Ghazali
says:
The philosophers agree-exactly as do the Mu’tazilites-that it is impossible to ascribe to the First Principle knowledge, power, and will, and they affirm that we have received these terms through the Divine Law, and that they may be used as verbal expressions, but that they refer to one essence as we have explained previously, and that it is not permissible to accept an attribute additional to its essence in the way we may consider, as regards ourselves, our knowledge, power, and will, as attributes of ourselves, additional to our essence. And they affirm that this causes a plurality, because if these attributes are supposed to occur to us in the course of our development, we know that they are additional to our essence, because they constitute new facts; on the other hand, if they are supposed to be simultaneous with our existence without any time-lag, their simultaneity does not prevent them from being an addition to our essence. ; For when one thing is added to another and it is known that they are not identical, it is thought, even if they are simultaneous, that they are two. Therefore the fact that these qualities would be simultaneous with the essence of the First does not prevent them from being extraneous to its essence, and this causes a plurality in the necessary existent, and this is impossible; and therefore they all agree in the denial of the attributes.
I say:
The
difficulty for the man who denies a plurality of attributes consists in this:
that different attributes are reduced to one essence, so that for instance
knowledge, will, and power would mean one and the same thing and signify one
single essence, and that also knowledge and knower, power and possessing power,
will and willer would have one and the same meaning. The difficulty for the
man, however, who affirms that there exist both an essence and attributes
additional to the essence, consists in this: that the essence becomes a
condition for the existence of the attributes and the attributes a condition
for the perfection of the essence, and that their combination would be a
necessary existent, that is, one single existent in which there is neither
cause nor effect. And this latter difficulty cannot be really solved when it is
assumed that there exists an essentially necessary existent, for this implies
that it must be one in every way and can in no way be composed of the condition
and the conditioned and of cause and effect, for such a composition would have
to be either necessary or possible; (t) if necessary, it would be necessary
through another, not through itself, since it is difficult to assume an eternal
compound as existing through itself, i. e. as not having a cause for its
composition, and this is especially difficult for the man who believes that
every accident is temporal, ‘ since the fact of being a compound would be an
eternal accident; (2) if possible, a cause would be needed to join together the
effect and the cause. Now, according to philosophical principles it is quite
impossible that there should be a compound existing by itself, having eternal
attributes, since the composition would be a condition of its existence; and
its parts could not be agents for the composition, for the composition would
have to be a condition for their existence. Therefore, when the parts of any
natural compound are disjoined, their original name can be only applied to them
equivocally, e. g. the term `hand’, used of the hand which is a part of the
living man and the hand which has been cut off; and every compound is for
Aristotle transitory and a fortiori cannot be without a cause?
But
as to the system of Avicenna, with its division of the necessary existent from
the possible existent, it does not lead to the denial of an eternal compound;
for when we assume that the possible ends in a necessary cause and that the
necessary cause must either have a cause or not, and in the former case must
end in a necessary existent which has no cause, this reasoning leads through
the impossibility of an infinite regress to a necessary existence which has no
efficient causenot, however, to an existent which has no cause at all, for this
existent might have a formal or a material cause, unless it is assumed that
everything which has matter and form, or in short every compound, must have an
external cause; but this needs a proof which the demonstration based on the
principle of the necessary existent does not contain, even if we do not
consider the mistake in it we have already mentioned. And for exactly the same
reason the proof of the Ash’arites that every temporal occurrence needs a cause
does not lead to an eternal First Principle which is not composite, but only to
a First Principle which is not temporal.
As
to the fact that knower and knowledge are one, it is not impossible, but
necessary, that such pairs of things lead up to the unity of their concepts; e.
g. if the knower knows through knowledge, that through which he becomes a
knower is more apt to be a knower, for the quality which any thing acquires
from another is in itself more apt to possess the concept which is acquired, e.
g. if the living bodies in our sublunary world are not alive by themselves, but
through a life which inheres in them, then necessarily this life through which
the non-living acquires life is alive by itself, or there would be an
infinite regress; and the same is the case with knowledge and the other
attributes.
Now,
it cannot be denied that one essence can have many attributes related,
negative, or imaginary, in different ways without this implying a plurality in
the essence, e. g. that a thing is an existent and one and possible or
necessary, l for when the one identical entity is viewed in so far as something
else proceeds from it, it is called capable and acting, and in so far as it is
viewed as differentiating between two opposite acts, it is called willing, and
in so far as it is viewed as perceiving its object, knowing, and in so far as
it is viewed as perceiving and as a cause of motion, it is called living, since
the living is the perceiving and the self-moving. What is impossible is
only a single simple existence with a plurality of attributes, existing by
themselves, and especially if these attributes should be essential and exist in
act, and as to these attributes existing in potency, it is not impossible,
according to the philosophers, that something should be one in act and a
plurality in potency, and this is the case according to them, with the parts of
the definition in their relation to the thing defined.
And as to Ghazali’s words:
And they affirm that this causes a plurality . . . that they are two.
He
means by them that the fact that these attributes are simultaneous with the
essence does not prevent them from being necessarily a plurality by themselves,
just as, if their existence were posterior to the essence, or if some of them
were posterior to others, mind would not conceive them as being one.
After stating the view
of the philosophers, Ghazali says:
But it must be said to the philosophers: How do you know the impossibility of plurality of this kind? for you are in opposition to all the Muslims, the Mu’tazilites excepted, and what is your proof of it? If someone says: ‘Plurality is impossible, since the fact that the essence is regarded as one is equivalent to the impossibility of its having a plurality of attributes’ this is just the point under discussion, and the impossibility is not self-evident, and a proof is needed. They have indeed two proofs. The first is that they say that, when subject and attribute are not identical, either both, subject and attribute, can exist independently of the other, or each will need the other, or only one of them will depend on the other. In the first case they will both be necessary existents, and this implies an absolute duality and is impossible. In the second case neither of them will be a necessary existent, because the meaning of a necessary existent is that it exists by itself and does not depend in any way on anything else, and when a thing requires something else, that other is its cause, since, if this other were annulled, its existence would be impossible and it would therefore exist not by itself but through another. In the third case the one which was dependent would be an effect and the necessary existent would be the other, on which it would be dependent, and that which was an effect would need a cause and therefore this would necessarily involve connecting the essence of the necessary existent with a cause. ‘
I say:
When
their opponents concede to the philosophers that there is an existent necessary
by itself and that the meaning of the necessary existent is that it has no
cause at all, neither in its essence through which it subsists, or through
something external, they cannot escape the conclusion which the philosophers
forced upon them: that if the attributes existed through the essence, the
essence would be an existent necessary through itself, and the attributes would
be necessary through something different from themselves, and the essence of
the necessary existent would exist by itself, but the attributes would be
necessary through something different from themselves, and essence and
attributes together would form a compound. z But the Ash’arites do not concede
to the philosophers that the existence of a necessary existent, subsisting by
itself, implies that it has no cause whatsoever, for their argument leads only
to the denial of an efficient cause additional to the essence. ;
Ghazali
says:
The objection against this is to say: The case to be accepted is the last, but we have shown in the fifth discussion that you have no proof for your denial of the first case, that of absolute duality; what is affirmed by you in the fifth discussion can only be justified by basing it upon your denial of plurality in this and the following discussions: how can you therefore base this discussion upon what” is itself the upshot of this discussion?’ But the correct solution is to say: `The essence does not need the attributes for its subsistence, whereas the attributes need a subject, as is the case with us ourselves. ‘ There remains their statement that what is in need of something else is not a necessary existent.
One may ask them: Why do you make such a statement, if you understand by `necessary existent’ only that which has no efficient cause, and why is it impossible to say that, just as there is no agent for the essence of the necessary existent, which is eternal, there is no agent for its attributes, which are equally eternal? If, however, you understand by `necessary existent’ that which has no receptive cause, we answer that that is not implied in this conception of the necessary existent, which, according to this conception is all the same eternal and has no agent; and what is wrong with this conception?
If it is answered that the absolute necessary existent is that which has no efficient cause and no receptive cause, x for if a receptive cause for it were conceded, it would be conceded that it was an effect-we say: To call the receptive essence a receptive cause is one of your technical terms, and there is no proof of the real existence of a necessary existent corresponding to your terminology; all that. is proved is that there must be a final term to the series of causes and effects, and no more, and this series can end in a unit with eternal attributes which have no more an agent than the essence itself, and are supposed to be in the essence itself. But let us put aside this term ‘necessary existent’, which is full of possible confusion. The proof indeed only demonstrates the end of the series and nothing more, and your further claims are pure presumption.
If it is said: In the same way as the series of efficient causes must have an end, the series of receptive causes must have an end, since if every existent needed a substratum to inhere in it and this substratum again needed a substratum, this would imply an infinite series, just as this would be the case if every existent needed a cause and this cause again another cause-we answer: You are perfectly right and for this very reason we say that the series has an end and that the attribute exists in its essence and that this essence does not exist in something else, just as our knowledge exists in our essence and our essence is its substratum, but does not exist itself in a substratum. The series of efficient causes comes to an end for the attribute at the same time as for the essence, since the attribute has an agent no more than the essence has, still the essence provided with this attribute does not cease to exist, although neither itself nor its attribute has a cause. As to the receptive causes, its series can only end in the essence, for how could the negation of a cause imply the negation of a substratum? The proof does not demonstrate anything but the termination of the series, and every method by which this termination can be explained is sufficient to establish the proof which demands the existence of the necessary existent. But if by `necessary existent’ is understood something besides the existent which has no efficient cause and which brings the causal series to an end, we do not by any means concede that this is necessary. And whenever the mind regards it as possible to acknowledge an eternal existent which has no cause for its existence, it regards it as possible to acknowledge an eternal subject for which there is no cause, either for its essence or for its attribute.
As to Ghazali’s words:
We have shown in the fifth discussion that you have no proof for your denial of the first case, that of absolute duality; what is affirmed by you in the fifth discussion can only be justified by basing it upon your denial of plurality.
I say:
Ghazali means the philosophers’ denial that
subject and attribute are both subsistent by themselves, for from this it
follows that they are independent of each other and that both are independent
gods, which is a dualistic theory, since there is no connexion through which
attribute and subject could become a unity. And since the philosophers used as
an argument for the denial of this kind of plurality the fact that it has
dualism as its consequence, ‘ and a demonstration ought to proceed in the
opposite sense, namely, that dualism would have to be denied, because of the
impossibility of plurality, he says that their proof is circular and that they
proved the principle by the conclusion.
Their
objection, however, was not based upon the facts themselves, but on the theory
of their opponents who deny dualism. And you have learned in another place that
there are two kinds of refutation, one based on the objective facts, the other
based on the statement of the opponent, and although the former is the true
kind of refutation, the second type may also be used .
As to Ghazali’s words:
But the correct solution is to say: ‘The essence does not need the attributes for its subsistence, whereas the attributes need a subject, as is the case with us ourselves. ‘ There remains their statement that what is in need of another is not a necessary existent.
I say:
Ghazali means that, when this tripartite
division which they use to deny plurality is submitted to them, the facts lead
them to establish that (i) the necessary existent cannot be a compound of
attribute and subject; (2) the essence cannot be a plurality of attributes, for
they cannot accept these things according to their principles. Then he starts
to show that the impossibility which they strive to deduce from this division
is not strict.
As to Ghazali’s words:
One may ask them: Why do you make such a statement, if you understand by `necessary existent’ only that which has no efficient cause, and why is it impossible to say that, just as there is no agent for the essence of the necessary existent, which is eternal, there is no agent for its attributes, which are equally eternal?
I say:
All
this is an objection to Avicenna’s method of denying the attributes by
establishing the necessary existent which exists by itself, but in this
question the most convincing method of showing the necessity of unity and
forcing it as a consequence upon the Ash’arites is the method of the
Mu’tazilites. For the latter understand by ‘possible existence’ the truly
possible, ‘ and they believe that everything below the First Principle is such.
Their opponents, the Ash’arites, accept this, and believe also that every
possible has an agent, and that the series comes to an end through what is not
possible in itself. The Mu’tazilites concede this to them, but they believe
that from this concession it follows that the First, which is the final term of
the series of possibility, is not a possible, and that this implies its
absolute simplicity. The Ash’arites, however, say that the denial of true
possibility does not imply simplicity, but only eternity and the absence of an
efficient cause, and therefore there is among the Ash’arites no proof of the
simplicity of the First through the proof based on the necessary existent. z
And Ghazali says:
If it is answered that the absolute necessary existent is that which has no efficient cause and no receptive cause, for if a receptive cause for it were conceded, it would be conceded that it was an effect.
I say:
Ghazali means that, if the philosophers say that
the proof has led to a necessary existent which has no efficient cause, it has,
according to them, no receptive cause either, and that according to the
philosophers the assumption of essence and attributes implies the assumption of
a receptive cause.
Then Ghazali, answering this, says:.
We say: To call the receptive essence a receptive cause is one of your technical terms, and there is no proof for the real existence of a necessary existent corresponding to your terminology; all that is proved is that there must be a final term to the series of causes and effects.
I say:
Ghazali means that the Ash’arites do not concede
that this essence in which the attributes inhere is a receptive cause, ‘ so as
to be forced to admit an efficient cause for it. He says that the proof of the
philosophers does not lead to an existent which has no receptive cause, let
alone proving the existence of what has no essence and no attributes. It only
proves that it has no efficient cause. This objection is a necessary
consequence of their own proof. Even if the Ash’arites had accepted the
philosophical theory that what has no efficient cause has no receptive cause,
their own statement would not have been overthrown, for the essence which they
assume only receives attributes which do not belong to the First, since they
assume that the attributes are additional to the essence of the First, and they
do not admit essential attributes in the way the Christians do.
And as to Ghazali’s words:
If it is said: In the same way as the series of efficient causes must have an end, the series of receptive causes must have an end, since if every existent needed a substratum to inhere in it and this substratum again needed a substratum, this would imply an infinite series, just as this would be the case if every existent needed a cause and this cause again another causewe answer: You are perfectly right and for this very reason we say that the series has an end and that the attribute exists in its essence and that this essence does not exist in something else, just as our knowledge exists in our essence and our essence is its substratum, but does not exist itself in a substratum.
I say:
This
statement has no connexion with this discussion either with respect to the
philosophical theories he mentions or with respect to the answers he gives, and
it is a kind of sophism, for there exists no relation between the question,
whether the receptive causes must or must not have an end, and the problem
which is under discussion, namely whether it is a condition of the First Agent
that it should have a receptive cause. For the inquiry about the finiteness of
receptive causes differs from the inquiry about the finiteness of efficient
causes, since he who admits the existence of receptive causes admits
necessarily that their series must end in a primary receptive cause which is
necessarily external to the First Agent, just as he admits the existence of a
First Agent external to the receptive matter. For if the First Agent possessed
matter, this matter would not exist numerically and individually either in the
first recipient or in the inferior recipients of other things; ‘ no, if the
First Agent possessed matter, this matter would have to be a matter peculiar to
it, and in short it would belong to it; that is, either it would be its primary
matter or we should arrive at a first recipient, and this recipient would not
be of the genus which is the condition for the existence of all the other
existents proceeding from the First Agent. ‘ But if matter were the condition
for the existence of the First Agent, it would be a condition for the existence
of all agents in their actions, and matter would not only be a condition for
the existence of the agent’s act-since every agent acts only on a
recipient -but it would be a condition for the existence of the agent
itself, and therefore every agent would be a body. ;
All
this the Ash’arites neither admit nor deny. But when the philosophers tell them
that an essence to which such an attribute is ascribed must be a body, they
answer: `Such an attribute is ascribed by you to the soul and yet, according to
you, the soul is not a body. ‘ This is the limit to which dialectical arguments
in this question can be carried. But the demonstrations are in the works of the
ancients which they wrote about this science, and especially in the books of
Aristotle, not in the statements of Avicenna about this problem and of other
thinkers belonging to Islam, if anything is to be found in them on this
question. For their metaphysical theories are pure presumptions, since they
proceed from common, not particular, notions, i. e. notions which are
extraneous to the nature of the inquiry.
And as to Ghazali’s words:
The series of efficient causes comes to an end for the attribute at the same time as for the essence, since the attribute has an agent no more than the essence has, still the essence provided with this attribute does not cease to exist, although neither itself nor its attribute has a cause.
I say:
This
is a statement which is not accepted by their opponents, the philosophers; on
the contrary, they affirm that it is a condition of the First Agent that it
should not receive an attribute, because reception indicates matter and it is
therefore not possible to assume as the final term of the causal series an
agent of any description whatsoever, but only an agent which has absolutely no
agent, and to which no attribute-from which it would follow that it had
an agent-can be ascribed. For the assumption of the existence of an
attribute of the First Agent existing in a receptive cause which would be a
condition for its existence is thought by the philosophers to be impossible.
Indeed, anything for the existence of which there is a condition can only be
connected with this condition through an external cause, for a thing cannot
itself be the cause of its connexion with the condition of its existence, just
as it cannot be the cause of its own existence. For the conditioned, if it were
not connected with its condition, would have to exist by itself, and it needs
an efficient cause to connect the condition with it, since a thing cannot be
the cause of the existence of the condition of its own existence; but all these
are common notions. And in general one cannot imagine that it is possible to
arrive by this method, as applied to this problem, at something near evidence,
because of the equivocation in the term `existent necessary by itself’, and in
the term `possible by itself, necessary through another’, and the other
preliminary notions which are added to them.
Ghazali
says:
The second proof of the philosophers is that they say that the knowledge and the power in us do not enter the quiddity of our essence, but are accidental, and when these attributes are asserted of the First, they too do not enter the quiddity of its essence, but are accidental in their relation to it, even if they are lasting; for frequently an accident does not separate itself from its quiddity and is a necessary attribute of it, but still it does not therefore become a constituent of its essence. And if it is an accident, it is consequent on the essence and the essence is its cause, and it becomes an effect, and how can it then be a necessary existent?’
Then Ghazali says, refuting this:
This proof is identical with the first, notwithstanding the change of expression. For we say: If you mean by its being consequent on the essence, and by the essence’s being its cause, that the essence is its efficient cause, and that it is the effect of the essence, this is not true, for this is not valid of our knowledge in relation to our essence, since our essence is not an efficient cause of our knowledge. If you mean that the essence is a substratum and that the attribute does not subsist by itself without being in a substratum, this is conceded, and why should it be impossible? For if you call this `consequent’ or `accident’ or `effect’ or whatever name you want to give it, its meaning does not change, since its meaning is nothing but `existing in the essence in the way attributes exist in their subjects’. And it is by no means impossible that it should exist in the essence, and be all the same eternal and without an agent. All the proofs of the philosophers amount to nothing but the production of a shock by the use of a depreciating expression: `possible’, `permissible’, ‘consequent’, `connected’, `effect’-but all this may be ignored. For it must be answered: If by this you mean that it has an agent, it is not true, and if only it is meant that it has no agent, but that it has a substratum in which it exists, then let this meaning be indicated by any expression you want, and still it will not become impossible.
I say:
This
is using many words for one idea. But in this question the difference between
the opponents consists in one point, namely: `Can a thing which has a receptive
cause be without an agent or not?’ Now it belongs to the principles of the
theologians that the connexion of condition and conditioned appertains to the
domain of the permissible’ and that whatever is permissible needs for its
realization and actualization an agent which actualizes it and connects the
condition with the conditioned, and that the connexion is a condition for the
existence of the conditioned and that it is possible neither that a thing
should be the cause of the condition of its existence, nor that the condition
should be the efficient cause of the existence of the conditioned, for our
essence is not the efficient cause of the existence of the knowledge which
exists in it, but our essence is a condition for the existence of the knowledge
existing in it. And because of all these principles it is absolutely necessary
that there should exist an efficient cause which brings about the connexion of
condition and conditioned, and this is the case with every conjunction of a
condition and a conditioned. But all these principles are annulled by the
philosophical theory that heaven is eternal, although it possesses essence and
attributes, for the philosophers do not give it an agent of the kind which
exists in the empirical world, as would be the consequence of these principles;
they only assume that there is a proof which leads to an eternal connexion
through an eternal connecting principle, and this is another kind of connexion,
differing from that which exists in transitory things. But all these are
problems which need a serious examination. And the assumption of the
philosophers that these attributes do not constitute the essence is not true,
for every essence is perfected by attributes through which it becomes more
complete and illustrious, and, indeed, it is constituted by these attributes,
since through knowledge, power, and will we become superior to those existents
which do not possess knowledge, and the essence in which these attributes exist
is common to us and to inorganic things. How therefore could such attributes be
accidents consequent on our essence? All these are statements of people who
have not studied well the psychological and accidental attributes.
Ghazali
says:
And often they shock by the use of a depreciating expression in another way, and they say: This leads to ascribing to the First a need for these attributes, so that it would not be self-sufficient absolutely, since the absolutely self-sufficient is not in need of anything else. ‘
Then Ghazali says, refuting this:
This is an extremely weak verbal argument, for the attributes of perfection do not differ from the essence of the perfect being in such a way that he should be in need of anything else. And if he is eternally perfect through knowledge, power, and life, how could he be in need of anything, or how could his being attached to perfection be described as his being in need? It would be like saying that the perfect needs no perfection and that he who is in need of the attributes of perfection for his essence is imperfect; the answer is that perfection cannot mean anything but the existence of perfection in his essence, and likewise being self-sufficient does not mean anything but the existence of attributes that exclude every need in his essence. How therefore can the attributes of perfection through which divinity is perfected be denied through such purely verbal arguments?
I say:
There
are two kinds of perfection: perfection through a thing’s own self and
perfection through attributes which give their subject its perfection, and
these attributes must be in themselves perfect, for if they were perfect
through perfect attributes, we should have to ask whether these attributes were
perfect through themselves or through attributes, and we should have therefore
to arrive at that which is perfect by itself as a final term. Now the perfect
through another will necessarily need, according to the above principles if
they are accepted, a bestower of the attributes of perfection; otherwise it
would be imperfect. But that which is perfect by itself is like that which is
existent by itself, and how true it is that the existent by itself is perfect by
itself!If therefore there exists an existent by itself, it must be perfect by
itself and self-sufficient by itself; otherwise it would be composed of
an imperfect essence and attributes perfecting this essence. If this is true,
the attribute and its subject are one and the same, and the acts which are
ascribed to this subject as proceeding necessarily from different attributes
exist only in a relative way.
Ghazali
says, answering the philosophers:
And if it is said by the philosophers: When you admit an essence and an attribute and the inherence of an attribute in the essence, you admit a composition, and every compound needs a principle which composes it, and just because a body is composed, God cannot be a body-we answer:
Saying that every compound needs a composing principle is like saying that every existent needs a cause for its existence, and it may be answered
The First is eternal and exists without a cause and without a principle for its existence, and so it may be said that it is a subject, eternal, without a cause for its essence, for its attribute and for the existence of its attribute in its essence; indeed all this is eternal without a cause. But the First cannot be a body, because body is a temporal thing which cannot be free from what is temporal’: however, he who does not allow that body has a beginning must be forced to admit that the first cause can be a body, and we shall try later to force this consequence on the philosophers.
I say:
Composition
is not like existence, because composition is like being set in motion, namely,
a passive quality, additional to the essence of things which receive the
composition, z but existence is a quality which is the essence itself, and
whoever says otherwise is mistaken indeed. Further, the compound cannot be
divided into that which is compound by itself and that which is compound
through another, so that one would finally come to an eternal compound in the
way one arrives, where existents are concerned, at an eternal existent, and we
have treated this problem in another place. ; And again: If it is true, as we
have said, that composition is something additional to existence, then one may
say, if there exists a compound by itself, . then there must exist also
something moved by itself, and if there exists something moved by itself, then
also a privation will come into existence by itself, for the existence of a
privation is the actualization of a potency, and the same applies to motion and
the thing moved. But this is not the case with existence, for existence is not
an attribute additional to the essence, and every existent which does not exist
sometimes in potency and sometimes in act is an existent by itself, whereas the
existence of a thing as moved occurs only when there is a moving power, and
every moved thing therefore needs a movers
The
distinctive point in this problem is that the two parts in any compound must be
either (i) mutually a condition for each other’s existence, as is, according to
the Peripatetics, the case with those which are composed of matters and forms,
b or (2) neither of them a condition for the existence of the other, or (3)
exclusively one the condition for the other.
In
the first case the compound cannot be eternal, because the compound itself is a
condition for the existence of the parts and the parts cannot be the cause of
the compound, nor the compound its own cause, for otherwise a thing might be
its own cause, and this kind of compound, therefore, is transitory and needs an
agent for its actualization. ‘
In
the second case-and for these compounds it is not in the nature of either
of their parts that it implies the other-there is no composition possible
without a composing factor, external to the parts, since the composition is not
of their own nature so that their essence might exist through their nature or
be a consequence of their nature; and if their nature determined the
composition and they were both in themselves eternal, their composition would
be eternal, but would. need a cause which would give it unity, since no eternal
thing can possess unity accidentally.
In
the third case, and this is the case of the non-essential attribute and
its subject, if the subject were eternal and were such as never to be without
this attribute, the compound would be eternal. But if this were so, and if an
eternal compound were admitted, the Ash’arite proof that all accidents are
temporal would not be true, since if there were an eternal compound there would
be eternal accidents, one of which would be the composition, whereas the
principle on which the Ash’arites base their proof of the temporality!of
accidents is the fact that the parts of which a body, according to them, is
composed must exist first separately; if, therefore, they allowed an eternal
compound, it would be possible that there should be a composition not preceded
by a separation, and a movement, not preceded by a rest, and if this were
permissible, it would be possible that a body possessing eternal accidents
should exist, and it would no longer be true for them that what cannot exist
without the temporal is temporal. And further, it has already been said that
every compound is only one because of a oneness existing in it, and this
oneness exists only in it through something which is one through itself. And if
this is so, then the one, in so far as it is one, precedes every compound, and
the act of this one agent-if this agent is eternal-through which it
gives all single existents which exist through it their oneness, is everlasting
and without a beginning, not intermittent; for the agent whose act is attached
to its object at the time of its actualization is temporal and its object is
necessarily temporal, but the attachment of the First Agent to its object is
everlasting and its power is everlastingly mixed with its object. And it is in
this way that one must understand the relation of the First, God, praise be to
Him, to all existents. But since it is not possible to prove these things here,
let us turn away from them, since our sole aim was to show that this book of Ghazali does not contain any proofs, but mostly
sophisms and at best dialectical arguments. But proofs are very rare, and they
stand in relation to other arguments as unalloyed gold to the other minerals
and the pure pearl to the other jewels. ‘ And now let us revert to our subject.
Ghazali says:
All their proofs where this problem is concerned are imaginary. Further, they are not able to reduce all the qualities which they admit to the essence itself, for they assert, that it is knowing, and so they are forced to admit that this is something additional to its mere existence, and then one can ask them: `Do you concede that the First knows something besides its essence?’ Some of them concede this, whereas others affirm that it only knows its own self. The former position is that taken by Avicenna, for he affirms that the First knows all things in a universal timeless way, but that it does not know individuals, because to comprehend their continual becoming would imply a change in the essence of the knower. z But, we ask, is the knowledge which the First has of all the infinite number of species and genera identical with its self-knowledge or not? If you answer in the negative, you have affirmed a plurality and have contradicted your own principle; if you answer in the affirmative, you are like a man claiming that man’s knowledge of other things is identical with his self-knowledge and with his own essence, and such a statement is mere stupidity. And it may be argued: `The definition of an identical thing is that its negation and affirmation cannot be imagined at the same time, and the knowledge of an identical thing, when it is an identical thing, cannot at the same time be imagined as existing and not existing. And since it is not impossible to imagine a man’s self-knowledge without imagining his knowledge of something else, it may be said that his knowledge of something else is different from his self-knowledge, since, if they were the same, the affirmation or negation of the one would imply the affirmation or negation of the other. For it is impossible that Zaid should be at one and the same time both existing and not existing, but the existence of self-knowledge simultaneously with the non-existence of the knowledge of something else is not impossible, nor is this impossible with the self-knowledge of the First and its knowledge of something else, for the existence of the one can be imagined without the other and they are therefore two things, whereas the existence of its essence without the existence of its essence cannot be imagined, and if the knowledge of all things formed a unity, it would be impossible to imagine this duality. Therefore all those philosophers who acknowledge that the First knows something besides its own essence have undoubtedly at the same time acknowledged a plurality.
I say:
The
summary of this objection to the proposition that the First knows both itself
and something else is that knowing one’s self is different from knowing
something else. But Ghazali falls here into
confusion. For this can be understood in two ways: first, that Zaid’s knowledge
of his own individuality is identical with his knowledge of other things, and
this is not true; secondly, that man’s knowledge of other things, namely of
existents, is identical with the knowledge of his own essence, and this is
true. ‘ And the proof is that his essence is nothing but his knowledge of the
existents. z For if man like all other beings knows only the quiddity which
characterizes him, and if his quiddity is the knowledge of things, then man’s self-knowledge
is necessarily the knowledge of all other things, for if they were different
his essence would be different from his knowledge of things. This is clear in
the case of the artisan, for his essence, through which he is called an
artisan, is nothing but his knowledge of the products of art. ; And as to Ghazali’s words, that if his self-knowledge
were identical with his knowledge of other things, then the negation of the one
would be the negation of the other and the affirmation of the one the affirmation
of the other, he means that if the self-consciousness of man were
identical with his knowledge of other things, he could not know his own self
without knowing the other things; that is, if he were ignorant of other things,
he would not know his own self, and this proposition is in part true, in part
false. For the quiddity of man is knowledge, and knowledge is the thing known
in one respect and is something different in another. And if he is ignorant of
a certain object of knowledge, he is ignorant of a part of his essence, and if
he is ignorant of all knowables, he is ignorant of his essence; and to deny man
this knowledge is absolutely the same as to deny man’s selfconsciousness, for
if the thing known is denied to the knower in so far as the thing known and
knowledge are one, man’s self-consciousness itself is denied. But in so
far as the thing known is not knowledge, it is not man, and to deny man this
knowledge does not imply the denial of man’s self-consciousness. And the
same applies to individual men. For Zaid’s knowledge of Amr is not Zaid
himself, and therefore Zaid can know his own self, while being ignorant of Amr.
Ghazali says:
If it is said: `The First does not know other things in first intention. No, it knows its own essence as the principle of the universe, and from this its knowledge of the universe follows in second intention, since it cannot know its essence except as a principle, for this is the true sense of its essence, and it cannot know its essence as a principle for other things, without the other things entering into its knowledge by way of implication and consequence; it is not impossible that from its essence consequences should follow, and this does not imply a plurality in its essence, and only a plurality in its essence is impossible’-there are different ways of answering this. First your assertion that it knows its essence to be a principle is a presumption; it suffices that it knows the existence of its essence, and the knowledge that it is a principle is an addition to its knowledge of its essence, since being a principle is a relation to the essence and it is possible that it should know its essence and not this relation, and if this being-a-principle were not a relation, its essence would be manifold and it would have existence and be a principle, and this forms a duality. And just as a man can know his essence without knowing that he is an effect, for his being an effect is a relation to his cause, so the fact that the First is a cause is a relation between itself and its object. This consequence is implied in the mere statement of the philosophers that it knows that it is a principle, since this comprises the knowledge of its essence and of its being a principle, and this is a relation, and the relation is not the essence, and the knowledge of the relation is not the knowledge of the essence and we have already given the proof of this, namely that we can imagine knowledge of the essence, without the knowledge of its being a principle, but knowledge of the essence without the knowledge of the essence cannot be imagined, since the essence is an identical unity.
I say:
The
proposition which the philosophers defend against Ghazali
in this question is based on philosophical principles which must be discussed
first. For if the principles they have assumed and the deductions to which,
according to them, their demonstration leads, are conceded, none of the
consequences which Ghazali holds against them
follows. The philosophers hold, namely, that the incorporeal existent is in its
essence nothing but knowledge, for they believe that the forms’ have no
knowledge for the sole reason that they are in matter; but if a thing does not
exist in matter, it is known to be knowing, and this is known because they
found that when forms which are in matter are abstracted in the soul from
matter they become knowledge and intellect, for intellect is nothing but the
forms abstracted from matter, z and if this is true for things which by the
principle of their nature are not abstracted, then it is still more appropriate
for things which by the principle of their nature are abstracted to be
knowledge and intellect. And since what is intelligible in things is their
innermost reality, and since intellect is nothing but the perception of the
intelligibles, our own intellect is the intelligible by itself, in so far as it
is an intelligible, and so there is no difference between the intellect and the
intelligible, except in so far as the intelligibles are intelligibles of things
in the nature of which there is no intellect and which only become intellect
because the intellect abstracts their forms from their matters, and through
this our intellect is not the intelligible in every respect. But if there is a
thing which does not exist in matter, then to conceive it by intellect is
identical with its intelligible in every respect, and this is the case with the
intellectual conception of the intelligibles. And no doubt the intellect is
nothing but the perception of the order and arrangement of existing things, but
it is necessary for the separate intellect that it should not depend on the
existing things in its intellectual conception of the existing things and of
their order, and that its intelligible should not be posterior to them, for
every other intellect is such that it follows the order which exists in the
existents and perfects itself through it, and necessarily falls short in its
intellectual conception of the things, and our intellect, therefore, cannot
adequately fulfil the demands of the natures of existing things in respect of
their order and arrangement. But if the natures of existing things follow the
law of the intellect and our intellect is inadequate to perceive the natures of
existent things, there must necessarily exist a knowledge of the arrangement
and order which is the cause of the arrangement, order and wisdom which exist
in every single being, and it is necessary that this intellect should be the
harmony which is the cause of the harmony which exists in the existents, and
that it should be impossible to ascribe to its perception knowledge of
universals, let alone knowledge of individuals, ‘ because universals are
intelligibles which are consequent on and posterior to existents, z whereas on
the contrary the existents are consequent on this intellect. And this intellect
necessarily conceives existents by conceiving the harmony and order which exist
in the existents through its essence, not by conceiving anything outside its
essence, for in that case it would be the effect, not the cause, of the
existent it conceives, and it would be inadequate.
And
if you have understood this philosophical theory, you will have understood that
the knowledge of things through a universal knowledge is inadequate, for it
knows them in potency, and that the separate intellect only conceives its own
essence, and that by conceiving its own essence it conceives all existents,
since its intellect is nothing but the harmony and order which exist in all
beings, and this order and harmony is received by the active powers which
possess order and harmony and exist in all beings and are called natures by the
philosophers. For it seems that in every being there are acts which follow the
arrangement and order of the intellect, and this cannot happen by accident, nor
can it happen through an intellect which resembles our intellect; no, this can
only occur through an intellect more exalted than all beings, and this
intellect is neither a universal nor an individual. And if you have understood
this philosophical theory, all the difficulties which Ghazali
raises here against the philosophers are solved; but if you assume that yonder
intellect resembles our own, the difficulties mentioned follow. For the
intellect which is in us is numerable and possesses plurality, but this is not
the case with yonder intellect, for it is free from the plurality which belongs
to our intelligibles and one cannot imagine a difference in it between the
perceiver and the perceived, whereas to the intellect which is in us the
perception of a thing is different from the perception that it is a principle
of a thing, and likewise its perception of another is different in a certain
way from the perception of itself. Still, our intellect has a resemblance to
yonder intellect, and it is yonder intellect which gives our intellect this
resemblance, for the intelligibles which are in yonder intellect are free from
the imperfections which are in our intellect: for instance, our intellect only
becomes the intelligible in so far as it is an intelligible, because there exists
an intellect which is the intelligible in every respect. The reason for this is
that everything which possesses an imperfect attribute possesses this attribute
necessarily through a being which possesses it in a perfect way. For instance,
that which possesses an insufficient warmth possesses this through a thing
which possesses a perfect warmth, and likewise that which possesses an
insufficient life or an imperfect intellect possesses this through a thing
which possesses a perfect life or a perfect intellect. ‘ And in the same way a
thing which possesses a perfect rational act receives this act from a perfect
intellect, and if the acts of all beings, although they do not possess
intellects, are perfect rational acts, then there exists an intellect through
which the acts of all beings become rational acts.
It
is weak thinkers who, not having understood this, ask whether the First
Principle thinks its own essence or if it thinks something outside its essence.
But to assume that it thinks something outside its essence would imply that it
is perfected by another thing, and to assume that it does not think something
outside its essence would imply that it is ignorant of existents. One can only
wonder at these people who remove from the attributes which are common to the
Creator and the created, all the imperfections which they possess in the
created, and who still make our intellect like His intellect, whereas nothing
is more truly free from all imperfection than His intellect. This suffices for
the present chapter, but now let us relate the other arguments of Ghazali in this chapter and call attention to the
mistakes in them.
Ghazali
says:
The second way to answer this assertion is to say that their expression that everything is known to it in second intention is without sense, for as soon as its knowledge comprehends a thing different from itself, in the way it comprehends its own essence, this First Principle will have two different objects of knowledge and it will know them both, for the plurality and the difference of the object known imply a plurality in the knowledge, since each of the two objects known receives in the imagination the discrimination which distinguishes it from the other. And therefore the knowledge of the one cannot be identical with the knowledge of the other, for in that case it would be impossible to suppose the existence of the one without the other, and indeed there could not be an other at all, since they would both form an identical whole, and using for it the expression `second intention’ does not make any difference. Further, I should be pleased to know how he who says that not even the weight of an atom, either in heaven or earth, escapes God’s knowledge, ‘ intends to deny the plurality, unless by saying that God knows the universe in a universal way. However, the universals which form the objects of His knowledge would be infinite, and still His knowledge which is attached to them would remain one in every respect, notwithstanding their plurality and their differentiation.
I say:
The
summary of this is found in two questions. The first is, `How can its knowledge
of its own self be identical with its knowledge of another?’ The answer to this
has already been given, namely that there is something analogous in the human
mind which has led us to believe in the necessity of its being in the First
Intellect.
The
second question is whether its knowledge is multiplied through the plurality of
its objects known and whether it comprehends all finite and infinite knowables
in a way which makes it possible that its knowledge should comprehend the
infinite. The answer to this question is that it is not impossible that there
should exist in the First Knowledge, notwithstanding its unity, a distinction
between the objects known, and it is not impossible, according to the
philosophers, that it should know a thing, different from itself, and its own
essence, through a knowledge which differs in such a way that there should
exist a plurality of knowledge. The only thing which is absolutely impossible
according to them is that the First Intellect should be perfected through the
intelligible and caused by it, and if the First Intellect thought things
different from itself in the way we do, it would be an effect of the existent
known, not its cause, and it has been definitely proved that it is the cause of
the existent. The plurality which the philosophers deny does not consist in its
knowing through its own essence, but in its knowing through a knowledge which
is additional to its essence; the denial, however, of this plurality in God
does not imply the denial of a plurality of things known, except through
dialectics, and Ghazali’s transference of the
problem of the plurality which is in the knowledge, according to the
philosophers, to the problem of plurality which is in the things known
themselves, is an act of sophistry, because it supposes that the philosophers
deny the plurality which is in the knowledge through the things known, in the
way they deny the plurality which arises through the duality of substratum and
inherent.
But
the truth in this question is that there is not a plurality of things known in
the Eternal Knowledge like their numerical plurality in human knowledge. For
the numerical plurality of things known in human knowledge arises from two
sources: first the representations, and this resembles spatial plurality;’
secondly the plurality of what is known in our intellect, namely the plurality
which occurs in the first genus-which we may call being-through its
division into all the species which are subsumed under it, for our intellect is
one; with respect to the universal genus which comprises all species existing
in the world, whereas it becomes manifold through the plurality of the species.
And it is clear that when we withhold the idea of the universal from the
Eternal Knowledge, this plurality is in fact abandoned and there only remains
in the Divine a plurality the perception of which is denied to our intellect,
for otherwise our knowledge would be identical with this eternal knowledge, and
this is impossible. And therefore what the philosophers say is true, that for
the human understanding there is a limit, where it comes to a stand, and beyond
which it cannot trespass, and this is our inability to understand the nature of
this knowledge. And again, our intellect is knowledge of the existents in
potency, not knowledge in act, and knowledge in potency is less perfect than
knowledge in act; and the more our knowledge is universal, the more it comes
under the heading of potential knowledge and the more its knowledge becomes
imperfect . But it is not true of the Eternal Knowledge that it is imperfect in
any way, and in it there is no knowledge in potency, for knowledge in potency
is knowledge in matter. Therefore the philosophers believe that the First
Knowledge requires that there should be a knowledge in act and that there
should be in the divine world no universal at all and no plurality which arises
out of potency, like the plurality of the species which results from the genus.
And for this reason alone we are unable to perceive the actually infinite, that
the things known to us are separated from each other, and if there exists a
knowledge in which the things known are unified, then with respect to it the
finite and the infinite are equivalent.
The
philosophers assert that there are definite proofs for all these statements,
and if we understand by `plurality in knowledge’ only this plurality and this
plurality is denied of the Divine, then the knowledge of God is a unity in act,
but the nature of this unity and the representation of its reality are
impossible for the human understanding, for if man could perceive the unity,
his intellect would be identical with the intellect of the Creator, and this is
impossible. And since knowledge of the individual is for us knowledge in act,
we know that God’s knowledge is more like knowledge of the individual than
knowledge of the universal, although it is neither the one nor the other. And
he who has understood this understands the Divine Words: `Nor shall there
escape from it the weight of an atom, either in the heavens or in the earth’,
and other similar verses which refer to this idea.
Ghazali
says:
Avicenna, however, has put himself in opposition to all the other philosophers who, in order not to commit themselves to the consequence of plurality, took the view that the First only knows itself; how, then, can he share with them the denial of plurality’ Still he distinguished himself from them by admitting its knowledge of other things, since he was ashamed to say that God is absolutely ignorant of this world and the next and knows only His own self-whereas all others know Him, and know also their own selves and other things, and are therefore superior to Him in knowledge-and he abandoned that blasphemous philosophical theory, refusing to accept it. Still he was not ashamed of persisting in the denial of this plurality in every respect, and he affirmed that God’s knowledge of Himself and of other things, yes, of the totality of things, is identical with His essence without this implying any contradiction, and this is the very contradiction which the other philosophers were ashamed to accept, because of its obviousness. And thus no party among the philosophers could rid itself of a blasphemous doctrine, and it is in this manner that God acts towards the man who strays from His path and who believes that he has the power through his speculation and imagination to fathom the innermost nature of the Divine.
I say:
The
answer to all this is clear from what we have said already, namely that the
philosophers only deny that the First Principle knows other things than its own
self in so far as these other things are of an inferior existence, so that the
effect should not become a cause, nor the superior existence the inferior; for
knowledge is identical with the thing known. They do not, however, deny it, in
so far as it knows these other things by a knowledge, superior in being to the
knowledge by which we know other things; on the contrary, it is necessary that
it should know them in this way, because it is in this way that the other
things proceed from the First Agent. As to the inquiry about the possibility of
a plurality of things known in the Eternal Knowledge, that is a second
question, and we have mentioned it, and it is not because of this that the
philosophers sought refuge in the theory that the First knows only its own
self, as Ghazali wrongly supposes; no, only
because in short-as we have dcclared already-its knowledge should
not be like our knowledge which differs from it in the extreme. And Avicenna
wanted only to combine these two statements, that it knows only its own essence
and that it knows other things by a knowledge superior to man’s knowledge of
them, since this knowledge constitutes its essence, and this is clear from
Avicenna’s words that it knows its own self and other things besides itself,
and indeed all things which constitute its essence, although Avicenna does not
explain this, as we have done. And, therefore, these words of his are not a
real contradiction, nor are the other philosophers ashamed of them; no, this is
a statement about which, explicitly or implicitly, they all agree. And if you
have grasped this well, you will have understood Ghazali’s
bad faith in his attack on the philosophers, although he agrees with them in
the greater part of their opinions.
Ghazali
says, on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said that if it is asserted that the First knows its own self as a principle by way of relation, the knowledge of two correlatives is one and the same, for the man who knows the son knows him through one single knowledge in which the knowledge of the father, of fatherhood, and sonhood are comprised, so that the objects of knowledge are manifold, but the knowledge is one. ‘ And in the same way the First knows its essence as a principle for the other things besides itself and so the knowledge is one, although what is known is manifold. Further, if the First thinks this relation in reference to one single effect and its own relation towards it, and this does not imply a plurality, then a plurality is not implied by an addition of things which generically do not imply a plurality. ‘ And likewise he who knows a thing and knows his knowing this thing, knows this thing through this knowledge, and therefore all knowledge is self-knowledge connected with the knowledge of the thing known, ‘ and the known is manifold, but knowledge forms a unity. ; An indication of this is also that you theologians believe that the things known to God are infinite, but His knowledge is one, and you do not attribute to God an infinite number of cognitions; if, indeed, the manifoldness of the known implied a plurality in the knowledge itself, well, let there then be an infinite number of cognitions in the essence of God. But this is absurd.
Then Ghazali says, answering the philosophers:
We say: Whenever knowledge is one in every respect, it cannot be imagined that it should be attached to two things known; on the contrary, this determines a certain plurality, according to the assumption and tenet of the philosophers themselves about the meaning of ‘plurality’, so that they even make the excessive claim that if the First had a quiddity to which existence were attributed, this would imply a plurality. And they do not think that to a single unity possessing reality existence also can be attributed; no, they assert that the existence is brought in relation to the reality and differs from it and determines a plurality, and on this assumption it is not possible that knowledge should attach itself to two objects of knowledge without this implying a greater and more important kind of plurality than that which is intended in the assumption of an existence, brought in relation to a quiddity. And as to the knowledge of a son and similarly of other relative concepts, there is in it a plurality, since there must necessarily be knowledge of the son himself and the father himself, and this is a dual knowledge, and there must be a third knowledge, and this is the relation; indeed, this third knowledge is implied in the dual knowledge which precedes it, as they are its necessary condition, for as long as the terms of relation are not known previously, the relation itself cannot be known, and there is thus a plurality of knowledge of which one part is conditioned through another. Likewise when the First knows itself as related to the other genera and species by being their principle, it needs the knowledge of its own essence and of the single genera and it must further know that there exists between itself and those genera and species the relation of being a principle, for otherwise the existence of this relation could not be supposed to be known to it. And as to their statement that he who knows something knows that he is knowing through this knowledge itself, so that the thing known can be manifold, but the knowledge remains one, this is not true; on the contrary, he knows that he knows through another knowledge, and this ends in a knowledge to which he does not pay attention and of which he is no longer conscious, and we do not say that there is an infinite regress, but there is a final term of knowledge attached to the thing known, and he is unconscious of the existence of the knowledge, but not of the existence of the known, like a man who knows the colour black and whose soul at the moment of his knowing it is plunged in the object of his knowledge, the colour black, and who is unconscious of his knowing this colour black and whose attention is not centred on it, for if it were, he would need another knowledge till his attention came to a stand. ‘ And as to the affirmation of the philosophers that this can be turned against the theologians concerning the things known by God, for they are infinite, whereas God’s knowledge according to the theologians is one, we answer, `We have not plunged ourselves into this book to set right, but to destroy and to refute, and for this reason we have called this book “The Incoherence of the Philosophers”, not “The Establishment of the Truth”, and this argument against us is not conclusive. ‘
And if the philosophers say: `We do not draw this conclusion against you theologians in so far as you hold the doctrine of a definite sect but in so far as this problem is applied to the totality of mankind, and the difficulty for all human understanding is the same, and you have no right to claim it against us in particular, for it can be turned against you also, and there is no way out of it for any party’-we answer: `No, but our aim is to make you desist from your claim to possess knowledge of the essential realities through strict proofs, and to make you doubt. And when your impotence becomes evident, we say that there are men who hold that the divine realities cannot be attained through rational inquiry, for it is not in human power to apprehend them and it was for this reason that Muhammad, the Lord of the Law, said “Ponder over God’s creation, but do not ponder over God’s essence”. Why then do you oppose this group of men who believe in the truth of the prophet through the proof of his miracles, ‘ who confine the judgement of the intellect to a belief in God, the Sender of the Prophets, who guard themselves against any rational speculation about the attributes, who follow the Lord of the Law in his revelations about God’s attributes, who accept his authority for the use of the terms “the knowing” “the wifer”, “the powerful”, “the living”, who refuse to acknowledge those meanings which are forbidden and who recognize our impotence to reach the Divine Intellect? You only refute these men in so far as they are ignorant of the methods of demonstration and of the arrangement of premisses according to the figures of the syllogisms, and you claim that you know these things by rational methods; but now your impotence, the breakdown of your methods, the shamelessness of your claim to knowledge, have come to light, and this is the intention of our criticism. And where is the man who would dare to claim that theological proofs have the strictness of geometrical proofs?’;
I say:
All
this prolix talk has only a rhetorical and dialectical value. And the arguments
which he gives in favour of the philosophers about the doctrine of the unity of
God’s knowledge are two, the conclusion of which is that in our concepts there
are conditions which do not through their plurality bring plurality into the
concepts themselves, just as there appear in the existents conditions which do
not bring plurality into their essences, for instance that a thing should be
one and exist and be necessary or possible. And all this, if it is true, is a
proof of a unique knowledge comprising a multitude, indeed an infinite number,
of sciences.
The
first argument which he uses in this section refers to those mental processes
which occur to the concept in the soul and which resemble the conditions in the
existents with respect to the relations and negations, which exist in them; for
it appears from the nature of the relation which occurs in the concepts that it
is a condition through which no plurality arises in the concepts, ‘ and it is
now argued that the relation which presents itself in the related things
belongs to this class of conditions. Ghazali
objects to this that the relation and the terms of the relation form a
plurality of knowledge, and that for instance our knowledge of fatherhood is
different from our knowledge of the father and the son. Now the truth is that
the relation is an attribute additional to the terms of the relation outside
the soul in the existents, but as to the relation which exists in the concepts,
it is better suited to be a condition than an attribute additional to the terms
of the relation;’ however, all this is a comparison of man’s knowledge with the
Eternal Knowledge, and this is the very cause of the mistake. Everyone who concerns
himself with doubt about the Eternal Knowledge and tries to solve it by what
occurs in human knowledge does indeed transfer the knowledge from the empirical
to the Divine concerning two existents which differ in an extreme degree, not
cxistents which participate in their species or genus, but which are totally
unlike.
The
second proof is that we know a thing through a single knowledge and that we
know that we know by a knowledge which is a condition in the first knowledge,
not an attribute additional to it, and the proof of this is that otherwise
there would arise an infinite series. Now Ghazali’s
answer, that this knowledge is a second knowledge and that there is no infinite
series here, is devoid of sense, for it is self-evident that this implies
such a series, and it does not follow from the fact that when a man knows a
thing but is not conscious that he knows the fact that he knows, that in the
case when lie knows that he knows, this second knowledge is an additional
knowledge to the first; no, the second knowledge is one of the conditions of
the first knowledge and its infinite regress is therefore not impossible; if,
however, it were a knowledge existing by itself and additional to the first
knowledge, an infinite series could not occur. ‘
As
to the conclusion which the philosophers force upon the theologians, that all
the theologians recognize that God’s knowledge is infinite and that at the same
time it is one, this is an negumentum ad
hominem, not an objective argument based on the facts themselves. And from
this there is no escape for the theologians, unless they assume that the
knowledge of the Creator differs in this respect from the knowledge of the
creature, and indeed there is no one more ignorant than the man who believes
that the knowledge of God differs only quantitatively from the knowledge of the
creature, that is that He only possesses more knowledge. All these are
dialectical arguments, but one may be convinced of the fact that God’s
knowledge is one and that it is not an effect of the things known; no, it is
their cause, and a thing that has numerous causes is indeed manifold itself,
whereas a thing that has numerous effects need not be manifold in the way that
the effects form a plurality. And there is no doubt that the plurality which
exists in the knowledge of the creature must be denied of God’s knowledge, just
as any change through the change of the objects known must be denied of Him,
and the theologians assume this by one of their fundamental principles. ‘ But
the arguments which have been given here are all dialectical arguments.
And
as to his statement that his aim here is not to reach knowledge of the truth
but only to refute the theories of the philosophers and to reveal the inanity
of their claims, this is not worthy of him-but rather of very bad men.
And how could it be otherwise? For the greater part of the subtlety this man
acquired-and he surpassed ordinary people through the subtlety he put in
the books he composed-he only acquired from the books of the philosophers
and from their teaching. And even supposing they erred in something, he ought
not to have denied their merit in speculative thought and in those ideas
through which they trained our understanding. Nay more, if they had only
invented logic, he and anyone else who understands the importance of this
science ought to thank them for it, and he himself was conscious of the value
of logic and urged its study and wrote treatises about it, and he says that
there is no other way to learn the truth than through this science, and he had
even such an exaggerated view of logic that he extracted it from the book of
God, the holy Qur’an. ‘ And is it allowed to one who is indebted to their books
and to their teaching to such an extent that he excelled his contemporaries and
that his fame in Islam became immense, is it really allowed to such a man to
speak in this way of them, and to censure them so openly, so absolutely, and
condemn their sciences? And suppose they erred in certain theological
questions, we can only argue against their mistakes by the rules they have
taught us in the logical sciences, and we are convinced that they will not
blame us when we show them a mistake which might be found in their opinions.
And indeed their aim was only the acquisition of truth, and if their only merit
consisted in this, it would suffice for their praise, although nobody has said
anything about theological problems that can be absolutely relied upon and
nobody is guaranteed against mistakes but those whom God protects in a divine,
superhuman way, namely the prophets, and I do not know what led this man to
this attack against such statements; may God protect me against failings in
word and in deed and forgive me if I fail!
And
what he says of the belief held by those who follow the Divine Law in these
things is in agreement with what is said by the renowned philosophers, for when
it is said that God’s knowledge and attributes cannot be described by, or
compared to, the attributes of the creature, so that it cannot even be asserted
that they are essence or an addition to the essence, this expresses the thought
of genuine philosophers and other true thinkers, and God is the Saviour, the
Leader.
Ghazali
says:
It may be said, `This difficulty applies only to Avicenna in so far as he says that the First knows other things, but the acknowledged philosophers are in agreement that it does not know anything besides itself, and this difficulty is therefore set aside. ‘
But we answer, `What a terrible blasphemy is this doctrine! Verily, had it not had this extreme weakness, later philosophers would not have scorned it, but we shall draw attention to its reprehensible character, for this theory rates God’s effects higher than Himself, since angel and man and every rational being knows himself and his principle and knows also of other beings, but the First knows only its own self and is therefore inferior to individual men, not to speak of the angels; indeed, the animals besides their awareness of themselves know other things, and without doubt knowledge is something noble and the lack of it is an imperfection. And what becomes of their statement that God, because He is the most perfect splendour and the utmost beauty, is the lover and the beloved? But what beauty can there be in mere existence which has no quiddity, no essence, which i observes neither what occurs in the world nor what is a consequence or proceeds from its own essence? And what deficiency in God’s whole world could be greater? And an intelligent man may well marvel at a group of men who according to their statement speculate deeply about the intelligibles, but whose inquiry culminates in a Lord of Lords and Cause of causes who does not possess any knowledge about anything that happens in the world. What difference is there then between Him and the dead, except that He has self-consciousness? And what perfection is there in His self-knowledge, if He is ignorant of everything else? And the blasphemy of this doctrine releases us from the use of many words and explanations.
Further, there may be said to them: `Although you plunge yourselves in these shameful doctrines, you cannot free yourselves from plurality, for we ask: “Is the knowledge He has of His essence identical with His essence or not?” If you say, “No”, you introduce plurality, and if you say they are identical, what then is the difference between you and a man who said that a man’s knowledge of his essence was identical with his essence, which is pure foolishness? For the existence of this man’s essence can be conceived, while he gives no attention to his essence, ‘ whereas when afterwards his attention returns, he becomes aware of his essence. Therefore his awareness of his essence differs from his essence. ‘
If it is argued: `Certainly a man can be without knowledge of his essence, but when this knowledge occurs to him, he becomes a different being’, we answer: ‘Non-identity cannot be understood through an accident and conjunction, for the identical thing cannot through an accident become another thing and that other thing, conjoined with this, does not become identical with it, but keeps its individual otherness. And the fact that God is eternally self-conscious does not prove that His knowledge of His essence is identical with His essence, for His essence can be imagined separately and the occurrence of His awareness afterwards, and if they were identical this could not be imagined.
And if it be said: `His essence is intellect and knowledge, and He has not an essence in which afterwards knowledge exists’, we answer: `The foolishness of this is evident, for knowledge is an attribute and an accident which demands a subject, and to say, “He is in His essence intellect and knowledge” is like saying, “He is power and will, and power and will exist by themselves”, and this again is like saying of black and white, quantity, fourness and threeness and all other accidents that they exist by themselves. And in exactly the same way as it is impossible that the attributes of bodies should exist by themselves without a body which itself is different from the attributes, it is known to be impossible that attributes like the knowledge, life, power, and will of living beings should exist by themselves, for they exist only in an essence. For life exists in an essence which receives life through it, and the same is the case with the other attributes. And therefore they do not simply content themselves with denying to the First all qualities (and not merely its real essence and quiddity); no, they deny to it also its very existence by itself’ and reduce it to the entities of accidents and attributes which have no existence by themselves; and besides we shall show later in a special chapter their incapacity to prove that it is conscious either of itself or of other things. ‘
I say:
The
problem concerning the knowledge of the Creator of Himself and of other things
is one of those questions which it is forbidden to discuss in a dialectical
way, let alone put them down in a book, for the understanding of the masses
does not suffice to understand such subtleties, and when one embarks on such
problems with them the meaning of divinity becomes void for them and therefore
it is forbidden to them to occupy themselves with this knowledge, since it
suffices for their blessedness to understand what is within their grasp. The
Holy Law, the first intention of which is the instruction of the masses, z does
not confine itself to the explanation of these things in the Creator by making
them understood through their existence in human beings, for instance by the
Divine Words: `Why dost thou worship what can neither hear nor see nor avail
thee aught?’, ‘ but enforces the real understanding of these entities in the
Creator by comparing them even to the human limbs, for instance in the Divine
Words: `Or have they not seen that we have created for them of what our hands
have made for them, cattle and they are owners thereof?’ and the Divine Words,
`I have created with my two hands’. s This problem indeed is reserved for the
men versed in profound knowledge to whom God has permitted the sight of the
true realities, and therefore it must not be mentioned in any books except
those that are composed according to a strictly rational pattern, that is, such
books as must be read in a rational order and after the acquisition of other
sciences the study of which according to a demonstrative method is too
difficult for most men, even for those w_ o possess by nature a sound
understanding, although such men are very scarce. But to discuss these
questions with the masses is like bringing poisons to the bodies of many
animals, for which they are real poisons. Poisons, however, are relative, and
what is poison for one animal is nourishment for another. The same applies to
ideas in relation to men; that is, there are ideas which are poison for one
type of men, but which are nourishment for another type. And the man who
regards all ideas as fit for all types of men is like one who gives all things
as nourishment for all people; the man, however, who forbids free inquiry to
the mature is like one who regards all nourishment as poison for everyone. But
this is not correct, for there are things which are poison for one type of man
and nourishment for another type. ‘ And the man who brings poison to him for
whom it is really poison merits punishment, although it may be nourishment for
another, and similarly the man who forbids poison to a man for whom it is
really nourishment so that this man may die without it, he too must be
punished. And it is in this way that the question must be understood. But when
the wicked and ignorant transgress and bring poison to the man for whom it is
really poison, as if it were nourishment, then there is need of a physician who
through his science will exert himself to heal that man, and for this reason we
have allowed ourselves to discuss this problem in such a book as this, and in
any other case we should not regard this as permissible to us; on the contrary,
it would be one of the greatest crimes, or a deed of the greatest wickedness on
earth, and the punishment of the wicked is a fact well known in the Holy Law.
And since it is impossible to
avoid the discussion of this problem, let us treat it in such a way as is
possible in this place for those who do not possess the preparation and mental
training needed before entering upon speculation about it.
So
we say that the philosophers, when they observed all perceptible things, found
that they fell into two classes, the one a class perceptible by the senses,
namely the individual bodies existing by themselves and the individual accidents
in these bodies, and the other a class perceptible by the mind, namely, the
quiddities and natures of these substances and accidents. And they found that
in these bodies there are quiddities which exist essentially in them, and I
understand by the `quiddities’ of bodies attributes existing in them, through
which these bodies become existent in act and specified by the act which
proceeds from them; and according to the philosophers these quiddities differ
from the accidental attributes, because they found that the accidents were
additions to the individual substance which exists by itself and that these
accidents were in need of the substances for their existence, whereas the
substances do not need the accidents for their own existence. And they found also
that those attributes which were not accidents were not additional to the
essence, but that they were the genuine essence of the individual which exists
by itself, so that if one imagined these attributes annulled, the essence
itself would be annulled. Now, they discovered these qualities in individual
bodies through the acts which characterize each of them; for instance they
perceived the attributes through which plants by their particular action become
plants’ and the attributes through which animals by their particular actions
become animals, and in the same way they found in the minerals forms of this
kind which are proper to them, through the particular actions of minerals.
Then, when they had investigated these attributes, they learned that they were
in a substratum of this essence and this substratum became differentiated for
them, because of the changing of the individual existents from one species into
another species and from one genus into another genus through the change and
alteration of these attributes; for instance the change of the nature of fire
into air by the cessation of the attribute from which the actuality of fire,
through which fire is called fire, proceeds, and its change into the attribute
from which the actuality peculiar to air, through which air is called air,
proceeds. They also proved the existence of this substratum through the
capacity of the individual essence to receive an actuality from another, just
as they proved by the actuality the existence of form, for it could not be
imagined that action and passivity proceed from one and the same natures They
believed therefore that all active and passive bodies are composed of two
natures, one active and the other passive, and they called the active nature
form, quiddity, and substance, and the passive part subject, ultimate basis of
existenceb and matter. And from this it became clear to them that the
perceptible bodies are not simple bodies as they appear to be to the senses,
nor compounded of simple bodies, since they are compounded of action and
passivity; and they found that what the senses perceive are these individual
bodies, which are compounded of these two things which they called form and
matter and that what the mind perceives of these bodies are these forms which
only become concepts and intellect when the intellect abstracts them from the
things existing by themselves, i. e. what the philosophers call substratum and
matter. ? And they found that the accidents also are divided in the intellect
in a way similar to those two natures, s although their substratum in which
they exist in reality is the bodies compounded of these two natures. And when
they had distinguished the intelligibles from the sensibles and it had become
clear to them that in sensible things there are two natures, potency and act,
they inquired which of these two natures was prior to the other and found that
the act was prior to the potency, because the agent was prior to its object, ‘
and they investigated also causes and effects, which led them to a primary
cause which by its act is the first cause of all causes, and it followed that
this cause is pure act and that in it there is no potency at all, since if
there were potency in it, it would be in part an effect, in part a cause, and
could not be a primary cause. And since in everything composed of attribute and
subject there is potency and act, it was a necessary implication for them that
the First could not be composed of attribute and subject, and since everything
free from matter was according to them intellect, it was necessary for them
that the First should be intellect.
This
in summary is the method of the philosophers, and if you are one of those whose
mind is sufficiently trained to receive the sciences, and you are steadfast and
have leisure, it is your duty to look into the books and the sciences of the
philosophers, so that you may discover in their works certain truths (or
perhaps the reverse) ; but if you lack one of these three qualities, it is your
duty to keep yourself to the words of the Divine Law, and you should not look
for these new conceptions in Islam; for if you do so, you will be neither a
rationalist nor a traditionalist. ‘
Such
was the philosophers’ reason for their belief that the essence which they found
to be the principle of the world was simple and that it was knowledge and
intellect. And finding that the order which reigns in the world and its parts
proceeds from a knowledge prior to it, they judged that this intellect and this
knowledge was the principle of the world, which gave the world existence and
made it intelligible. This is a theory very remote from the primitive ideas of
mankind and from common notions, so that it is not permitted to divulge it to
the masses or even to many people; indeed, the man who has proved its evidence
is forbidden to reveal it to the man who has no power to discover its truth,
for he would be like his murderer. And as to the term `substance’ which the
philosophers give to that which is separate from matter, the First has the
highest claim on the term `substance’, the terms `existent’, `knowing’,
`living’, and all the terms for the qualities it bestows on the existents and
especially those attributes which belong to perfection, for the philosophers
found that the proper definition of substance was what existed by itself and
the First was the cause of everything that existed by itself.
To
all the other reproofs which he levels against this doctrine no attention need
be paid, except in front of the masses and the ordinary man, to whom, however,
this discussion is forbidden.
And as to Ghazali’s words:
What beauty can there be in mere existence which has no quiddity, no essence, which observes neither what occurs in the world nor what is a consequence or proceeds from its own essence? . . .
-this
whole statement is worthless, for if the philosophers assume a quiddity free
from a substratum it is also void of attributes, and it cannot be a substratum
for attributes except by being itself in a substratum and being composed of the
nature of potency and the nature of act. The First possesses a quiddity that
exists absolutely, and all other existents receive their quiddity only from it,
and this First Principle is the existent which knows existents absolutely,
because existents become existent and intelligible only through the knowledge
this principle has of itself; for since this First Principle is the cause of
the existence and intelligibility of existents, of their existence through its
quiddity and of their intelligibility through its knowledge, it is the cause of
the existence and intelligibility of their quiddities. The philosophers only
denied that its knowledge of existents could take place in the same way as
human knowledge which is their effect, whereas for God’s knowledge the reverse
is the case. For they had established this superhuman knowledge by proof.
According to the Ash’arites, however, God possesses neither quiddity nor
essence at all but the existence of an entity neither possessing nor being a
quiddity cannot be understood, ‘ although some Ash’arites believed that God has
a special quiddity by which He differs from all other existents, ‘ and
according to the Sufis it is this quiddity which is meant by the highest name
of God.
And as to Ghazali’s words:
Further, there may be said to them: `Although you plunge yourself in these shameful doctrines, you cannot free yourselves from plurality, for we ask: “Is the knowledge He has of His essence identical with His essence or not?” If you say, “No”, you introduce plurality, and if you say, “they are identical”, what then is the difference between you and a man who said that a man’s knowledge of his essence was identical with his essence?’
I say:
This
is an extremely weak statement, and a man who speaks like this deserves best to
be put to shame and dishonoured. For the consequence he draws amounts to saying
that the perfect one, who is free from the attributes of becoming and change
and imperfection, might have the attribute of a being possessing imperfection
and change. For a man indeed it is necessary, in so far as he is composed of a
substratum and knowledge, which exists in this substratum, that his knowledge
should differ from his essence in such a way as has been described before,
since the substratum is the cause of change in the knowledge and the essence.
And since man is man and the most noble of all sentient beings only through the
intellect which is conjoined to his essence, but not by being essentially
intellect, it is necessary that that which is intellect by its essence should
be the most noble of all existents and that it should be free from the
imperfections which exist in the human intellect. ‘
And as to Ghazali’s words:
And if it be said: His essence is intellect and knowledge and He has not an essence in which afterwards knowledge exists, we answer: `The foolishness of this is evident, for knowledge is an attribute and an accident which demands a subject, and to say “He is in His essence intellect and knowledge” is like saying “He is power and will, and power and will exist by themselves”, and this again is like saying of black and white, fourness and threeness, and all other accidents that they exist by themselves. ‘
I say:
The
error and confusion in his statement is very evident, for it has been proved
that there is among attributes one that has a greater claim to the term
`substantiality’ than the substance existing by itself, and this is the
attribute through which the substance existing by itself becomes existing by
itself. For it has been proved that the substratum for this attribute is
something neither existing by itself nor existing in actuality; no, its
existing by itself and its actual existence derive from this attribute, and
this attribute in its existence is like that which receives the accidents,
although certain of these attributes, as is evident from their nature, need a
substratum in the changeable things, since it is the fundamental law of the
accidents, that they exist in something else, whereas the fundamental law of
the quiddities is that they exist by themselves, except when, in the sublunary
world, these quiddities need a substratum through being in transitory i things.
But this attribute is at the greatest distance from the nature of an accident,
and to compare this transcendent knowledge to sublunary accidents is extremely
foolish, indeed more foolish than to consider the soul an accident like
threeness and fourness.
And this suffices to show the incoherence and the foolishness of this whole argument, and let us rather call this book simply `The Incoherence’, not `The Incoherence of the Philosophers’. And what is further from the nature of an accident than the nature of knowledge, and especially the knowledge of the First? And since it is at the greatest distance from the nature of an accident, it is at the greatest distance from having a necessity for a substratum.