Ibn Rushd ( Averroës
), medieval
Latin AVERROËS, also called IBN RUSHD, Arabic in full ABU AL-WALID MUHAMMAD
IBN AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD IBN RUSHD (b. 1126, Cordoba--d. 1198, Marrakech, Almohad
Empire), influential Islamic religious philosopher who integrated Islamic
traditions and Greek thought. At the request of the caliph Ibn at-Tufayl he
produced a series of summaries and commentaries on most of Aristotle’s works
(1162-95) and on Plato’s Republic, which exerted considerable influence for
centuries. He wrote the Decisive Treatise on the Agreement Between Religious
Law and Philosophy (Fasl), Examination of the Methods of Proof Concerning the
Doctrines of Religion (Manahij), and The Incoherence of the Incoherence
(Tahafut) at-Tahafut, all in defense of the philosophical study of religion
against the theologians (1179-80).
Averroës was born into a distinguished family of
jurists at Cordoba and died at Marrakesh, the North African capital of the
Almohad (al-Muwahhidun) dynasty. Thoroughly versed in the traditional Muslim
sciences (especially exegesis of the Qur`an--Islamic scripture--and Hadith, or
Traditions, and fiqh, or Law), trained in medicine, and accomplished in
philosophy, Averroës rose to be chief qadi (judge) of Cordoba (Qurtubah), an
office also held by his grandfather (of the same name) under the Almoravids
(al-Murabitun). After the death of the philosopher Ibn Tufayl, Averroës
succeeded him as personal physician to the caliphs Abu Ya’qub Yusuf in 1182 and
his son Abu Yusuf Ya’qub in 1184. In 1169 Ibn Tufayl introduced Averroës to Abu
Ya’qub, who, himself a keen student of philosophy, frightened Averroës with a
question concerning whether the heavens were created or not. The caliph
answered the question himself, put Averroës at ease, and sent him away with
precious gifts after a long conversation that proved decisive for Averroës’
career. Soon afterward Averroës received the ruler’s request to provide a badly
needed correct interpretation of the Greek philosopher Aristotle’s philosophy,
a task to which he devoted many years of his busy life as judge, beginning at
Seville and continuing at Cordoba. The exact year of his appointment as chief
qadi of Cordoba, one of the key posts in the government (and not confined to
the administration of justice), is not known.
Between 1169 and 1195 Averroës wrote a series of
commentaries on most of Aristotle’s works (e.g., the Organon, De anima,
Physica, Metaphysica, De partibus animalium, Parva naturalia, Meteorologica,
Rhetorica, Poetica, and the Nicomachean Ethics). He wrote summaries, and middle
and long commentaries--often two or all three kinds on the same work.
Aristotle’s Politica was inaccessible to Averroës; therefore he wrote a
commentary on Plato’s Republic (which is both a paraphrase and a middle
commentary in form). All of Averroës’ commentaries are incorporated in the
Latin version of Aristotle’s complete works. They are extant in the Arabic
original or Hebrew translations or both, and some of these translations serve
in place of the presumably lost Arabic originals; e.g., the important
commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and on Plato’s Republic.
Averroës’ commentaries exerted considerable
influence on Jews and Christians in the following centuries. His clear,
penetrating mind enabled him to present competently Aristotle’s thought and to
add considerably to its understanding. He ably and critically used the
classical commentators Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias and the
falasifah (Muslim philosophers) al-Farabi, Avicenna
(Ibn Sina), and his own
countryman Avempace (Ibn Bajjah). In commenting on Aristotle’s treatises on the
natural sciences, Averroës showed considerable power of observation.
His own first work is on General Medicine
(Kulliyat, Latin Colliget), written between 1162 and 1169. Only a few of his
legal writings and none of his theological writings are preserved. Undoubtedly
his most important writings are three closely connected religious-philosophical
polemical treatises, composed in the years 1179 and 1180: the Fasl with its
Appendix: Manahij; and Tahafut at-Tahafut in defense of philosophy. In the two
first named Averroës stakes a bold claim: only the metaphysician employing
certain proof (syllogism) is capable and competent (as well as obliged) to
interpret the doctrines contained in the prophetically revealed law (Shar’ or
Shari’ah), and not the Muslim mutakallimun (dialectic theologians), who rely on
dialectical arguments. To establish the true, inner meaning of religious
beliefs and convictions is the aim of philosophy in its quest for truth. This
inner meaning must not be divulged to the masses, who must accept the plain,
external meaning of Scripture contained in stories, similes, and metaphors. Averroës
applied Aristotle’s three arguments (demonstrative, dialectical, and
persuasive--i.e., rhetorical and poetical) to the philosophers, the
theologians, and the masses. The third work is devoted to a defense of
philosophy against his predecessor al-Ghazali’s telling attack directed against
Avicenna and al-Farabi in particular. Spirited and successful as Averroës’
defense was, it could not restore philosophy to its former position, quite
apart from the fact that the atmosphere in Muslim Spain and North Africa was
most unfavourable to the unhindered pursuit of speculation. As a result of the
reforming activity of Ibn Tumart (c. 1078-1130), aimed at restoring pure
monotheism, power was wrested from the ruling Almoravids, and the new Berber
dynasty of the Almohads was founded, under whom Averroës served. In
jurisprudence the emphasis then shifted from the practical application of
Muslim law by appeal to previous authority to an equal stress on the study of
its principles and the revival of independent legal decision on the basis of
Ibn Tumart’s teaching. Of perhaps even more far-reaching significance was Ibn
Tumart’s idea of instructing the heretofore ignorant masses in the plain
meaning of the Shari’ah so that practice would be informed with knowledge.
These developments were accompanied by the encouragement of the falasifah--”those who,” according to Averroës’
Fasl, “follow the way of
speculation and are eager for a knowledge of the truth”--to apply demonstrative
arguments to the interpretation of the theoretical teaching of the Shari’ah.
But with the hands of both jurists and theologians thus strengthened, Averroës’
defense of philosophy continued to be conducted within an unfavourable
atmosphere.
Averroës himself acknowledged the support of Abu
Ya’qub, to whom he dedicated his Commentary on Plato’s Republic. Yet Averroës
pursued his philosophical quest in the face of strong opposition from the mutakallimun, who, together with the jurists, occupied a position of eminence
and of great influence over the fanatical masses. This may explain why he
suddenly fell from grace when Abu Yusuf--on the occasion of a jihad (holy war)
against Christian Spain--dismissed him from high office and banished him to
Lucena in 1195. To appease the theologians in this way at a time when the
caliph needed the undivided loyalty and support of the people seems a more
convincing reason than what the Arabic sources tell us (attacks on Averroës by
the mob, probably at the instigation of jurists and theologians). But Averroës’
disgrace was only short-lived--though long enough to cause him acute
suffering--since the caliph recalled Averroës to his presence after his return
to Marrakesh. After his death, Averroës was first buried at Marrakesh, and
later his body was transferred to the family tomb at Cordoba.
It is not rare in the history of Islam that the
rulers’ private attachment to philosophy and their friendship with philosophers
goes hand in hand with official disapproval of philosophy and persecution of
its adherents, accompanied by the burning of their philosophical writings and
the prohibition of the study of secular sciences other than those required for
the observance of the religious law. Without caliphal encouragement Averroës
could hardly have persisted all his life in his fight for philosophy against
the theologians, as reflected in his Commentary on Plato's Republic, in such
works as the Fasl and Tahafut
at-Tahafut, and in original philosophical
treatises (e.g., about the union of the active intellect with the human
intellect). It is likely that the gradual estrangement of his two masters and
patrons from Ibn Tumart’s theology and their preoccupation with Islamic law
also helped him. That Averroës found it difficult to pursue his philosophical
studies alongside the conscientious performance of his official duties he
himself reveals in a few remarks scattered over his commentaries; e.g., in that
on Aristotle’s De partibus animalium.
To arrive at a balanced appraisal of Averroës’
thought it is essential to view his literary work as a whole. In particular, a
comparison of his religious-philosophical treatises with his Commentary on
Plato’s Republic shows the basic unity of his attitude to the Shari’ah dictated
by Islam and therefore determining his attitude to philosophy, more precisely
to the nomos, the law of Plato’s philosopher-king. It will then become apparent
that there is only one truth for Averroës, that of the religious law, which is
the same truth that the metaphysician is seeking. The theory of the double
truth was definitely not formulated by Averroës, but rather by the Latin
Averroists. Nor is it justifiable to say that philosophy is for the
metaphysician what religion is for the masses. Averroës stated explicitly and
unequivocally that religion is for all three classes; that the contents of the
Shari’ah are the whole and only truth for all believers; and that religion’s
teachings about reward and punishment and the hereafter must be accepted in
their plain meaning by the elite no less than by the masses. The philosopher
must choose the best religion, which, for a Muslim, is Islam as preached by
Muhammad, the last of the prophets, just as Christianity was the best religion
at the time of Jesus, and Judaism at the time of Moses.
It is significant that Averroës could say in his
Commentary on Plato’s Republic that religious law and philosophy have the same
aim and in the Fasl that “philosophy is the companion and foster-sister of the
Shari’ah." Accepting Aristotle’s division of philosophy into theoretical
(physics and practical (ethics and politics), he finds that the Shari’ah
teaches both to perfection: abstract knowledge commanded as the perception of
God, and practice--the ethical virtues the law enjoins (Commentary on Plato’s
Republic). In the Tahafut he maintains that “the religious laws conform to the
truth and impart a knowledge of those actions by which the happiness of the
whole creation is guaranteed.” There is no reason to question the sincerity of
Averroës. These statements reflect the same attitude to law and the same
emphasis on happiness. Happiness as the highest good is the aim of political
science. As a Muslim, Averroës insists on the attainment of happiness in this
and the next life by all believers. This is, however, qualified by Averroës as
the disciple of Plato: the highest intellectual perfection is reserved for the
metaphysician, as in Plato’s ideal state. But the Muslim’s ideal state provides
for the happiness of the masses as well because of its prophetically revealed law,
which is superior to the Greek nomos (law) for this reason. The philosopher
Averroës distinguishes between degrees of happiness and assigns every believer
the happiness that corresponds to his intellectual capacity. He takes Plato to
task for his neglect of the third estate because Averroës believes that
everyone is entitled to his share of happiness. Only the Shari’ah of Islam
cares for all believers. It legitimates speculation because it demands that the
believer should know God. This knowledge is accessible to the naive believer in
metaphors, the inner meaning of which is intelligible only to the metaphysician
with the help of demonstration. On this point all falasifah are agreed, and all
recognize the excellence of the Shari’ah stemming from its divinely revealed
character. But only Averroës insists on its superiority over the nomos.
Insisting on the prerogative of the
metaphysician--understood as a duty laid upon him by God--to interpret the
doctrines of religion in the form of right beliefs and convictions (like
Plato’s philosopher-king), he admits that the Shari’ah contains teachings that
surpass human understanding but that must be accepted by all believers because
they contain divinely revealed truths. The philosopher is definitely bound by
the religious law just as much as the masses and the theologians, who occupy a
position somewhere in between. In his search for truth the metaphysician is
bound by Arabic usage, as is the jurist in his legal interpretations, though
the jurist uses subjective reasoning only, in contrast to the metaphysician’s
certain proof. This means that the philosopher is not bound to accept what is
contradicted by demonstration. He can, thus, abandon belief in the creation out
of nothing since Aristotle demonstrated the eternity of matter. Hence creation
is a continuing process. Averroës sought justification for such an attitude in
the fact that a Muslim is bound only by consensus (ijma’) of the learned in a
strictly legal context where actual laws and regulations are concerned. Yet,
since there is no consensus on certain theoretical statements, such as
creation, he is not bound to conform. Similarly, anthropomorphism is
unacceptable, and metaphorical interpretation of those passages in Scripture
that describe God in bodily terms is necessary. And the question whether God
knows only the universals, but not the particulars, is neatly parried by
Averroës in his statement that God has knowledge of particulars but that his
knowledge is different from human knowledge. These few examples suffice to
indicate that ambiguities and inconsistencies are not absent in Averroës’
statements.
The Commentary on Plato’s Republic reveals a side
of Averroës that is not to be found in his other commentaries. While he carried
on a long tradition of attempted synthesis between religious law and Greek
philosophy, he went beyond his predecessors in spite of large-scale dependence
upon them. He made Plato’s political philosophy, modified by Aristotle, his own
and considered it valid for the Islamic state as well. Consequently, he applied
Platonic ideas to the contemporary Almoravid and Almohad states in a sustained
critique in Platonic terms, convinced that if the philosopher cannot rule, he
must try to influence policy in the direction of the ideal state. For Plato’s
ideal state is the best after the ideal state of Islam based on and centred in
the Shari’ah as the ideal constitution. Thus, he regrets the position of women
in Islam compared with their civic equality in Plato’s Republic. That women are
used only for childbearing and the rearing of offspring is detrimental to the
economy and responsible for the poverty of the state. This is most unorthodox.
Of greater importance is his acceptance of Plato’s
idea of the transformation and deterioration of the ideal, perfect state into
the four imperfect states. Mu’awiyah I, who in Muslim tradition perverted the
ideal state of the first four caliphs into a dynastic power state, is viewed by
Averroës in the Platonic sense as having turned the ideal state into a
timocracy--a government based on love of honour. Similarly, the Almoravid and
Almohad states are shown to have deteriorated from a state that resembled the
original perfect Shari’ah state into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and
tyranny. Averroës here combines Islamic notions with Platonic concepts. In the
same vein he likens the false philosophers of his time, and especially the mutakallimun, to Plato’s sophists. In declaring them a real danger to the
purity of Islam and to the security of the state, he appeals to the ruling
power to forbid dialectical theologians to explain their beliefs and
convictions to the masses, thus confusing them and causing heresy, schism, and
unbelief. The study of The Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics enabled the
falasifah to see more clearly the political character and content of the
Shari’ah in the context of the classical Muslim theory of the religious and
political unity of Islam.
Leaning heavily on the treatment of Plato’s
political philosophy by al- Farabi, a 10th-century philosopher, Averroës looks
at The Republic with the eyes of Aristotle, whose Nicomachean Ethics
constitutes for Averroës the first, theoretical part of political science. He
is, therefore, only interested in Plato’s theoretical statements. Thus he concentrates
on a detailed commentary on Books II-IX of The Republic and ignores Plato’s
dialectical statements and especially his tales and myths, principally the myth
of Er. He explains Plato, whose Laws and Politikos he also knows and uses, with
the help, and in the light, of Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora, De anima,
Physica, and Nicomachean Ethics. Naturally, Greek pagan ideas and institutions
are replaced by Islamic ones. Thus Plato’s criticism of poetry (Homer) is
applied to Arab pre-Islamic poetry, which he condemns.
Averroës sees much common ground between the
Shari’ah and Plato’s general laws (interpreted with the help of Aristotle),
notwithstanding his conviction that the Shari’ah is superior to the nomos. He
accepts al-Farabi’s equation of Plato’s philosopher-king with the Islamic imam,
or leader and lawgiver, but leaves it open whether the ideal ruler must also be
a prophet. The reason for this may well be that, as a sincere Muslim, Averroës
holds that Muhammad was “the seal of the prophets” who promulgated the divinely
revealed Shari’ah once and for all. Moreover, Averroës exempts Muhammad from
the general run of prophets, thus clearly rejecting the psychological
explanation of prophecy through the theory of emanation adopted by the other falasifah. No trace of this theory can be discovered in Averroës’ writings,
just as his theory of the intellect is strictly and purely Aristotelian and
free from the theory of emanation. In conclusion, it may be reiterated that the
unity of outlook in Averroës’ religious-philosophical writings and his
commentary on The Republic gives his political philosophy a distinctly Islamic
character and tone, thereby adding to his significance as a religious
philosopher.
(E. I. J. Rosenthal)
·
Léon Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Averroès) (1948), a balanced
overall picture of his life and works, and La
Théorie d’lbn Rochd (Averroès) sur les rapports de la religion et de la
philosophie (1909), an indispensable work that was the basis for the
author’s later study cited above;
·
G.F. Hourani, (Averroës)
On the Harmony of Religion and
Philosophy (Eng. trans. 1961);
·
E.I.J. Rosenthal, “The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of
Ibn Rushd,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol.
15, no. 2 (1953), a discussion of Averroës’ political philosophy within the
context of his life and writings reprinted in Studia Semitica et Orientalia II
(1971), Averroës’ Commentary on Plato’s
Republic, 3rd ed. (1969), Hebrew text, Eng. trans. and notes, giving
Averroës’ Greek and Arabic sources, and “Ibn
Rushd: The Consummation,” in Political
Thought in Medieval Islam, 3rd ed., ch. 9 (1968);
·
S. van den Bergh,
Averroës’ Tahafut al-Tahafut: The
Incoherence of the Incoherence, 2 vol. (1954), Eng. trans. with important
notes tracing Averroës’ sources, especially Aristotle.
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Source: Ibn Rushd's Life
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