rushdi stage. Given that these two stages involve radically
different and contradictory conceptions, our study may now proceed in one of
two directions. One alternative would be to trace the evolution in Ibn Rushd's
writings; this would involve an examination of all three texts, and our
analysis would proceed on the assumption that there are two discernible stages,
and that the amendments in Al-Talkhis represent
the middle ground between them. The other would be to attempt an analysis of
Ibn Rushd's psychological system, or, more specifically, of his conception of
the problem of the intellect. In this case we would no longer need to examine Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis or, indeed, refer to them.
Since the
differences between the texts are clearly the result of a developing process,
an examination focusing on all three texts would be awkward and misguided. We
are, in effect, postulating the existence of two possible approaches towards
the problem of the intellect, stemming from what is not merely an evolution but
an enormous change in Ibn Rushd's position, with two distinct stages being
divided by a weak intermediate link (this link will be more fully considered
later). Let us therefore now examine these stages more closely, confining
ourselves, in our review, to those elements involving the material and
theoretical intellect.
11.1. The Ibn Bajja-Alexandrian stage or the Ibn Bajja-Alexandrian
Ibn Rushd
This stage, as noted above,
combines two phases, contained in Al-Mukbtasar
and Al-Talkhis. The rationale for
combining these into one single stage springs from important perceived
similarities between the two texts in question; nonetheless, there are also
differences between them, particularly, as mentioned earlier, with respect to
the respective strategies employed. The significant similarities stem from the
fact that Ibn Rushd compiled both these texts in the light of others'
viewpoints; he was, at this stage, much more dependent on the opinions and analyses
of previous commentators, effectively seeing and hearing Aristotle through the
eyes and ears of others rather than cultivating his own independent
perceptions. At the beginning he was primarily influenced by Ibn Bajja, then,
later, by Alexander, and he only freed himself of these influences, finally,
when he composed Al-Sharh al-kabir; it
is in this text that we are offered a new image of Ibn Ru hd, which best
captures the independence and uniqueness of his thought. Al-Sharh's originality
gives a sense of personal satisfaction, making all our arduous and painstaking
efforts appear worthwhile in the end. As we follow Ibn Rushd's argument, we are
struck by the insightful way he criticises the positions of earlier writers,
positions which he himself had earlier upheld in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis; and,
as such, his arguments might be interpreted as a form of self-criticism and
self-revision. This is why I have combined AlMukk
tasar and Al-Talk-1 is as representing a single stage, with the second
stage represented by Al-Sharh. Let us
begin by examining the two phases of the first stage as articulated in the
original texts.
For all the difficulties
associated with reading Al-Mukhtasar, its
analysis can reasonably be seen as centring around the theoretical intellect or
theoretical intelligibles. He regards these intelligibles as the most important
structural element in his theory of the intellect, other elements having
importance only in so far as they elucidate the nature of the intelligibles
themselves-this applying, also, to the material and active intellect, which he
considers to constitute the matter and form of the intelligibles (there will be
an opportunity to examine this structure in more detail later in the paper). It
is this conception of intelligibles which distinguishes Al-Mukhtasar from Al-Talkhis.
Yet despite these differences-which become still more marked when we
compare Al-Talkhis with Al-Sharh-the
two works do in fact share a common approach.
In the first stage of his
analysis Ibn Rushd concludes that intelligibles are subject to alteration. They
therefore necessarily possess matter and have in the first place a potential
existence and in the second place an actual existence. They are contingent,
corruptible and plural with regard to the plurality of objects and they are
numerous in the range of their numbers. This is significant when it is
considered that their conjunction with imaginative forms is spontaneous. The
analysis shows Ibn Rushd following Ibn Bajja's conclusions as set out in Risalat al-ittisnl, although he never in
fact mentions Ibn Bajja by name.27 It must be emphasised that this
position is very different from the one adopted in Al-Shtarh, where he asserts that the theoretical intellect is
eternal with respect to its substance and a corruptible entity with respect to
its action-intelligibles being, in other words, linked with two objects: the
material intellect which is eternal and imaginative forms which are a
corruptible entity.28 This analysis is equally relevant for
understanding the positions found in Al-Mukbtasar,
particularly his concept of the material intellect or the matter of
intelligibles. When Ibn Rushd distinguishes between the form and the matter of
intelligibles he states quite clearly that their form, which is the active
intellect, remains unchanged, being neither generating nor corrupting. When
considering the matter of intelligibles, however, he shows awareness of
disagreements between the earlier commentators, and, by adopting the stand of
Ibn Bajja, he rejects the other positions, particularly the view that the
material intellect is an eternal substance; this rejection stemming from the
contradiction inherent in the proposition that the intellect is eternal while
the intelligibles found in it are contingent. Contingency, Ibn Rushd says, is
incompatible with an eternal substance; and if intelligibles were in fact
contingent, then the material intellect would also have to be contingent,
because the material intellect is merely the capacity giving rise to the formation
of intelligibles. This capacity is irreducible, and it is thus necessarily a
special object, which is neither body nor intellect, but rather a soul. The
conception of the soul is seen as being the object of intelligibles and is
represented by imaginative forms-hence, the capacity found in imaginative forms
capable of accepting intelligibles is the material intellect. The habituated or
theoretical intellect can best be explained as the actualisation of
intelligibles which had previously existed in
potentia. Ibn Rushd buttresses his interpretation by citing examples used
by Aristotle, especially when attempting to define the passivity of the
intellect by comparing it to the passivity of the tablet which is merely
disposed to writing. He states that the capacity of the imaginative faculty to
accept intelligibles is similar to the corresponding relationship between the
tablet and writing; the soul, subject to this capacity, being in the position
of the tablet. Yet this capacity is not an actual thing in and of itself; thus
the concept of passivity cannot really be applied to it. This analysis is no
more than an interpretation of Ibn Bajja's propositions.29 By the admission of
Ibn Rushd himself, Ibn Bajja was the first commentator to state that the
material intellect is merely a capacity found in imaginative forms; a capacity
able to accept intelligibles. This interpretation endeavours to surmount some
of the absurdities put forth by Alexander. The conclusion in Al-sharh is that the material intellect
is neither an actual thing nor an explicitly eternal thing or separate
substance. It is evident that a considerable interval separated the two stages
as reflected in the two positions in question. Some of the reasons which led
Ibn Rind, subsequently, to revise and amend Al-Mukhtasar
have already been pointed out.
Such, then, is the basic nature
of the first phase of this stage. The important points to bear in mind include
the way Ibn Rushd deals with the problem of conjunction as set out in Ibn
Bajja's famous treatise on the subject and the way he adopts Ibn Bajja's
interpretation of the problem of the intellect, and his arguments should also
be examined in the light of the selected themes and subsequent amendments in Al-Mukhtasar. Let us now examine the
second phase of this stage, as represented in the text of Al-Talkhis.
Whereas the argument of Al-Mukhtasar revolved around the
theoretical intellect or intelligibles, the analytical thrust of Al-Talkhis is primarily directed towards
the material intellect and its role in the process of intellection.30
This thematic difference between the two texts is both marked and significant.31
The change reflects the evolving
position of Ibn Rushd on the problem of the intellect and, in particular, on
the question of the material intellect, and it can, as mentioned earlier, be
generally explained in terms of Ibn Rushd's transition from an echoing of Ibn
Bajja's stand to his subsequent inclination towards the views of Alexander
(though the two commentators do, we should remember, share the view that the
material intellect is only a capacity and not a separate substance). Let us
therefore consider further the full significance of the differences between Al-TaWhis and Al-Mukhtasar, and let us focus on the amendments incorporated in Al-Talk) is, especially those relating
to the nature of the material intellect, which mark a revolution in Ibn Rushd's
view of the subject and, indeed, on the entire question of the intellect-a
revolution which later becomes fully articulated in Al-Sharh.
Ibn Rushd begins, in accordance
with the text of Aristotle, by stating that the faculty capable of accepting
intelligibles is neither passive nor subject to change. If there is indeed any
question of passivity, this is merely confined to the acceptance of the intelligibles
and does not imply mixing with any of the material forms. By this, Ibn Rus_hd
means that the material intellect is the accepting faculty, accepting and
comprehending all forms and all things. However, if it were to accept any
forms, we would have to uphold one of the two following explanations: either it
does not comprehend the other forms, only the form with which it is mixed; or
it would be a mixed form which would change what it comprehends through the
intellect, and it would thus be unable to comprehend fully the essence of
things as they really are.
The material intellect is unable
to mix with anything and is hence only a capacity; this implying, too, that the
potential intellect is merely a capacity, containing nothing. However, although
it is an object ultimately incapable of mixing, it is not to be classified as a
subject of the potential intellect. On the whole the intellect carries a sense
of passivity which is not confined to the process of acceptance only, and the
subject of this acceptance is not a thing but a capacity able to accept
intelligibles; there can be no notion of an independently existing capacity.
This, as is well known, represents a summary of Alexander's position on the
material intellect, and it is this position which is incorporated within A1-Talkhis, or at least in the passage
from Al-Talkhis noted above.
Among the many features of Al-Talkkis which help to clarify Ibn
Rushd's concept of the material intellect, the most prominent is the passage in
which he compares the capacity in the intellect with the potentiality in the
tablet to accept writing. He emphasises that, just as the capacity found on the
surface of the tablet does not mix with the tablet itself, so this is the case,
also, with the intellect and the intelligibles. The acceptance of the tablet
does not signify passivity, and, analogously, the acceptance of the intellect
is neither passive nor active. This interpretation differs from the one given
in Al-Mukhtasar, where the capacity
is represented by the ability of imaginative forms to accept intelligibles-a
capacity, that is, whose object is embodied in the imaginary processes of the
soul. However, in this case the capacity is not conceived as being similar to
the blank tablet, and this is because the intellect as such is perceived as
being a capacity and not an actual thing. As for the written tablet it
resembles the perfected intellect while the actual intelligibles represent
another type of intellect.
The analogy of the tablet helps
us to understand the evolution in Ibn Rushd's position on the material
intellect, not only in connection with the transition from Al-Muk_htasar to Al-Talkh-is
but also with respect to its final version as found in Al-Sharh al-kabir. In this final version Ibn Rus_hd traces the
different positions back to their original authors,32 and it is in
this context that he severely criticises Alexander's comparison of the
intellect with the potentiality found in the tablet. His other criticisms will
be examined later.
Other themes connected with Ibn
Rushd's discussion of the active intellect should also be briefly noted: the
first of these concerns the ontological nature of the active intellect, and the
second its role in the process of intellection and cognition (ma'rifa).
He begins his first discussion in
Al-Talkhis by citing an Aristotelian
proposition that establishes a correspondence between the intellect and
material things. Aristotle asserts that there exist, in all categories of
natural matter, two things in opposition: that which has the capacity to
receive and that which is the agent; the receptive capacity is potential in all
things that exist, while the agent acts in everything within these categories.
Ibn Ruhd applies this notion of Aristotelian opposition to his concept of the
intellect, thereby postulating the existence of an active and passive
intellect;33 and, despite the difference between this and what he
later concludes in Al-Sharh, he
continues to maintain that the active intellect is a transcendent substance,
not a corruptible entity, comprehending its own essence when it is separated
from humanity and comprehending the material affairs of the world when it is
linked
to humanity. As such, the intellect and intelligibles, contrary to Ibn Rushd's
later conception of the material intellect, are one and the same.
The second discussion in Al-Talkhis focuses on the process of
intellection, with analysis centring on the active intellect to the exclusion
of others. Like Aristotle, Ibn Rushd compares the role of this intellect with
light; more precisely, it is a light which translates colours from potentiality
to actuality, thus enabling the eye to see and experience them. Similarly, the
active intellect provides the material intellect with the capacity for
accepting intelligibles, and this capacity further changes the imaginary
representations of the intelligibles until they are no longer potential but
actualised. Though this description is very similar to what is contained in Al-Sharh, the passage still leaves us
with some difficulties and questions.
The preceding discussion touches
upon the most important points contained in Al-Talk
is. There is, however, another dimension to this text which in effect makes
it an intermediate link between the first and second stages of Ibn Rushd's
thought. It is possible to examine this text from two different angles: on the
one hand, it can be viewed, along with Al-Mukhrasar,
as constituting the first stage in the evolution of Ibn Rushd's
psychological system; on the other, it can be seen as representing a bridge by
means of which he was able to construct another version or form of the problem
of the intellect. This dual viewpoint is made possible by the very nature of
the amendments in Al-Talkhis; for
these not only help us to distinguish the differences between Al-Talkis and Al-Mukhtasar, but also allow us to
evaluate Al-Talkhis vis-à-vis Al-Sharh. The
amendment to the analogy of the tablet marks the first transition from the
former position, with the material intellect, regardless of the arguments put
forth by Ibn Bajja or the Alexandrian school, now viewed simply as a capacity.
As noted earlier, this change does not completely crystallise into a new
position, but rather foreshadows the new developments that eventually took
place in Al-Sharh. Let us now, as an
introduction to the changes occurring in the second stage of Ibn Ruhd's
thought, examine the context from which the amendment emerged, confining our
examination, for the moment, to a discussion of the nature of the material
intellect and leaving till later a more general consideration of the intellect
as a whole.
It
is immediately apparent that the amendment reflects Ibn Rushd's struggle with
the difficulties and absurdities inherent in Alexander's position (which, it
will be recalled, he had earlier upheld, together with corresponding positions
attributed to Themistius and other ancient commentators); he is attempting to
formulate a conciliatory viewpoint through which to establish an appropriate
interpretation of the viewpoints of the Alexandrian school.
He maintains, as Alexander had
also done, that the material intellect is a capacity independent of material
forms, but claims that it is also a transcendent substance invested with this
capacity. In other words, this capacity is found in Man, and yet it is solely
an object connected to a transcendent substance. It is not, as claimed by
earlier commentators, a capacity existing, as it were, by the very nature of
this transcendent substance; nor is it, as Alexander had claimed, a mere
capacity.
The
material intellect is a product of the conjunction between a transcendent
substance and the capacity existing in Man. It can also be viewed as a compound
of the capacity and its connection with the intellect. We must, therefore, seek
to understand the nature of this compound and of the capacity inherent in it,
and, also, to understand the link between the transcendent substance and its
corresponding capacity. As for the transcendent substance, what is meant by it
here is clearly the active intellect, the implication being that this intellect
becomes a potential intellect in the state of conjunction. The substance of the
active intellect is transformed when it is invested with a certain type of
capacity, the character of which is best understood as the continuous movement
from potentiality to actuality. In this movement the action of the intellect is
transformed from one state to another; in other words the active intellect is
eventually transformed into a material intellect, while the material intellect
is, in its turn, eventually transformed into an active intellect. Ibn Rushd's
rationale for this analysis is that he views the intellect as being one thing
which yet contains two functions with respect to the soul: the first being the
action of intelligibles, and the second that of accepting intelligibles.
While the identity and meaning of
the separate substance has now been clarified, the notion of "capacity
found in Man" remains somewhat obscure: we do not, for example, know
whether this capacity is an intellect or a soul, or, moreover, whether it is
capable of mixing with any of the faculties in the body. This obscurity can be
attributed to the fact that Ibn Rushd did not himself define the nature of this
capacity and its contents-which means that we also do not know the meaning of
his statement that the material intellect is a compound of the capacity and
that the intellect is linked with this capacity. A possible explanation can be
found if we assume that the material intellect is not in itself a separate
substance. Such an assertion would, however, run contrary to Ibn Rushd's later
conclusion in Al-Sharh, where he
makes a clear distinction between the active and the material intellect,
considering them both to be transcendent substances, neither generating nor corrupting.
We do not, though, know whether this amendment in Al-Talk/is refers to the
material or the active intellect 34
Ibn
Rushd is advancing, through this amendment, a new interpretation which he
believes accurately reflects the original view of Aristotle, and he refers to
this interpretation as the "school of synthesis", implying, by the
latter term, a middle road between the views of Alexander and those of other
commentators on the nature of the material intellect. According to Ibn Rushd,
the synthesis enables him to go beyond the absurdities inherent in these, the
avowed aim being to free himself from the necessity to debase a transcendent
thing in whose substance some capacity exists, merely because this transcendent
thing happens to exist in conjunction with Man rather than by virtue of its own
nature. He further notes that the synthesis frees him from the necessity of
limiting the potential intellect to being solely a capacity, merely on the
basis that there is, somehow, a separate thing to which this capacity
accidentally clings.
For all his claims, Ibn Rushd
ultimately fails to construct a genuine synthesis; its falsity and incoherence
soon, indeed, become clear to him, leading him to embark on a revision of his
views in Al-Sharh al-kabir, where he
does not refer to the doctrine of synthesis, but laboriously examines, one by
one, the views of the schools of Ibn Bajja, Alexander and Themistius, then
criticises them by comparison with the original Aristotelian text. And from the
springboard which this critical strategy provides he simultaneously articulates
and justifies his own new interpretation. Ibn Rushd's influence on the
development of philosophy among the Latins, from the middle of the 13th century
onwards, can be traced back to the legacy of this critical method.
Such, then, are the main
characteristics of Ibn Rind's new position-a position which, as noted earlier,
represents both the end of the first stage of his thought and a link or bridge,
with respect to postulations about the material intellect, to the subsequent
stage. It now remains to demonstrate how the analytical strands of this new
position culminated in the creation of a new, second stage in his writings.
11.2. The Rushdi stage; or the Rushdi Ibn Rushd
This final stage was the fruit of
more than thirty years of study and ceaseless probing. In retrospect, his
writings can best be interpreted as a quest for both an original and an
authentic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical system-a quest sustained,
as it were, both through a persistent dialogue with Aristotle's writings and
through a concurrent critical engagement with major thinkers within the
Aristotelian heritage.
Ibn Rushd's commentary on De Anima is, as I have noted in an
earlier work,35 the most important text among his psychological
writings. Let us now examine it in detail, in order to analyse the evolution of
his thought, and, more importantly, to assess the originality of his
philosophical contribution.
The preceding analysis of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tabs revealed the gradual processes whereby Ibn Rushd critically
rejected the views of Alexander and, subsequently, those of Ibn Bajja, thereby
exorcising the AlexandrianIbn Bajja influences in his own earlier writings. A
similar transition had also in fact occurred with respect to Abu Nasr
al-Farabi: his earlier writings on logic had been deeply influenced by
al-Farabi's views, but in a later commentary on the Analytica Posteriora (Al-Burhdn) he severely criticised al-Farabi
on account of views which he himself had specifically upheld earlier in Mukhtasar al-Burhan (Epitome of Analytica Posteriora) 36 Ibn
Rushd's revisionist inclinations aptly demonstrate the degree of rigour and
seriousness with which he pursued his philosophical vocation; and there is no
better example of this rigour than Al-sharh
al-kabir, which formulates a completely different psychological system and
a completely different approach to the problem of the intellect, whose force
almost annuls much of what he had previously written in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis.
The analysis of Al-Sharh will be conducted somewhat
differently from those made of Al-Mukbtasar
and Al-Talkhis, the reason being
that the original Arabic text of the work is lost; the earliest authoritative
version is in fact preserved in a Latin translation. For the purposes of this
paper I shall be basing myself on sections of the text which have been
translated into French from the Latin version 37 and on portions of the text which have been recorded
in the margins of the manuscript copies of A1-Talkhis
found in the Modena library. Let us begin by briefly reviewing the central
strands of this text, which sufficiently indicate the complete transformation
in Ibn Rushd's thought.
The transformation
appears not only in the new views advanced but in the very style in which Al-Sharh is written. There is a conscious attempt, on Ibn Rushd's part,
to articulate processes of thought which have now led him to confront hitherto
unexplored questions and unexamined obscurities. The conclusions reached in the
work are advanced in a manner which implicitly suggests a new set of
perspectives.
Ibn Rushd
immediately makes it clear that the material intellect38 constitutes the central theme of this text,39 but he also clearly
indicates, thereafter, that the examination of the material intellect in
isolation from the other faculties would be impractical and misguided. As such,
the scope of changes in Al-Sarh affects
not only the conception of the material intellect, as previously articulated in
Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis, but his entire psychological structure, involving all
the major elements from the intellect, theoretical intelligibles and the active
intellect to imaginary representations. The implications of these structural
changes are examined from the perspective both of epistemological states and of
the different ontological states in question; his discussion of the material
intellect is thus constantly linked up with all the other aspects of the
intellect. With regard to the relationship between the material intellect and
the senses, Ibn Rusted states that, while the material intellect is not
affected by a passivity similar to that of the senses, and does not experience
change analogous to what the senses undergo, there does nonetheless exist
within it a concept of passivity whose meaning is subsumed within its function
of acceptance. The material intellect is regarded as belonging among the genus
of passive faculties, and is thus rightfully distinguished from the active
intellect, yet it is neither a body nor a faculty within a body; it is, in
effect, a substance which accepts all forms without itself being one of the
forms it accepts. This is because the material forms are not separate, whereas
the material intellect is simple and separate. The material intellect is devoid
of a specific nature, except in so far as it exists in potentia. It contains, potentially, all universal material
intelligibles, but in actuality it is not a thing prior to its being endowed
with the faculty of reason.4°
Hence it differs from the irrational prime matter which accepts particular
forms, and, similarly, differs from the form, the matter and the compound of
both. It is a part of a particular mode of existence. To assert that the
material intellect exists in potentia does
not mean that it is not a definite thing or a substance; what is implied is
that, whatever the substrate bears, it cannot exist in actuality and thus
cannot be taken in an absolute sense, but should rather be approached in a
qualified manner. However, the substrate need not be a definite thing in
actuality; rather, what the substrate bears should not be found in it in
actuality.
The first obstacle to
understanding the nature of this intellect is the question of how it can be
from the genus of the passive faculties, while at the same time being simple,
separate and not mixed in with the body. If we say that it is separate and
simple, does this mean that the intellect and the intelligibles within it are
one, as is the case with the active and separate intellects? This is a second
difficulty.
The solution to the first
difficulty lies in defining the concept of passivity in the context of the
material intellect; for passivity, here, has a specialised meaning, implying a
form of changeless potentiality, analogous to the disposition in the tablet to
receive writing without being affected by passivity or change. Just as the
tablet does not bear any writing either in actuality or in potentia approaching actuality, so the material intellect does
not embrace any of the intelligible forms which it accepts, either in actuality
or in potentia approaching actuality.
It would be wrong to say, with Alexander, that the material intellect is
similar to the disposition that exists in the tablet, rather than to the tablet
itself inasmuch as it is disposed 41
This is because we must first know the nature of the thing that is disposed
before we can completely know the nature of the disposition-this because the
material intellect is not only a disposition. Here, clearly, Ibn Rushd is not
only criticising the views of Alexander, but also laying aside his own
positions in Al-Talkis and Al-Mukasar. He emphasises for the first
tune that the capacity within the intellect is different from all other
capacities, since it does not bear any intelligibles, either in actuality or in potentia, and is neither a body nor a
faculty within a body. Nor is it a capacity existing within imaginative forms;
for, among the many other absurdities enumerated,42 this would make it a faculty within a body and
therefore accepting the intellect itself.
As for the second difficulty, he asserts that the
material intellect is closer to the other faculties of intellection than to
separate intellects. There is, however, an important distinction, namely that
it is, in its essence, an intellect existing in actuality, while the other
intellects exist in potentia. He
further states, however, that the material intellect ranks lowest among the
separate intellects, in that the action of the material intellect is less
powerful than that of the separate intellects. Furthermore, the material
intellect is marked more by passivity than by activity, and in this respect it
differs from the active intellect 43
In Al-Sharh the material intellect is not simply discussed for the
elementary purposes of formulating a new definition, but is also analysed for
its philosophical significance. Ibn Rushd daringly asserts that the material
intellect is eternal and unitary with respect to mankind, and it is this which
underlines the radical transformation in his thought and the revolt against his
own earlier positions and those of his predecessors. It is not possible, here,
to analyse the significance of this assertion in detail; this paper will rather
content itself with a brief review of the changes arising out of the new
position. To this end, we must analyse the text with reference to general
approach, content of the dialogue, criticism and the final conclusions embodied
in the text, as against those reached in his earlier writings.
Ibn Rushd has finally broken away
from Alexander's position on the material intellect, which he himself had
earlier upheld, and, just as he had attacked Ibn Bajja's writings, so he
criticises the school of Themistius and others for their views on the
theoretical intellect and the active intellect. 44 The main
criticism is directed against Themistius' view that the theoretical intellect
springs from the conjunction of the active and material intellect within us,
and is therefore external. Since the first two intellects are external, Ibn Rushd
asserts that Themistius' viewpoint has departed from that of Aristotle and is
in opposition to truth itself. Ibn Rushd had already criticised this position
earlier, in Al-Mukhtasar, but there
his criticism reflects his adoption of the Ibn Bajja or Alexandrian school,
whereas now it springs from a new position and a new conception of the system
of relations required by the process of intellection. The criticism is equally
determined by the ontological position of the material and active intellect,
together with the role played by imaginary representations. All this is in
contrast to the viewpoint of earlier schools, which had concluded the
theoretical intellect to be eternal. It is this belief, in Ibn Rushd's view,
that will eventually lead to absurdities undermining the process of
intellection and the intellect itself.
The intellect is indeed the
offspring of the material and active intellect, yet different from both. The
compound of two things which are eternal, as the material and active intellect
are, must itself necessarily be eternal and one. There is, however, another
important element neglected by Themistius and his followers, namely the
decisive role played by imaginative forms in the process of intellection. In
this respect, the connection of the theoretical intellect to its activity
regarding imaginary representations in particular is
corrupting and multiple, due to the corruption and
multiplicity of the imaginary representations themselves. This necessary
connection is similar to the connection existing between the senses and
sensibles. Just as the senses do not perceive anything without the presence of
sensibles, so, similarly, the rational faculty does not conceptualise without
imagination. Hence the intellect and intelligibles are not to be seen as
contingent, generating and corrupting.
Yet it cannot be conceived that
intelligibles are contingent while the intellect is eternal; for this would not
correspond with the proposition that the material intellect is eternal and one.
In other words, if the material intellect is the first perfection of Man and
the theoretical intellect is the second perfection, then both these categories
should be functioning under the same conditions. For example, if Man is
generating and corrupting, this would apply equally to the first and second
perfection within Man-a viewpoint which contradicts earlier conclusions and
leads to absurdities and ambiguities concerning the material intellect. The
assertion, for example, that the material intellect is a body or a faculty within
a body could not possibly be upheld, since it has already been postulated that
the intellect is not generating or corrupting. When we say that the first
perfection is one and not multiple in relation to the human race, then
inescapable ambiguities emerge, which can only be resolved if we assert that
the first perfection is an individual concept embedded in matter, which is
corruptible and multiple in relation to. the multiplicity of individuals. We
are then left with several questions: can we resolve this problem, and what
exactly is the nature of the theoretical intellect and theoretical
intelligibles if we are to assume that the material intellect is one and
eternal?
Alexander resolves the problem by
stating that the material intellect is generating and corrupting, and is at the
same time a faculty. This Ibn Rushd rejects, just as he rejected Ibn Bajja's
position, which, in his view, did not satisfactorily resolve Alexander's
inconsistencies. All earlier views are in fact judged inadequate, the only way
out being through the assertion that theoretical intelligibles have two
elements, the first contingent and the second eternal. The first element makes
them contingent and the second element makes them one of the existents.
Imaginative forms are the first element and the material intellect is the
second element. Imaginary representations or forms set the intellect into
motion, this motion arising out of the process whereby the active intellect has
transformed imaginary representations from potential intelligibles into active
intelligibles.
I conclude, with Ibn Rushd, that
there are two separate aspects to intelligibles: with respect to the subject
which makes them contingent they are generating and corrupting, while with
respect to the material intellect which makes them one of the existents of the
world they are eternal; from this
perspective they can be viewed as simultaneously generating, corrupting and
eternal. The theoretical intellect is, in other words, eternal with respect to
its activity. This solution bypasses the difficulties and absurdities found in
the previous schools of commentators, and Ibn Rushd takes evident pride in his
significant discovery, which enables him to uphold and further fortify his
central thesis about the intellect and its eternity 45
These, then, are some of the
major points it has been possible to derive from Ibn Rushd's key psychological
texts. It has not been the aim of this study to analyse the points in full
critical detail, but rather to explore the transformation in approaches to the
problem of the intellect up to the writing of Al-Sharh. If the paper has shed some light on this area, then any
oversights apparent in the analysis may perhaps be excused.
There are, I am
convinced, two distinct phases in the evolution of Ibn Rushd's psychological
system-this is indeed the claim from which the study begins-and the recognition
of an evolution in his thought provides further encouragement for taking a more
chronologically systematic approach to the Rushdi corpus. The discovery of
amendments, as in the case of Al-Mulchtasar
and Al-Talkhis, will inevitably
lead us to label Ibn Rushd's earlier writings as obsolete, yet such an approach
will, nevertheless, ultimately provide us with deeper and richer insights. It
would in any case be mere obstinacy to ignore such established differences
between texts as occur in the various versions of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tallliis.
46
What must now be investigated is
the nature and philosophical significance of the evolution in Ibn Rushd's
thought. Was it, for example, an evolution born of successive and laborious
interpretations of the Aristotelian text, or did it rather reflect a
philosophical curiosity in search of new horizons beyond the limits of the
original text? In either case what is the scope and depth of this evolution? Is
it possible to speak of an evolution or a change within the context of an
interpretative philosophy? These and other such questions represent a whole new
and vital area of study. For the moment I shall rest content merely with
raising them, in the hope of tackling them in a future study.
NOTES
1
Al-Matn al-Rushdi, mad !jal li-gira'a jadida, Casablanca, 1986.
2
Another examination of the
evolution of the theory of demonstration according to Ibn Rind was made in a
paper contributed to Al-Halqa
al-Rushdiyya. Symposium lbn Rushd 1, which took place in Fez in March 1989.
3
In its original format this study
was a critical review of the book lshkaliyyat
al-'aql 'ind Ibn Rushd by Muhammad al-Misbahi, Casablanca, 1988.
4
A commendable effort has been
under way for some years now to publish the works of Ibn Rushd in their
original language, as well as in their Hebrew and Latin translations. Hopefully
this work will soon be completed, and the major basic impediment to contemporary
Rushdi studies removed.
5 Ibn Rushd left behind nearly ten
treatises on the soul (nafs), the
intellect ('aqi) and conjunction (ittisal), all of which are lost in the
original Arabic, with the exception of an addendum to the doctrine of the
rational faculty within an Epitome (Mint
tasar) of the De Anima in the
Cairo manuscript; this addendum being, apparently, a commentary or part of a
commentary on the Risalat al-ittisal of
Ibn Bajja Most of it is in Hebrew and Latin translations. He also composed three
texts which represent, I believe, the kernel of the Ruhdi study of the subject,
these being, in order: (a) the Epitome (Al-Mukhtasar)
on the soul, which is extant in the original Arabic and has several printed
editions (which might rather mislead the reader than guide him), foremost among these being the Egyptian
edition; (b) The Talkhu, of De Anima, which is also extant in the
original Arabic, although transcribed in Hebrew characters, but remains for the
moment in manuscript. A published edition by Professor Alfred Ivry is expected
shortly; (c) The commentary on De Anima ,
whose original is of course lost, although fragments are to be found in the
marginal notes of the Modena manuscript of the Talkhis of De Anima, transcribed
in Hebrew characters. Some years ago, also, Kalmen P. Bland published Ibn
Ruahd's Risala fi imkdn al-ittisal bi
'I-'aql al fa"al (New York, 1982) with a commentary by Moses of
Narbonne, which will not, however, be discussed in this study.
6
See my book Al-Matn al-Rushdi, where the commentaries of Ibn Rush d are
discussed in detail and the position of each of the texts is explained.
Although a viewpoint was adopted there concerning the abridged Mulcbtasar of De Anima, I feel this is now in need of further careful examination
and revision.
7
I am referring to the short commentaries (awdmi`) on Al-Samd' al-rabi i (De Physico Auditu),
Al-Samd' wa '!--'alam (De Coelo et Mundo) (ed. Jamal al-Din al-'Alawi, Fez,
1984), AlKawn wa 'I fasad (De Generatione
et Corruptione) and Al-Athar al-'ulwiyya
(Meteorologica). We may add to these the synthesis (jawamf) of Ma bad al-rabi a
(Metaphysica).
8
There are six known manuscripts
today: two in Cairo and one each in Madrid, Teheran, the Chester Beatty Library
and Hyderabad.
9
There are three printed editions:
Rasd'il 11m Rurhd, Hyderabad, 1947; Talkhis kitab alnafs, ed. F. al-Ahwani,
Cairo, 1950; and Epitome de Anima, ed.
Salvador G6mez Nogales, Madrid, 1985.
10 The other two printed editions are in no better
state.
11
Perhaps the latest editor
to indicate this is G6mez Nogales in his edition of this Mukhtasar.which he calls a'Talkhis'", as al-Ahwani had done.
He states that the Madrid manuscript is the most recent copy and that he will
be basing himself upon it. His edition of the book is no less bad than the
previous two, despite his having new manuscript copies at his disposal.
12
It is possible, by and large, to
say that the second version has been transmitted to us in the Madrid manuscript
and the first version by the others-although differences between the latter are
such that we may in fact consider there is an intermediate link represented by
the Hyderabad manuscript. However, let us, for practical convenience, consider
what we have as two versions until at least part of the book has been edited in
an accurate and scientific fashion.
13
We do not find this analogy in
the Madrid manuscript copy , or in the printed Hyderabad edition, which relied
on another manuscript, being taken from the Cairo manuscript copy. Whether it
is recorded in the other copies I do not know, as I have as yet had no
opportunity to study them.
14 Possibly he deleted it for this reason when he
revised the text of Al-Mukhtasar some
time after its composition.
15
In Al-Sharh al-kabir he mentions Ibn Bajja as comparing the imaginative
faculty's capacity to accept intelligibles with the tablet's retention of
writing, the created self (a!-nafs
almaw-44'a) of this capacity being compared to the tablet. In other words,
this analogy follows the school of Ibn Bajja
entirely.
16 See particularly section 36 of chapter III of the
commentary on De Anima, Latin
translation, edited by Crawford.
17 Tafsir
ma ba'd at-labia, ed. Maurice
Bouyges, Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, S6rie Arabe, Beirut, 1938-52,11,
1230 and 111,1489-90.
18
The Madrid manuscript copy is the
only one with this amendment, just as the Cairo manuscript copy is the only one
with the Talkhis of the Risalat al-ittisal of Ibn Bajja The
Hyderabad edition does not contain either the amendment or the summary.
19
Le., with the school of Alexander
(together with Ibn Bajja) and the school of Theophrastus and Themistius. It
will be seen how he reconciles the viewpoints of the two schools in Al-Tallshis, and we shall further see
how, in Al-Sharh, he goes beyond both
these schools to establish a new school which won him great fame among the
Latins.
20 It is the first if we consider as commentaries
other treatises which he composed on questions treated in the De Anima of Aristotle; otherwise it
would be one of two, namely Al-Talkbis and
Al-Sharh al-kabir.
21
This definition of Al-Talkhis is verified in the first
version. If, however, we consider the additions to it, then we may say that it
forms an intermediate link between Al-Mukhiasar
and Al-Sharh.
22 There are two manuscript copies of the Talkhis of De Anima, transcribed in Hebrew characters: those of Paris and
Modena (Italy).
23 See folio 114, redo, of the Paris MS.
24
See folio 147, recto, of the
Paris MS. The text does, however, lend itself to two readings, the first
("as we have shown in our tarp of
Aristotle's words") clearly suggesting, as said, a reference to the sharh, and the second ("as he has
shown in his ,barb on the words of
Aristotle") embodying a reference to the
sharh of Themistius. What makes the first reading more probable, however,
is that Ibn Rushd calls the work of Themistius "Talkhis" and not "Sharh".
25 On the first amendment, see folio 144, recto
(second column), and 141, verso, in the Paris MS. On the second amendment, see
folio 148, recto, in the same manuscript.
26
It will be seen from the
preceding and following argument that I do not share the viewpoint of Professor
Alfred Ivry, editor of the Talkhis of
De Anima, who claims that this Talkhis abrogates opinions expressed by
Ibn Rushd in Al-Sharh al-kabir etc. See
his study "On the commentaries of Ibn Rushd on Aristotle's book on
Psychology" contributed to the Rushdi Symposium I in Fez, March, 1989.
This will be published shortly in the proceedings of the symposium
27
The really strange thing is that
Ibn Bajja is not mentioned in Al-Mukhtasar,
either explicitly or implicitly. As for the mention of him at the end of
the discussion on the rational faculty in the Madrid manuscript copy, this is,
as noted earlier, merely an amendment made by Ibn Rushd after composing Al-Sharh al-kabir.
28 This viewpoint is magisterially summarised in his
revision of Al-Mukhtasar.
29
See my classified list of the
later writings of Ibn Bajja, notably Tadbir
al-mutawahhid, Risalat al-wads' and Risalat
al-ittisal, the last being the most important in this connection (Rasi'il lbn Bajja'l-ilahiyya, Beirut,
1968).
30
I mean that Ibn Rushd's
preoccupation with the material intellect in Al-Talkbis exceeds his preoccupation with the other kinds. We
should remember, in this connection, that the Talkhis -unlike Al-Mukhtasar-follows
the text of Aristotle and respects the order of its discussions.
31 Foremost among these reasons is that Al-Talkhis is a commentary on the
meaning of Aristotle's text. As such, Ibn Rushd had to submit to the logic and
order of the original text.
32
In the light of what is written
in Al-Sharh, we may say that the
analogy as it appears in Al-Mukhtasar is taken
from Ibn Bajja, but that that in Al-Ta1khis
derives from Alexander. Ibn Rushd states, in Al-Sharh, that he held the opinions of Ibn Bajja when writing Al-Mukhtasar and leaned towards the
standpoint of Alexander when writing Al-Talkhis.
33
The designation of the material
intellect as the passive intellect, together with the twofold designation
active and passive, should be stressed, and should be borne in mind later when
we compare what he has to say in Al-Sharh
al-kabir.
34
His discussion, in the final
analysis, concerns the active intellect. As for the material intellect, it is
the conjunction of the active intellect with the capacity existing in Man.
Hence the active intellect is not only a capacity, nor is it only a
transcendent substance.
35 See Al-Main
al-Rusbdi, referred to above.
36 See my article
"Tatawwur nazariyyat al-burhdn'ind
lbn Rutted", contributed to the symposium Al-Halga al-Rushdiyya al-ala, Fez, March 1989, to be published
shortly in the proceedings of the symposium.
37
This translation was made by
Alain Griffaton, in collaboration with Muhammad al-Misbahi, and was published
in instalments in Majallat kulliyyat
al-adab, Fez, Nos. 4-5 (19811982) and No. 6 (1982-1983), covering
Crawford's edition, pp. 379-454.
38 There is also a particular interest in the active
intellect and in the ambiguity of the conjunction with the active intellect.
39 I am referring to sections 5 to 20 and section 36
of Chapter III of Al-Sharh al-kabir of
De Anima (ed. Crawford). See also the
translation referred to above.
40 See section 4 of Chapter III of Al-Sharh,
ed. Crawford. See also section 5.
41
The view attributed here to Alexander
is, as noted earlier, the one he himself upheld in Al-Talklis.
42 See sections 4, 5, 14 and 19.
43 See sections 13, 15 and 16.1 have also, in this
brief synopsis, relied on the first twenty sections of the commentary on
Chapter III of De Anima, ed. Crawford.
44 See section 5 of Chapter HI. See also section 20.
45 In Al-Sharh
al-kabir of the Metaphysics, he
has summarised, in chapter Al-Lam, some
of the conclusions emerging from his commentary on De Anima, ending this short commentary by referring to the synopsis
indicated. See pp. 1487-1490, ed. Maurice Bouyges.
46 Mention must be made here of two important studies
published in recent years by Professor H. A. Davidson, the first on Ibn Rushd's
view of the material intellect and the second on the active intellect. See,
respectively, "Averroes on the Material Intellect", Viator, 17, 1986, and "Averroes on
the Active Intellect as a Course of Existence", Viator, 18, 1987.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Al-Alawi, Jamil al-Din, Al-Main al-Rufhdi, madkhal li-gira'a jadida,
Casablanca: Dar Tuqbal li 'I nashr,1986.
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al-burhan'ind Ibn Rushd", paper contributed to the symposium Al-Halqa al-Rushdiyya 'l-ula, Fez, March
1989, to be published shortly in the proceedings of the symposium.
Davidson, H. A., "Averroes on
the Material Intellect", Viator, 17,
1986.
-, "Averroes on the Active
Intellect as a Course of Existence", Viator,
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www.brill.nl/m_catalogue_sub6_id2866.htm
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